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1EDITORIAL
Democracy at crossroaDs: 
a Focus on central europe 
the aim of this special issue of czechoslovak psychology is to commemorate the con-
ference „What’s next for Democratic capitalism? social and systemic problems of 
central european Democracies” held in Warsaw in november 2014. the conference 
was organized by the Institute of psychology of the polish academy of sciences and 
the psychology committee of the polish academy of sciences. It brought together 
approximately 100 participants from 13 european countries: Bulgaria, croatia, czech 
republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, latvia, poland, romania, switzerland, 
uK, and ukraine. this number included not only psychologists, but also sociologists, 
political scientists, and economists. 
the ultimate goal of the conference was to sum up and discuss the past 25 years of 
system transformation processes in europe. this international project also aimed to 
identify common problems and barriers to the development of democracy and mar-
ket economies in europe, and to explain the causes of regional differences on both 
psychological and systemic levels. the oral papers were grouped into six thematic 
sessions: 1) social problems of democratization; 2) national identities and national-
isms; 3) market economy and market failure; 4) mentality and attitudes toward de-
mocracy and capitalism; 5) social and political attitudes, lifestyles, and well-being; 
and 6) social and political problems of contemporary capitalism. 
this special issue of czechoslovak psychology is not meant to be a standard volume 
of conference proceedings, but rather a collection of invited papers inspired by the main 
conference theme. We believe that these twelve submissions offer a unique – multina-
tional and interdisciplinary – perspective on current social and political transformations 






2DEMOCRACY THROUGH IDEOLOGY AND BEYOND:
THE VALUES THAT ARE COMMON TO THE RIGHT 
AND THE LEFT
GIan VIttorIo caprara, mIcHele VeccHIone
Sapienza University of Rome
aBstract
Previous findings have shown that individual 
differences in basic values (e.g., universalism, 
power) and core political values (e.g., equality, 
free enterprise) account for substantial variation 
in political preferences. the present study goes 
beyond earlier studies that focus exclusively 
on values differences among voters of opposite 
ideologies. It addresses what is common across 
voters in basic values and core political values, 
taking into account their order importance across 
15 countries from 4 continents, including polities 
whose pathways to democracy have been quite 
different. self-direction among basic values and 
equality and civil liberties among political values 
ranked highest in most countries, independently 
of voters ideological orientation. this accords 
with the ideals of democracy as the political sys-
tem that aims to grant all citizens equal respect 
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Issue
Ideologies usually refer to different world views carrying competing interpretations and 
prescriptions about how life should be lived and society should be governed. In political 
science, ideologies have been viewed mostly as configurations of ideas and attitudes 
whose elements are bound together by some forms of constraint or functional interde-
pendence (converse, 1964). In political psychology, they have been viewed mostly as 
cognitive devices to structure political knowledge that are convenient for both politi-
cians and voters to match political offer and political preferences (Jost et al., 2009). 
most of research has focused on beliefs and priorities, their degree of coherence, and 
the extent to which they constrain political behavior. In reality, when shared by groups 
of individuals, political ideologies do not serve only as heuristic devices to orient in po-
litical matters, but also provide a sense of belonging that is crucial to distinguish the us 
and the others, the in-groups and the out-groups, the allies and the adversaries. 
likely the function of political ideology extends much beyond the mere organiza-
tion of political knowledge as ideological identification satisfies citizens’ needs for 
social inclusion and self-realization, concurring significantly to define their personal 
and social identity. thus it may occur that different platforms can be traced to the 
same ideology across different polities as contingent opportunities and constraints 
make salient different issues and priorities.
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3among established democracies political opinions have been traced to a unique 
ideological dimension opposing left and right and liberal and conservative, being 
dominant the former in us and uK, and the latter in continental europe and most 
other democracies. In reality, this mostly concern western democracies that derive 
from common traditions of political thought, that find their premises in the European 
enlightment and that lead to view democratic institutions as the ones that grant citi-
zens either the liberty to voice their opinions and the equality of respect and treatment 
before the law.
since the time of French revolution, the ideals of liberty, equality and solidarity stayed at the 
core political changes that opposed authority, hierarchy and obedience and that spread democracy 
over the world. since then change vs. conservation has been the major cleavage of ideological divi-
sions between the left and liberal leaning towards change and the right and conservative towards 
conservation. 
Yet, distinctions between right and left largely diversified over time and across countries in con-
comitance with the different trajectories to democracy of various polities and with the need to accord 
the pursuit of original ideals to the pressures, the constraints and the opportunities of contingent 
political orders. Different combinations of ideals and programs have made difficult to identify the 
distinctive features of platforms that often converge on common policies while it proved impossible 
to trace the heterogeneity of meanings associated to left and right to one single attitude dimension 
(Feldman, Johnston, 2014).
Nevertheless, empirical findings attest to the role that traditional ideologies still play in mak-
ing sense of political discourse and offer as citizens show an intuitive understanding of traditional 
ideological cleavages despite the different meanings that may be assigned to the same poles across 
countries and within countries across times. Indeed, left/right and liberal conservative self place-
ment continues to represent the best predictor of voting through which citizens of western estab-
lished democracies give voice to their personal leanings and aspirations and orient themselves in the 
complex world of politics. 
thus ideological divisions have survived the dilution of their original distinctiveness. all mod-
ern democracies have become more free and egalitarian as the rights to voice one’s opinions and to 
claim equal respect and treatment before the law have been extended to all citizens. likewise, few 
would contend the need to grant all citizens the right to achieve decent conditions of life by having 
access to basic health services, education, and work opportunities. as the pressure of contingen-
cies has pushed right/conservative and left/liberal into pragmatic convergences the heterogeneity 
of meanings resulted to be an asset other than a limitation of ideology to the extent that it allowed 
ideology to serve as an effective device with which citizens may combine believing and belonging 
and navigate through politics.
likely left and right, as liberal and conservative, should be viewed as social constructions 
whose validity should be assessed in accordance to ecological other than psychometric criteria. 
their value, in fact, derive from the function they exert with regard to both to believing and be-
longing. on the one hand, political ideology may serve as a compass to orient citizens into the 
political world. on the other hand, it may serve as signature that attest to ones’ personality and 
social status. In this regard the common tendency to divide the social world between us and them, 
has been further reinforced by political systems in which citizens have to choose between coali-
tions in government and at the opposition and by the media that constantly remind and redefine 
what is distinctive of left and right and what and of conservative and liberal.
 this, however, does imply that what has been repeatedly found in support of traditional ideo-
logical cleavages in established democracies may necessarily occur in polities whose trajectories to 
democracy have been quite different. one may doubt that left and right make much sense in recent 
democracies that rest upon world views and ideals about human rights, citizens, virtues and govern-
ment of society than are quite different from the ones that have been at the core of western political 
thought. likewise, one may doubt that left and right may serve as a device to organize political 
knowledge, to match political preferences with political offer, to create consensus among partisans, 
to form coalitions and to be effective in opposition, in the same ways even among countries that 
share similar ideals world views and cultural heritages but whose itineraries to democracy have been 
different. 
4We believe that left/right and liberal/conservative ideology may still serve democracy to the 
extent that they allow citizens to voice and share their preferences, to assess alternative political 
offer and to exert control over the performance of their representatives. to capture the content 
of and the meaning of left/right and liberal conservative ideology in different polities and across 
different times, however, requires to address the interrelated set of needs and beliefs that stay at 
the core of citizens ideological self placement. In this regard notable progress has been made in 
recent years.
In the past ideological identification and self placement was mostly a matter of belonging and 
social ascription, as citizens’ social milieu, their education, their work, their income and religion 
accounted for most of their political preferences. today, instead, ideological self placement it is 
primarily a matter of free choice largely driven by pattern of interrelated values and beliefs about 
how society should be governed in the pursuit of common good. the more citizens are able to ap-
propriate the political discourse, the more they bring their individuality to the fore, thus reversing 
the traditional ‘top down’ path of influence from political elites to voters.
ultimately it is citizens’ unique organization of affect, cognitions and habits that, taken together, 
can make sense of their experiences and choices also in the realm of politics. Indeed, findings have 
shown that political preferences can be traced to an interrelated set of beliefs that are grounded in 
people traits and values (caprara, Zimbardo, 2004). Whereas personality traits have proved to ac-
count for political preferences more than traditional socio-economical variables, like income and 
education, basic values have proved to mediate entirely the influence of basic traits on political pre-
ference (caprara, Vecchione, schwartz, 2009). likewise, individual differences in the importance 
assigned to basic values and more specific political values accounted for most of ideological orienta-
tion across diverse polities, with political values largely mediating the influence of basic values on 
voting (schwartz, caprara, Vecchione, 2010).
The distinctive values of the left and the right
The validation of a theory that identifies a comprehensive set of basic personal va-
lues and the near universal structure of relations among them has been among major 
achievement of recent years in social psychology (schwartz, 1992, 2006). this theory 
posits 10 basic values that from universal requirements of human condition: power, 
achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradi-
tion, conformity and security. 
these values can be traced to two opposite clusters of values: openness to change 
values include self direction and stimulation and oppose conservation values, that 
include conformity, tradition and security. self transcendence values include univer-
salism and benevolence and oppose self enhancement values, that include power and 
achievement.
Previous studies have shown that basic values account for a significant portion of variance of 
political preferences across polities as voters accord their preferences to parties or coalitions whose 
leaders and policies they perceive as likely to promote or protect their own personal values. Further-
more, it has been shown that there is a consistency across countries in connecting conservative pref-
erences to conservation and self-enhancement values, and in connecting left and liberal preferences 
to self-transcendence and openness to change values. at the same time, it has become clear that the 
influence that basic personal values may exert on political choices may significantly vary across 
contexts, depending on historical and cultural contingencies and priorities, on the different political 
offer, and on the different rhetoric of political parties and leaders. Differently from what observed in 
longer established democracies, for example, the effect of basic values on political orientation was 
found to be weak or null in post-communist countries like the czech republic, Hungary, poland, and 
slovenia (piurko, schwartz, Davidov, 2011).
Basic personal values are abstract beliefs that transcend specific situations and that may take differ-
ent expressions in diverse and concrete circumstances and across different contexts. likely they corre-
spond to general principles and standards of judgment that do not determine behavior directly, but may 
operate through the mediation of beliefs and values that are more proximal to the various contexts of 
life. as political discourse typically revolves around issues related to government and society organiza-
tion, specific political values may operate as mediators between basic values and political choices. 
5Converse (1964) viewed political values as “a sort of glue to bind together many more specific 
attitudes and beliefs” (p. 211). Feldman (1988) pointed to political values as principles that un-
derlie specific attitudes, preferences, and evaluations about the sphere of politics, thereby giving 
them some degree of coherence and consistency. 
In general political values have concerned the priorities that government should assign to poli-
cies and resources’ allocations, in the pursuit of a just society, and individual differences in political 
values have been extensively used to account for variations in policy preferences, voting behavior, 
and ideological identification. 
Earlier findings (Schwartz, Caprara, Vecchione, 2010) have shown that basic va-lues account for 
a substantial portion of variance in a set of values that stay at the core of current political debates 
of most countries, like law and order, traditional mora-lity, equality, free enterprise, civil liberties, 
blind patriotism, and acceptance of immigrants. Valuing equality, civil liberties, and accepting im-
migrants led to accord with policies with policies that emphasizes solidarity, tolerance of diversity, 
equality, and social justice. Valuing free enterprise, traditional morality, military intervention, blind 
patriotism, and law and order, by contrast, led to voting for the right. this accords with policies that 
encourage a free market economy with minimal government intervention, favor law and order over 
free expression and diversity, emphasize traditional family values, build on nationalism, and favor 
demonstration of military might. as expected, the causal link between basic values and voting was 
indirect and fully mediated by core political values. 
In a subsequent study (schwartz et al., 2014), similar patterns of correlations between core po-
litical values and basic values were found to be remarkably similar across several non-communist 
countries (Brazil, Finland, chile, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, spain, uK and us). a system-
atic association between basic values and core political values also emerged in the post-communist 
countries (poland, slovakia, and ukraine), although with not negligible exceptions and variations 
with respect to that seen for the non-communist countries. to give some examples, correlations of 
military intervention with conservation values were positive in non-communist countries, but near 
to zero in post-communist societies. correlations between equality and conservation values were 
negative in the non-communist countries, and positive in the post-communist countries. on the con-
trary, correlations of free enterprise with conservation values were positive in the non-communist 
countries, and negative in the post-communist countries.
In reality, the exceptions we found in the pattern of correlations between basic va- 
lues and political values parallel notable exceptions in the pattern of correlations found 
between basic values and ideological self-placement and voting. Indeed, the positive 
correlation of self-enhancement values with right and conservative voting in post-
communist countries like poland, slovakia, and ukraine, contrasts with the negative 
or nil correlations found in post-communist countries (research report, unpublished). 
Aim of the present contribution
the focus on individual differences let completely unexplored what left and liberal 
could have in common with right and conservative. In reality, the study of ideological 
similarities in the domain of values in no less important than the study of ideological 
diversities to better understand the status of democracy. the similarities, in fact, can 
tell us more than the diversities about the common principles upon which democracy 
can function and progress.
the aim of the present contribution is to examine the commonalities in basic values 
and core political values between left/liberal and right/conservative voters. to achieve 
this goal, we relied upon the data from 15 different countries. 
metHoD
Participants and procedures
this study involves secondary analysis of data taken from a cross-national project on 
the role of values in shaping political preferences (caprara et al., 2015; schwartz et 
al., 2014; Vecchione et al., 2015). The project involved fifteen countries: Australia, 
6Brazil, chile, Germany (east and West), Greece, Finland, Israel, Italy, poland, slo-
vakia, spain, turkey, ukraine, united Kingdom, and united states. a representative 
national sample was obtained in australia and Germany. In the other countries, re-
searchers enlisted university students to gather the data among members of the adult 
population. the same instructions were used for administering the instruments in 
all countries. Questionnaires were administered online in australia and Finland and 
by telephone in Germany. In the other countries, written self-reports were obtained. 
table 1 presents the characteristics of the samples.
Measures
Ideology. Ideology was measured in each country through two distinct indicators. 
The first was a self-placement item on the left-right scale: “In political matters, peo-
ple sometimes talk about and “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your 
views on this scale, generally speaking?” alternatives were ranged from 1 (left) to 
9 (right), without intermediate labels. participants who scored from 1 to 4 on the 
left-right scale were classified as left-wing voters. Participants who scores from 6 to 
9 were classified as right-wing voters. 
the second indicator was a self-placement item on the liberal-conservative scale: 
“In political matters, people sometimes talk about conservatives and liberals. How 
would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” alternatives ranged 
from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal). participants who scored 
from 1 to 3 on the liberal-conservative scale were classified as liberal voters; partici-
pants who scored from 5 to 7 were classified as conservative voters. 
Values. the portrait Values Questionnaire (pVQ, schwartz, 2005, 2006) measured 
basic values. the pVQ includes 40 short verbal portraits of different people matched 
to the respondents’ gender, each describing a person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes 
Table 1 Description of the samples
country n % Female mean age (sD) 





australia 285 54% 36.1 (13.9) 16.6 (3.6) 3
Brazil 995 56% 34.1 (9.0) 19.1 (4.1) 2
chile 415 50% 43.3 (13.4) 15.8 (4.2) 3
Finland 428 68% 40.1 (13.2) 16.2 (4.3) 4
Germany 1066 46% 53.7 (16.4) 14.6 (4.4) 4
Greece 374 48% 41.9 (12.0) 15.3 (3.5) 3
Israel 478 57% 38.6 (12.7) 15.6 (3.0) 4
Italy 557 56% 38.7 (13.9) 15.3 (3.7) 4
poland 699 56% 36.6 (13.0) 15.1 (3.0) 4
slovakia 485 51% 47.7 (14.6) 14.4 (3.3) 5
turkey 512 46% 37.7 (13.2) 11.4 (3.3) 5
ukraine 735 48% 41.1 (12.6) 14.0 (3.3) 4
united Kingdom 469 64% 36.7 (12.1) 14.2 (2.9) 2
united states 543 56% 32.6 (14.4) 14.0 (2.2) 4
Notes. a Include compulsory years of schooling; b Income was measured with the following scale: 
1=very much above the average of your country, 2=above the average, 3=a little above average, 
4=about average, 5=a little below the average, 6=below the average, 7=very much below the 
average.
7that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For example, “It is very important 
to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being” describes 
a person who holds benevolence values important. three to six items measure each 
value. For each portrait, respondents indicate how similar the person is to themselves 
on a six-point scale, ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much like me.” We 
infer respondents’ own values from the implicit values of the people they consider 
similar to themselves. studies in seven countries supported the reliability of the pVQ 
for measuring the 10 values (schwartz, 2005). psychometric properties of the pVQ in 
the present samples were reported in a previous study by Vecchione et al. (2015; see 
also schwartz et al., 2014).
Core political values 
We measured eight core political values by adopting the scale developed by schwartz 
et al. (2014; see also schwartz, caprara & Vecchione, 2010). In Israel, accepting im-
migrants and military intervention were not included. as schwartz et al. (2014) wrote, 
immigration items have a different meaning in Israel than elsewhere, given an official 
policy and public discourse that encourages Jewish immigration from around the world. 
moreover, the constant state of military threat in Israel and the frequent engagement 
in wars give a different meaning to the military intervention items. Differently from 
schwartz et al. (2014), economic security was included as an additional political value. 
this concerns the importance assigned to job and income guarantees by all citizens.
each political value was measured from two to three items. examples of items 
(with the corresponding value in parentheses) are: “our society should do whatever is 
necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed” (equality), 
“there should be more incentives for individual initiative even if this reduces equality 
in the distribution of wealth” (free enterprise), “It is extremely important to defend 
our traditional religious and moral values” (traditional morality)”, “the police should 
have more powers so they can protect us better against crime” (law and order), “It is 
unpatriotic to criticize this country” (blind patriotism), “the right to individual free-
dom is inviolable and has to be maintained at all cost” (civil liberties), “people who 
come to live here from other countries generally make this country a better place to 
live” (accepting immigration), and “Going to war is sometimes the only solution to in-
ternational problems” (military intervention), “the biggest threat to our country is the 
collapse of our economy” (economic security). responses ranged from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Details on the psychometric properties of the scale 
were presented in schwartz et al. (2014). 
results
Commonality across countries in basic personal values of rival voters
as a preliminary analysis, the mean importance ratings of the ten values was ave-
raged across the 15 samples (N = 8,041), without distinguishing between left/liberal 
and right/conservative voters. We found that universalism, self-direction, and be-
nevolence were rated as most important, followed by security, conformity, hedonism, 
and achievement. stimulation, tradition, and power were rated as least important. 
the spearman rank correlation between this pattern and the pan-cultural normative 
baseline (i.e., the value hierarchy found among school teachers in 56 nations, see 
schwartz, Bardi, 2001), was .92 (p < .001). this suggests that the order of impor-
tance of the 10 values observed in the present sample is highly similar to the one 
commonly observed around the world.
8Table 2 mean ratings and corresponding ranks for the ten basic values among left (or liberal) and 
right (or conservative) voters
    left (or liberal) voters right (or conservative) voters
mean rank mean rank
security 4.31 4 4.39 4
conformity 4.04 6 4.13 5
tradition 3.55 9 3.63 8
Benevolence 4.61 2 4.56 1
universalism 4.67 1 4.46 3
self-direction 4.55 3 4.51 2
stimulation 3.73 7 3.62 9
Hedonism 4.09 5 3.94 6
achievement 3.70 8 3.74 7
power 3.05 10 3.11 10
Table 3 the two basic values with highest mean scores in each country by left (or liberal) 
and right (or conservative) voters
left (or liberal) voters right (or conservative) voters
australia 1. self-direction (4.77)2. universalism (4.53)
1. self-direction (4.86)
2. security (4.51)
Brazil 1. self-direction (5.12)2. universalism (4.99)
1. self-direction (4.99)
2. Benevolence (4.84)
chile 1. universalism (5.17)2. Benevolence (5.04)
1. Benevolence (5.08)
2. universalism (5.00)
Finland 1. universalism (5.06)2. self-direction (4.72)
1. universalism (4.77)
2. self-direction (4.72)
Germany – east 1. self-direction (5.17)2. universalism (5.12)
1. self-direction (5.07)
2. security (5.04)
Germany – West 1. self-direction (5.14)2. universalism (5.12)
1. self-direction (5.06)
2. Benevolence (5.05)
Greece 1. universalism (4.97)2. self-direction (4.76)
1. self-direction (4.78)
2. security (4.66)
Israel 1. self-direction (4.84)2. Benevolence (4.79)
1. self-direction (4.82)
2. Benevolence (4.71)
Italy 1. universalism (4.94)2. self-direction (4.78)
1. self-direction (4.64)
2. security (4.60)
poland 1. self-direction (4.38)2. Benevolence (4.32)
1. Benevolence (4.48)
2. self-direction (4.45)
slovakia 1. Benevolence (4.55)2. security (4.50)
1. Benevolence (4.55)
2. universalism (4.49)
spain 1. universalism (5.08)2. self-direction (4.92)
1. Benevolence (4.81)
2. universalism (4.70)
turkey 1. universalism (5.26)2. security (5.18)
1. security (5.20)
2. universalism (5.18)
ukraine 1. self-direction (4.13)2. universalism (4.13)
1. self-direction (4.26)
2. universalism (4.23)
u.K. 1. self-direction (4.75)2. universalism (4.69)
1. self-direction (4.42)
2. Benevolence (4.38)
u.s. 1. self-direction (4.69)2. Benevolence (4.57)
1. Benevolence (4.70)
2. self-direction (4.68)
Note. mean ratings are in parenthesis
9to investigate whether a similar pattern is replicated among voters with diffe- 
rent ideological orientations, the value hierarchy was examined among leftist/liberals, 
and rightist/conservatives voters, considered as separate groups. table 2 reports the 
mean importance ratings, and the respective ranks, of each value. We found that right 
and conservative voters rated benevolence most important, self-direction second, and 
universalism third. left and liberal voters rated universalism most important, benevo-
lence second, and self-direction third. 
As can be observed from Table 2, the mean ratings of the first three values were 
rather close in both groups. the spearman rank correlation for the order of importance 
of the 10 values observed in the two groups was .91 (p < .001). these results indicate 
that the order of importance of basic values was similar across voters with different 
ideological orientations.
table 3 reports the pair of values with the highest scores of importance among left/lib-
eral and right/conservative voters. In most countries self-direction is among the two val-
ues that scored highest in importance for both left/liberal and right/conservative voters. 
In australia, Brazil, Germany (east and West), Israel, ukraine, and the uK, self-
direction values are the most important, regardless of voters’ political orientation. 
left-wing voters in poland and the us and right-wing voters in Greece and Italy also 
rated self-direction most important.
universalism and benevolence are values more frequently distinctive of the left, but are 
also found among those rated as most important for the right in several countries. Specifi-
cally, universalism was the value type rated most important among both left- and right-
wing voters in Finland, and among left-wing voters in chile, Greece, Italy, and spain.
Benevolence was the value type rated most important among both left- and right-wing 
voters in slovakia, and among right-wing voters in chile, poland, spain, and the u.s. 
Security was ranked first among voters of the right in Turkey, and second among 
right voters in australia, Greece and Italy. In turkey it was rated second among the 
left voters. 
the other values (i.e., conformity, tradition, hedonism, stimulation, achievement, 
and power) were never rated among the two most important values in all countries. 
In most countries (Italy, slovakia, turkey, ukraine, uK, Finland, chile, Greece, 
us, spain, Germany), power was the least important value for both left/liberal and 
right/conservative voters. power appeared at the bottom of the value hierarchy also 
among left-wing voters in australia, and among right-wing voters in poland and Bra-
zil. In few cases, tradition was rated as the least important values. this happened 
among both left- and right-wing voters in Israel, among right-wing voters in australia, 
and among left-wing voters in poland and Brazil. 
Commonalities across countries in core political values of rival voters 
As we did for basic values, we first calculated the mean ratings of each core political 
value by combining the data across countries and voters. results showed that equa- 
lity, civic liberties, and accepting immigrants were the political values with the high-
est mean score, followed by economic security, traditional morality, and law and or-
der. the lowest scores were obtained by free enterprise, blind patriotism, and military 
intervention. 
table 4 shows the mean ratings of the nine core political values among left/liberal 
and right/conservative voters, combined across countries. In both groups, the two 
highest scores were attributed to equality and civil liberties, respectively. the third 
highest score was attributed to accepting immigrants by left/liberal voters, and to 
traditional morality by right/conservative voters. spearman rank correlation for the 
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nine political values observed in the two groups was .93 (p<.001), suggesting that 
left/liberal and right/conservative voters exhibited a remarkably degree of similarity 
in their political value ratings.
the two political values to which left-wing (or liberal) and right-wing (or conserv-
ative) individuals assigned the highest score in each country are shown in table 5. We 
found that in 8 countries equality and civil liberties form the pair of political values 
with the highest scores, among both left-liberal and right-conservative voters. 
For both groups of voters, equality is the most important value in Brazil, chile, 
Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, poland, slovakia, spain, and turkey. civil liberties, 
instead, is the most important value in Finland and ukraine for all voters. 
In australia, accepting immigrants and equality are the most important values for all 
voters. In uK and the us, equality and civil liberties obtained the highest score only 
among liberal voters. Specifically, equality was rated as most important by UK liberal 
voters, whereas civil liberties was rated as most important by us liberal voters. con-
servative voters of both countries, by contrast, scored highest in traditional morality. 
In most countries, the least important political values for both left/liberal and right/
conservative voters were military intervention (chile, Greece, Italy, poland, turkey, 
ukraine, slovakia, turkey) and blind patriotism (australia, Brazil, Germany, Fin-
land, uK). 
DIscussIon
Findings from earlier studies attest to the current validity of left (or liberal) and right 
(or conservative) ideologies to orient citizens into the political world, and to predict 
their political preferences. Indeed, ideology still plays an important function in creat-
ing consensus, in sustaining collective action around the order of priorities, and in 
binding the action of politicians to the realization of their promises. this despite the 
pressure of contingencies that push left and right to converge into pragmatic govern-
mental coalitions, and to dilute their traditional distinctiveness. 
Also earlier findings have shown that left (or liberal) and right (or conservative) 
choices are associated to significant individual differences in voters’ values. Basic 
values have proved to account for significant portions of variations in ideological self 
placement and voting across polities that differ widely in their pathways to the estab-
lishment of democracy.
Table 4 mean ratings and corresponding ranks for the nine core political values among 
left (or liberal) and right (or conservative) voters
     left (or liberal) voters right (or conservative) voters
mean rank mean rank
traditional morality 3.07 5 3.51 3
economic security 3.30 4 3.35 4
law and order 2.70 6 3.04 6
Free enterprise 2.52 7 2.88 7
equality 3.96 1 3.71 1
Blind patriotism 2.33 8 2.62 8
civic liberties 3.75 2 3.60 2
military Intervention 2.29 9 2.61 9
accepting Immigrants 3.44 3 3.18 5
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These findings lend support to a model that posits basic values at the basis of ideolog-
ical orientation, that turns into political choices through the mediation of political val-
ues. Whereas basic values correspond to the principles that guide people in life, political 
values correspond to the forms that those principles take contingently in response to the 
constraints and opportunities of situations. likely self-enhancement and conservation 
values predispose to endorse political values and platforms that prioritize security, tradi-
tion, order, and power, which accord with concerns of right and conservative ideolo-
gies. self-transcendence and openness to change values, instead, predisposes to endorse 
political values and platforms that prioritize solidarity and tolerance of diversity, which 
mostly accord with the ideals of left and liberal ideologies.
This, however, does not exclude that the pattern of relations may significantly vary 
across countries with different political histories, in particular when comparing established 
democracies with post-communist democracies communist countries. rather, one should 
Table 5 the two political values with highest mean scores in each country by leftist/liberals 
and rightist/conservatives voters
leftist/liberals participants rightist/conservative participants
australia 1. accept immigrants (3.93)2. equality (3.83)
1. accept immigrants (3.85)
2. equality (3.47)
Brazil 1. equality (4.26)2. civil liberties (3.89)
1. equality (3.79)
2. civil liberties (3.74)
chile 1. equality (4.33)2. civil liberties (3.57)
1. equality (3.97)
2. traditional morality (3.78)
Finland 1. civil liberties (4.07)2. equality (3.79)
1. civil liberties (3.98)
2. equality (3.26)
e/Germany 1. equality (4.16)2. accept immigrants (3.88)
1. equality (3.84)
2. traditional morality (3.54)
W/Germany 1. equality (3.98)2. accept immigrants (3.94)
1. equality (3.60)
2. traditional morality (3.51)
Greece 1. equality (4.36)2. civil liberties (3.90)
1. equality (4.07)
2. traditional morality (3.71)
Israel 1. equality (3.83)2. civil liberties (3.38)
1. equality (4.02)
2. civil liberties (3.74)
Italy 1. equality (4.18)2. civil liberties (4.05)
1. equality (3.88)
2. civil liberties (3.73)
poland 1. equality (3.71)2. civil liberties (3.62)
1. equality (3.64)
2. civil liberties (3.52)
slovakia 1. equality (3.69)2. civil liberties (3.58)
1. equality (3.66)
2. civil liberties (3.63)
spain 1. equality (4.06)2. civil liberties (3.50)
1. equality (3.63) 
2. traditional morality (3.55)
turkey 1. equality (4.33)2. civil liberties (4.10)
1. equality (4.20)
2. traditional morality (4.10)
ukraine 1. civil liberties (3.83)2. equality (3.75)
1. civil liberties (3.85)
2. equality (3.77)
u.K. 1. equality (3.91)2. accept immigration (3.72)
1. traditional morality (3.71)
2. civil liberties (3.41)
u.s. 1. civil liberties (3.77)2. equality (3.66)
1. traditional morality (3.79)
2. civil liberties (3.62)
Note. mean ratings are in parenthesis.
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not underestimate the diversity of attitudes that can stay at the back of left and right ideo-
logical self-placement in countries that carry a different political legacy, have to manage 
different contingencies, and have to cope with different challenges. In this regard, the 
study of individual differences in personality can be particularly useful to understand how 
people think and behave in politics, and thus to better understand either the sources of divi-
sions and the opportunities of integration and union that at personal and collective levels 
should be mobilized in the pursuit of common ideals and achievements.
along this reasoning, a better understanding of what is distinctive in different world 
views, ideals and policies that claim to pursue the common good can be extremely 
fruitful. It may allow to reduce conflicts and to turn divisions into synergies, where 
diversities can complement each other. to this aim, however, to acknowledge and value 
commonalities is no less important than to highlight diversities. thus, the present study 
goes beyond earlier studies that have focused on what distinguishes right conservative 
and left liberal voters in the domain of basic and political values. Indeed, focusing on 
the rank-order in importance ratings (basic values) or agreement (political values) re-
ported by left/liberal and right/conservative voters, proved to add information beyond 
that which can be attained by comparing single values’ means and correlations.
among basic values, we found that left/liberal and right/conservative voters share 
a similar value hierarchy. self-direction, in particular, was the value ranked as most 
important by both groups in the majority of examined polities. This accord with find-
ings of Welzel and Inglehart (2005) that point to autonomy of thought and action 
as particularly congenial to Democracy and, as such, highly valued through all the 
ideological divide. 
self-transcendence values were also largely prioritized by voters across most coun-
tries, although with not negligible differences between right and left voters. left/li-
beral voters, in fact, tended to prioritize universalism, namely the value that is consist-
ent with an open view of communion and thereby the pursuit of all mankind’s welfare. 
right/conservative voters, instead, tended to prioritize benevolence, namely the value 
that is consistent with an inclusive view of communion and thereby to caring being 
focused primarily on the good of the family and people one knows and likes.
With regard to political values, equality and civil liberties were prioritized over 
the other values in the majority of examined polities across voters with different ori-
entation. this shows that right-conservative and left-liberal voters are not so distant 
from each other on the importance assigned to values that have been crucial for the 
advancement of democracy.
equality is the value under which the advancement of democracy is attested by the 
extension to all citizens of the rights for equal respect, equal opportunities to growth 
and carry a decent life and equal treatment on behalf of government. Whereas equality 
has been a major source of differences between left and right in the past, today few 
would argue against the need to grant all citizens adequate resources to protect their 
health and to cultivate their education as well as adequate labor conditions where to 
express and develop their talents.
civil liberties is the value under which nowadays the legacy of rights to freedom 
of thought accord with the change in habits and customs carried by modernity in the 
domain of ethics and individuals rights.
power, blind patriotism, and military intervention were the lowest ranked values by 
all electorate across polities further attesting to the decline of values that were promi-
nent in authoritarian regimes.
although caution is needed in interpreting results mostly derived from samples of 
convenience, it is remarkable to observe the substantial commonalities among voters 
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that traditionally have been portrayed as partisans of alternative views of social order 
and government. Basic values and political values that underlie traditional ideologies 
not only appeared less distant than in the past, but often converge. Viewing at the 
past, likely it has been the alternation between left and right that has moved the pen-
dulum of politics towards the appropriation of larger space of freedom and decisional 
power on behalf of citizens, and towards a major concern for political institutions to 
extend to all the rights to live a life that is worth of living. Viewing at the future, it is 
likely that the extension of democracy will further extend people demands for self-
determination in concomitance with their greater awareness of their rights to the full 
expression of their personalities 
In this regard it is desirable that future studies will further clarify the extent to which 
right/left and liberal/conservative ideologies will continue to serve as convenient de-
vices to orient citizens in politics. one can’t exclude that the common appropriation 
of values that stay at the core of democracy may further take advantage of competing 
ideologies to the extent that they may serve to nurture the democratic discussion and 
to activate virtuous circles in which the pursuit of shared values may benefit from the 
diversity of political platforms. 
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IntroDuctIon
one of the suggestions as to how to regulate relations between representatives of 
divergent social groups in a way that would maintain their equal status, mutual re-
spect, preserving authenticity and autonomy originates from the ideas of delibera-
tive democracy. This thread of thought has gained scientific interest in the last two 
decades, inspiring numerous theoretical analyses in the fields of political philosophy 
and theory (for example ackerman, Fishkin, 2004; Dryzek, 2000; mansbrigde, 2010; 
Regh, 2000). It has also initiated empirical research in the fields of political science 
(steiner et al., 2004), sociology (Fishkin, luskin, 2005; Gastil, Deess, Weiser, 2002), 
linguistics (Holzinger, 2004; landwehr, Holzinger, 2009) and psychology (mendel-
berg, 2002; Karpowitz, Mendelberg, 2007; Reykowski, 2006; Wesołowska, 2007; 
2010). the interest in the ideas of deliberative democracy stems from the fact that it 
offers meaningful advice on how to improve the functioning of contemporary demo-
cratic systems. this improvement can be accomplished through the dissemination of 
deliberative debates as procedures for decision making and conflict resolution at vari-
ous levels of social life.
 The purposes of the paper are following. First, to make a few clarification concern-
ing studies on deliberative debates. Second, to comment briefly on the current state of 
the research in the field emphasizing the contribution of Polish scholars. And finally, 
indicate how the idea of “education for deliberative democracy” emerged as a future 
prospect on the background of the previous work.
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aBstract
the main idea of deliberative democracy (origi-
nating in the writings of John rawls and Jür-
gen Habermas) is that citizens will consciously 
and effectively participate in a unique form of 
a group discussion (called the deliberative de-
bate). participation in a deliberation requires 
numerous sophisticated intellectual and social 
skills on the side of the citizen.
the purposes of the paper are following. 
First, to make a few clarifications concerning 
studies on deliberative debates. Second, briefly 
comment on the current state of the research in 
the field emphasizing the contribution of Polish 
scholars. particular attention is paid to attempts 
to measure the quality of group discussions. ty-
pology of different modes of working out group 
recommendations is presented. 
the argumentation presented throughout 
the paper leads to the conclusion that even ad-
vanced attempts to initiate deliberative debates 
in real life conditions rarely lead to truly deli- 
berative behaviours of disputants. thus, the idea 
of „deliberative education” seems to emerge as 






tHe IDea oF DelIBeratIVe DeBate
the idea of deliberative debate is rooted in the philosophical writings of John rawls 
(1971) and Jürgen Habermas (1984). Its most pragmatic formulation is depicted in the 
model developed by amy Gutmann and Denis thompson (1996). according to that 
model, the deliberative debate refers to the group process of searching for an agree-
ment through discussion in which individuals participate free of any external pres-
sures, following the principles of equal status and mutual respect. Distinctive of this 
form of communication is an open presentation of disputants’ positions concerning a 
discussed issue, accompanied by rational argumentation and justification. The dispu-
tants attempt to understand the essence of the discrepancy between their stances and 
try to find a commonly acceptable solution. The core idea of a deliberative debate is 
the mutual justification that participants should offer to support and explain their posi-
tions in the discussion. The justification should extend beyond narrow self-interest, 
take into account the public good and obey the so called reciprocity principle. “reci-
procity holds that citizens owe one another justifications for the mutually binding 
laws and public policies they collectively enact. the aim (…) is to help people seek 
political agreement on the basis of principles that can be justified to others who share 
the aim of reaching such an agreement” (Gutmann, thompson, 2002, p. 156).
‘What’s the innovation of deliberative democracy?’– one might ask. ‘Different 
variations of group discussions have been a part of decision making processes for 
ages’. examples of various group discussions are debates, oxford-style debates or 
impromptu debates. a debate takes place when two people (or teams) who have dif-
ferent opinions, come together to advocate and defend their positions. It is usually a 
competition (or a contest) between two sides: who can present better, more convinc-
ing argumentation for his own position and against the opposite position. sides do 
not propose any alternative solution nor come up with a compromise that both could 
accept. a debate is a contest that can be won by one side only. oxford-style debate is a 
very formal and competitive format in which a clearly formulated thesis is discussed. 
the discussion is led by a moderator. It starts with the presentation of the thesis. the 
proponents of the thesis sit on one side of the room and their opponents sit on the 
opposite side. the undecided audience sits in the middle. the disputants take turns 
in presenting their arguments. they can not ridicule, insult or offend the opponents. 
The final decision is made by voting. Impromptu (extempore, “off the cuff”) debate is 
relatively informal. the topic is given to the participants 20 minutes before the debate 
starts and the format is simple: representatives of each side speak for five minutes 
each, alternating sides (taking turns). then, 10 minutes is allowed for open cross-
examination of the issue and a five-minute break after that. Following the break, each 
team gives a four-minute rebuttal. 
the differences between deliberation and other forms of debates can be summa-
rized on the following dimensions. (1) a deliberation requires cooperation of both 
sides in working towards agreement while a debate is a competition. (2) the ques-
tions for a deliberation are formulated as open-ended problems (such as “what can be 
done in order to improve …?”), and the participants are asked to come up with such 
recommendations that they all can approve of. For a debate, a thesis with two alterna-
tive options is formulated in advance and the sides have to either defend it or prove 
it wrong. (3) In a deliberation, the precise rules of cross-examination of an issue are 
given. namely, the disputants should take on the main perspective of public good and 
common interest as their main frame of reference. While arguing, they should try to 
apply the reciprocity principle. reciprocity principle means that disputants try to use 
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argumentation that could be understandable and acceptable by their opponents. In a 
debate formal rules refer only to the procedure and not argumentation. (4) the dif-
ference is also in the expected final result. Deliberation aims at working out of a new 
quality or integration of divergent perspectives. the debate results in an informed 
choice of one alternative out of two predefined options.
advocates of deliberative democracy claim that deliberative debates have evident 
advantages over other types of group decision making, such as voting with a majority 
rule, bargaining or reaching a compromise; all of which result only in a partial sa-
tisfaction of the needs of the involved parties. The following benefits of deliberative 
debates are mentioned in the literature: shaping informed preferences of participants 
(Fishkin, rosell, 2004; sturgis, roberts, allum, 2005), moral accommodation (that 
is, acknowledgement of the moral value of stances or views opposed to one’s own), 
reaching a reasonable consensus, legitimacy of collective decisions (Knight, 1999), 
building knowledge and competence (Burkhalter, Gastil, Kelshaw, 2002), positive 
transformative effects on attitudes (sulkin, simon, 2001), fostering democratic values 
and attitudes (Dryzek, Braithwaite, 2000), and promoting democratic participation 
(Gastil, Deess, Weiser, 2002). moreover, a deliberative debate is recommended as a 
special remedy for severe problems that a democratic system faces, such as the peace-
ful coordination of society composed of social groups differing in worldviews, identi-
ties and interests (regh, 2000). 
the concept of deliberative democracy has its convinced supporters, as well as 
sceptics. the latter argue that a deliberative debate is a project impossible to put into 
practice because it requires the participants to have sophisticated sociocognitive com-
petencies. In order to truly participate in deliberative debates the disputants should 
critically reflect on their own beliefs and values, attempt to understand the perspective 
of other people, be able to make a rational analysis of a problem, consider alterna-
tives, have the ability as to attentive listening and clear self-expression, display a co-
operative approach, show mutual respect and treat each other as equals (reykowski, 
2006). 
all of the above enumerated are very demanding competencies. they are learned 
mainly during the formal education process and trained through the practical experi-
ence of constructive discussions. It leads to the question of deliberative debate fea-
sibility, namely is it possible to carry out in real life conditions a group discussion 
that would meat demanding standards of deliberative debate? this question instigated 
numerous empirical investigations.
“empIrIcal turn” In  tHe stuDIes  oF  DelIBeratIon
 the deliberative democracy ideal was conceived by its founding fathers as a theoreti-
cal model of how to reform democratic systems. early interest in the idea remained 
at the theoretical level of analysis. over time however it evolved form a “theoretical 
statement” into a “working theory” which assumptions were tested in both experimen-
tal and real-life settings. the major research questions asked were: (1) to what extend 
the ideal of deliberative debate is feasible in real life conditions? (2) What outcomes 
would deliberative debates produce (in terms of attitude changes, quality of final deci-
sion)? (3) How do institutional arrangements influence the course of deliberation?
I would like to stress that we have a polish contribution to the empirical study of 
deliberation which represents a variety of empirical approaches applied in this field 
of studies. In the chronological order we a had a quasi-experimental study on citi-
zen deliberation in the quasi-experimental project “psychological prerequisities and 
consequences of deliberative functioning in political groups” conducted by the team 
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of psychologists in Warsaw in the yeras 2004-2007 (Reykowski, 2006; Wesołowska 
2007, 2010). In 2009 we had the first deliberative poll in our country focused on the 
question: “What should be done with the National Stadium in Poznań after Euro Foot-
ball championship?” organized in cooperation with center of Deliberative Democ-
racy of stanford university (siu, przybylska, 2010). In 2012 the on-line deliberative 
poll took place in which Warsaw students were discussing the quality of university 
education organized by Center for Deliberation affiliated at Institute of Sociology of 
Warsaw university (cd.uw.edu.pl/sd/). the most recently, in 2014 a series of focus 
group interviews following a deliberative format were conducted. their topic was 
„parents’ expectations and concerns about education toward maturity in primary and 
secondary schools” (Institute for educational research, IBe). 
Let me elaborate more on the first of these initiatives because it aimed at answering 
the crucial for deliberative democracy questions: (1) Would it be possible to foster a 
deliberative debate in a group of citizens as described by theoretical models? (2) What 
other courses (if not the truly deliberative debate) can citizen discussions assume un-
der conditions meant to bring about deliberation? 
the research followed a quasi-experimental design. parents of school-aged chil-
dren discussed issues of sex education in state schools in small groups of 7 to 13 peo-
ple. parents volunteered to take part in a discussion and were assigned to discussion 
groups at their convenience. this resembles the natural arrangement of citizen discus-
sions – when participants decide whether they want to participate or not.
the experimental procedure attempted to implement the assumptions of the theo-
retical model of a deliberative debate. Group discussions were facilitated by a pro-
perly trained psychologist following a scenario prepared in advance. the facilitator 
introduced the group task, set the agenda for the discussion and introduced the group 
norms. participants were told to let each other speak freely, listen carefully to each 
other, treat each other with respect and avoid potentially insulting phrases. the facilita-
tor intervened in situations when any group norm was violated. to implement the per-
spective of the public good, participants were encouraged to analyze the controversial 
issue collectively and to work out a common set of recommendations regarding sexual 
education for state schools in poland. to stress the importance of the task, disputants 
were informed that recommendations would be presented to the ministry of educa-
tion. they were told that the aim of the discussion was “the collective comprehension 
of the problem and finding the fairest solution which would as far as possible consider 
divergent points of view”. the subjects were also asked to “try to understand in which 
respects their opinions differed and what they had in common.” the whole task was 
placed in an institutional framework of the polish academy of sciences suggesting 
neutrality, objectivity and a scientific approach. When group recommendations were 
made, the facilitator wrote them down.
sex education in public schools (embracing topics of contraceptives and abortion) 
is a controversial political issue in poland. opinions on such issues are an important 
part of political discourse and reflect the ideological cleavage of Polish society with 
conservative views represented by one side (mainly reflecting Catholic Church teach-
ing) and liberal-secular views by the other. attempts to change the legal regulations 
concerning abortion in Poland generated many social conflicts and manifestations. 
even members of parliament (whom we expect to be experienced in discussing con-
troversies) displayed difficulties in finding constructive agreements on the problem 
of abortion). Issues regarding public education should undergo deliberation because 
they affect many people and might generate moral and cultural conflicts that have no 
clear policy solutions.
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Issues concerning sex education were discussed in 20 groups with a total of 195 par-
ticipants (including 151 women). there were 18 persons with elementary or vocational 
education, 111 persons with high school education and 66 persons with university de-
grees. 152 of the participants were between 25 and 45 years old. each debate lasted for 
about an hour and a half, was video recorded and then transcribed. In total, there were 
almost 30 hours of recordings and over 1100 pages of transcription to analyze.
the conclusions of the above described research as well as of other investigations 
of “empirical turn” are following. Deliberative ideals when they are set as normative 
standards for discussion and it’s context have positive influence on real-life commu-
nications such as: observable quality of real discussions, positive subjective evalua-
tions of the course of the discussion by its participants (in terms of respect, hearing 
different opinions and being listened to) and working out some sort of group common 
stance. But the normative standards of deliberative debate don’t make miracles. strik-
ing deviations from the desirable mode of interaction still happen (despite attempts 
to set normative standards). attempts have been made to describe these alternative 
modes of interaction. they require tools (procedures) for analyzing the quality and 
features of group discussion processes. two such procedures will be presented and 
compared in the next section, namely Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by 
swiss- american of steenbergen, Bächtiger, spörndli and steiner (2003) and assess-
ment of Deliberative Process (ADP) developed by Wesołowska (2010).
assessments oF  DelIBeratIVe DeBates QualIty
In the most widely used instrument (DQI) deliberative quality is measured by inter-
preting if and in what intensity speech acts satisfy the conditions of Habermasian 
Discourse Ethics, mainly respect, justification and public good perspective. DQI is a 
methodological hybrid: the speech acts are evaluated by qualitative measures (judging 
if they fulfill deliberative criteria) and on the basis of that they are ascribed numerical 
codes. the codes can be summarized and averaged for the whole discussion to form 
an index, or indexes can be created for discussions of different issues, or for repre-
sentatives of different political parties. 
the author of this paper made another attempt to grasp the quality of deliberation 
by developing measurement that is called aDp (assessment of Deliberative process). 
the differences between the DQI and aDp are summarized in table 1. 
Table 1 summary of differences between Discourse Quality Index (DQI) and assessment 
of Deliberative process (aDp)
DImensIons DQI (steiner et al. 2004) aDp (Wesołowska 2010)
application parliamentary discussions citizen deliberation
theoretical framework Discourse ethics by Habermas model by Gutmann & thompson
unit 
of analysis
speech acts in the context of 
previous acts
speech acts in the context of 
previous acts
procedure l qualitative evaluationsl computing summary index
l qualitative evaluations
l search for similar profiles of 
interactions
Final outcome comparative measurements typology of group processes of working out an agreement
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as table 1 presents DQI and aDp can be compared on the following dimensions. 
DQI applies to analysis of parliamentary discussion (which are usually prepared in ad-
vance, contain elaborated argumentation) and for this reason it is based on theoretical 
formulation of discourse ethics by Habermas. aDp is meant to capture the quality of 
citizens discussion in real life conditions which are more spontaneous and reactive to 
previous speakers. For these reasons the deliberative debate model by amy Gutmann 
and Denis thompson was chosen as its theoretical framework. In both measurements 
the unit of analysis are speech acts in the context of previous acts. The final outcome 
of DQI application is a comparative measurement which allows for comparison of 
quality of discussions in various institutional settings (such as plenary parliament 
session versus commission working groups discussion). The final outcome of ADP 
application is a typology of group processes of working out group recommendation 
(based on observation of similar configurations of participants behaviours while solv-
ing different controversies).
aDp application to the data from the empirical project “psychological prerequisites 
and consequences of deliberative functioning in political groups” (described above) 
allowed for the classification of a vast majority of disputants observable behaviours 
(as fulfilling or violating the deliberative debate criteria). It led to the following con-
clusions on the feasibility of citizen deliberation and its quality. 
moments when group functioning was close to the deliberative debate ideal were 
very rare: only 8 cases out of 101 analyzed situations when a controversy was raised 
in a group forum. In the remaining majority of situations, groups employed different 
strategies of coping with differences of opinions and in most of them managed to 
work out a group agreement. 
These strategies involved various configurations of behaviors derived from the the-
oretical model. this leads to answering the second question as to what other courses a 
citizen discussion can take under those conditions meant to bring about deliberation. 
observations of similar patterns of interactions in numerous attempts to deal with 
opinion differences in various groups gave rise to the idea that there may be three 
main types of group strategies which were manifested in different forms:
(1) strategies of conflict avoidance (when a group attempts to go around an articu-
lated opinion difference without even trying to resolve it), 
(2) strategies of enforcing a solution (when one or both sides of a conflict try to pass 
their own point of view as the whole group’s recommendation),
(3) strategies of conflict resolution (which relies on the attempts of both sides of a 
conflict to work out together an agreement which would address both sides’ expecta-
tions).
In the analyzed material, two ways in which groups tried to avoid conflict were 
observed. The first could be called ‘suppressing the differences’ because it prevented 
the expressed difference of opinion to escalate into an open confrontation. suppres-
sion was accomplished through suggestions to finish the discussion, emphasizing time 
constraints, warning that a continuation of a discussion may result in a quarrel or 
indicating that the problem is unsolvable. In some instances the group minority was 
openly discouraged to elaborate on its stance. the group ceased the discussion of 
the controversial issue and moved on to another topic. substitutive topics comprised 
generally socially acceptable matters or trivial questions marginal to the main contro-
versy.
The second form of conflict avoidance was named ‘looking for similarities’. This 
refers to situations when a group looked for commonality or common ground which 
could serve as the basis for formulating some recommendations without actually 
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substantially analyzing the core of articulated differences. Quite often it was done 
through story telling. the disputants took turns in relating their personal experiences 
connected in some way with the discussed controversy. the main characters in the 
stories were the disputants themselves or members of their families. In addition to re-
counting the course of events, the narrator revealed personal emotions which accom-
panied it. a story told by one person triggered another story told by one of the listeners 
(recounting an event in some ways similar to the first story). Thus, a chain of stories 
developed in a group. Quite frequently it concluded with a statement of the common-
ality of experiences, concerns, needs or motives in the group. It sometimes resulted in 
noticing some common social category that all the disputants belonged to. 
In strategies of conflict avoidance most of the deliberative debate criteria enume-
rated in the ideal model were not met. participants obeyed the principle of respect 
towards others and their views; there were no instances of insulting behaviors. But 
this was certainly not the analytical, rational, argumentation-based approach to a con-
troversial issue. the core of the controversy was approached only on its surface. there 
were no justifications, no reason giving and sometimes not even elaborations of diffe- 
rent positions. The illustration of conflict avoidance strategy revealed with the appli-
cation of aDp is presented in the appendix (controversy nr 2).
the second type of group strategies that could be observed in our material was en-
forcing a solution. It assumed three forms: ‘persuasion’, ‘polemics’ and ‘fight’. 
‘persuasion’ refers to situations in which one side of a conflict was much more ac-
tive than the other and tried to force its own position to represent a whole group’s re-
commendation. this was done through presenting arguments to support a given point 
of view, its advantages and benefits of implementation. The persuaders also pointed to 
disadvantages and potential threats of implementing an alternative solution. they sup-
ported and elaborated upon each others’ statements. the rest of the group restrained 
itself to merely signaling a difference of opinions without presenting its details. this 
means that some (although biased) analysis of a controversial issue was presented in a 
group forum, but the criteria of reciprocity and cooperation were not met. 
In ‘polemics’ both sides tried to persuade each other to accept their own solution 
through communication and argumentation. Each side presented justifications of its 
own proposal, pointed to the advantages and benefits for its acceptance. Both sides 
asked each other questions and acquired an alternative point of view in detail. Dis-
putants indicated disadvantages, difficulties with the implementation and potentially 
harmful results of the implementation of the solutions different from their own. some-
times they applied a reciprocity principle in argumentation. thus different points of 
view underwent some analysis in a group forum, but the sides did not co-operate in 
finding a commonly accepted solution. The discussion relied on mutual attempts to 
convince opponents that “our” solution is better than theirs. the illustration of pole-
mics revealed with the application of aDp is presented in the appendix (controversy 
nr 1).
In some cases ‘polemics’ led to a reformulation of a discussed problem: a new per-
spective was presented or attention was called to other important aspects than the ones 
that had been discussed so far. It sometimes included an indication that the discussed 
controversy was only one aspect of a more sophisticated, multidimensional pheno-
menon or that more general dilemmas were the core of the controversy. 
the last form of enforcing solution, namely ‘fight’, describes a situation in which 
both sides openly communicated their stances and revealed their basic assumptions 
and worldviews. After finding a significant discrepancy between them, one side started 
questioning or diminishing the value and legitimacy of the opposite worldview. the 
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antagonistic side referred to opponents’ views as morally wrong, socially detrimental 
or too removed from real life. At least one side of the conflict used discriminating 
or insulting expressions referring to the other side. thus, the deliberative criteria of 
respect and equal status of alternative worldviews were violated. open communica-
tion in ‘fight’ resulted in different ways of understanding a controversial issue and 
different proposals of solving it being presented in the group forum. the illustration 
of fight strategy revealed with the application of ADP is presented in the Appendix 
(controversy nr 3).
The further course of ‘fight’ depended on the reaction of the attacked side. There 
were cases when the attacked side continued a discussion in a respectful manner, pre-
sented argumentation supporting its own stance or suggested organizational solutions 
which could potentially satisfy expectations of both sides. sometimes the attacked 
side called the normative context of a discussion (formulated in the aim and rules 
given by the facilitator) and demanded respectful treatment for itself. In a few situa-
tions the attack was reciprocated with a counterattack.
The strategy of conflict resolution in our material was displayed in two ways: ‘ne-
gotiation’ and ‘common consideration’. ‘negotiations’ were those situations when 
both sides tried to work out a commonly accepted recommendation through a mutual 
exchange of concessions. Both sides presented their points of view and learned their 
opponents’ opinions. after becoming acquainted with them, the participants attempted 
to argue while using the adversaries’ ideas (fulfilling the reciprocity principle). They 
searched for a compromise or an organizational solution which would not violate dif-
ferent worldviews and values. Different proposals of organizational solutions were 
presented and justified in a group forum and then underwent some analysis. Different 
ideological options were considered as having equal status but were clearly differenti-
ated. Groups applying this strategy managed to work out a common recommendation 
if at least one of the sides decided to modify its initial stance or if one of the sides 
managed to propose an innovative organizational solution. this type of strategy met 
numerous criteria of a deliberative debate: namely argumentation, reciprocity, ana-
lytical approach and cooperation. What it lacked to meet the ideal was the effort to 
integrate different ideological options.
The second type of conflict resolution strategy, namely ‘common consideration’, 
relied on both sides’ cooperation in working out a group recommendation through 
an analysis of different proposals and the ideas supporting them. the analysis was 
applied to other participants’ ideas as well as to one’s own together with their justi-
fications. Some controversial issues were formulated as open questions and posed in 
a group forum for thorough consideration. participants learned stances different than 
their own and their rationales. they searched for similarities or for superior values 
which would embrace all of them. Different ideological options and proposals of so-
lutions were articulated. a group applying this type of strategy was able to work out a 
shared recommendation if at least one of the sides had cognitive capacities sufficient 
enough to detect similarities and common ideas in divergent stances. a recommen-
dation was accepted if the sides decided that it enabled the realization of values of 
personal importance to all of them. this type of strategy was the closest to the ideal 
deliberative debate but unfortunately very rare.
these results of empirical studies of deliberation in real life conditions are in line 
with numerous other observations: Williamson and Fung (2004, p. 3) summarize their 
survey of different opportunities for public deliberation already incorporated in the 
u.s. government practice stating that “there is huge variation in the quality of deli-
beration within the venues that aim to produce it.”
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conceptual WIDenInG oF DelIBeratIon moDel
clash of the normative ideal with reality resulted in conceptual widening/enrichment 
of a theoretical model from purely rational communication (where premises are linked 
to conclusion by the rules of logic) to accommodation of diverse modes of interaction 
such as story-telling or personal narratives.The most spectacular work in this field is the 
study by Jurgen steiner on deliberation in deeply divided society of columbia where 
the conflict was so severe that it resulted in war (Jaramillo & Steiner, 2014). The authors 
organized discussion groups of decommissioned ex-combatants from left and right sides 
on the topic “how to make progress in peace process?” the researchers attempted to 
investigate the question of what group dynamics contribute to deliberation raise or fall.
the research strategy relied on identifying situations after which the quality of 
discussion either went up or down adopting qualitative interpretative approach. the 
concept of Deliberative transformative moments (Dtm) resulted from these analy-
sis. Dtms can be sometimes brief and not elaborated speech acts that improve the 
quality of discussion: by putting it back on the main track or summarizing what previ-
ous disputant said, introducing an important perspective, or encouraging opponents 
to interact. there can also be speech acts that transform the level of deliberation from 
high to low such as offensive statements, irrelevant comments or incoherent, confus-
ing statements which make the continuation of meaningful discussion difficult. The 
researchers showed how narratives revealing personal stories can transform a discus-
sion from a low to a high level of deliberation (or have the opposite effect). these 
results subscribe to the increased attention to personal stories in deliberative literature 
with claims being made that the conceptualization of deliberation should encompass 
these alternative forms of communication (Black, 2008; ryfe, 2006; young, 1999).
Widening the deliberative debate model too much to embrace varied interaction 
would loose its innovative character I stressed out at the beginning of this paper. not 
every group discussion or exchange deserves to be called the deliberative debate. thus 
too much of a conceptual widening may reach a dead end. alternative direction for 
continuation of work on deliberation should focus on educational programs and tech-
niques designed to foster deliberative capacities in citizens. this direction is called 
“deliberative education” or “deliberative pedagogy” (roth, 2008; alfaro, 2008). 
DelIBeratIVe eDucatIon 
so far the theory of deliberative democracy was based on the assumption that the de-
liberative skills would develop naturally/ organically through the act of participation, 
mainly through modeling and non-obtrusive facilitation. Direct references to Jean 
piaget conception of cognitive development can be found in the writings of delibera-
tive democracy founding fathers John rawls, Jürgen Habermas and amy Gutmann 
(quoted in Griffin, 2011, p.6) Human development is conceived as a process best en-
couraged by providing environments, situation in which a person will encounter new 
environment. For example the teacher provides information and allows the children to 
discuss what they believe to be right or wrong.
the alternative account of development that potentially offers more suitable foun-
dation to deliberative democracy would be social constructivism as represented by 
lev Wygotsky. according to this account higher mental functions (such as perspec-
tive taking, inductive reasoning), are socially acquired and mediated by “cultural 
tools” that are present and common in a given society. the development is dependent 
on the context of society and culture in which it continues. thus if we want to train 
deliberative competences in citizens we should pay attention to the cultural tools that 
are provided in the process of their education from early ages (Griffin, 2011).
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Deliberative education, in short, is ‘education for civic engagement and decision 
making citizens’ in which two processes play a major part: discussion and choice (al-
faro, 2008). the general model of deliberative education consists of the following key 
elements: (1) increasing the variety and frequency of interactions among students, 
(2) creating temporary and task oriented groups of students, (3) explaining the idea 
of deliberation, (4) arranging deliberation about two common kinds of problems: so-
cial interactions themselves and academic controversies at the core of each discipline 
(parker, 1997). 
conclusIon
the argumentation presented throughout the paper leads to the conclusion that even 
advanced attempts to initiate deliberative debates in real life conditions rarely lead 
to truly deliberative behaviours of disputants. as the research quoted indicate the 
citizens attempt to work out group recommendation through other modes than de-
liberative debate (such as story telling, polemics, persuasion, enforcing a solution or 
fight). Widening the deliberative debate model as to embrace such modes would lead 
to losing its innovative quality. the answer to the question of this paper “What’s next 
for deliberative democracy?” would be “deliberative education”. this means creating 
learning environments that model deliberative behaviours, introducing deliberative 
debates as educational tools in formal education system with the purpose of foster-
ing deliberative skills and competences in future citizens. the interest in the idea of 
deliberative education has grown in the recent decade (for example claxton, 2008; 
Englund, 2011; Shaffer, 2014; Wesołowska, Sołoma, 2012; 2014) It reflects the con-
viction that deliberative functioning is a set of skills which cannot be activated by sin-
gle, short-term intervention but need planned and long-term strategy of education.
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IntroDuctIon
the importance of citizens participation within governance processes has currently 
gained wide attention, both in academic discourse and actual practice. analysts 
have used theoretical constructs such as deliberative democracy or participatory 
democracy to analyze the scope and limitations of people’s participation in the 
process of governance, through a review of the traditional democracy theories. 
effective participation by all stakeholders at local levels of government and reduc-
tion of social exclusion and political apathy have come to be viewed as a necessary 
condition for promoting good governance and a cohesive society.
the shift of focus towards new horizontal governance models (as opposed to 
the traditional vertical ones) in recent years highlights a fundamental need to 
reconceptualize public sector. In this regard, participatory governance practices 
(edwards, 2002; lovan, murray and shaffer, 2004; osmani, 2007) are aimed to 
provide non-government actors, both individuals and organizations, with a means 
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aBstract 
objectives. the present study aimed at testing 
whether costs, trustworthiness of government, 
and expected voice could predict citizens’ will-
ingness to get involved in participatory go-
vernance processes.  participants and setting. 
research participants were one-hundred and 
ninety-two volunteer students of sapienza uni-
versity of rome, 66% female. Hypotheses. We 
hypothesized both main effects of trust (posi-
tive) and expected costs (negative) and an in-
teractive effect of the two variables on citizens’ 
willingness to participate. We also expected 
voice to be a mediator of such an interaction 
effect on willingness to participate. statisti-
cal analyses. a 2 (costs) by 2 (trust) anoVa 
was applied both to manipulation checks and 
to motivation to participate. Following this, 
we performed a bootstrap mediated modera-
tion analysis (Hayes, 2013). results. motiva-
tion to participate was significantly affected 
by trust, in fact participants in the high trust 
condition, were more willing to participate 
(M = 3.84, SD = .91) rather than those in the 
low trust condition (M = 3.31, SD = .99). 
also, a main effect of costs emerged, with low 
costs inducing higher motivation to participate 
(M = 3.73, SD = .92) than high costs 
(M = 3.41, SD = 1.03). more importantly, these 
effects were qualified by the predicted interac-
tion between costs and trust: while in the high 
trust condition costs did not affect willingness 
to participate, in the low costs condition they 
made a significant difference. Finally, medi-
ated moderation analysis showed that that ex-
pected voice was responsible for the impact of 
the trust by costs interaction on motivation to 
participate. limitation. the main limitation of 
the study concerns generalizability of its re-






trust in government, 
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to genuinely and actively be part of the process of developing policy. such pro-
cesses have taken hold as intermediary spaces that readjust the boundaries between 
the state and its citizens, establishing new places in which participants from both 
can engage each other in new ways.
therefore new deliberative institutions seek to colonize the state power by 
transforming the interfaces between local citizens and higher levels of govern-
ment where citizens are viewed as an integral part of governance processes and 
their active involvement is considered essential in the substantive decisions fac-
ing a community.
aDVantaGes anD pItFalls In  partIcIpatIon
citizens’ participation in governance processes is largely recognized as a valuable 
process (nylen 2002; Buchy and race 2001). the arguments in favor of enhanc-
ing citizen participation frequently focus on the benefits of the process itself as 
stated by King and stivers (1998), suggesting that improved citizen participation 
could stop the deterioration of public trust evidenced by widespread hostility to-
ward government entities.
citizen involvement is intended to produce better decisions, and thus more 
benefits for the entire society (Beierle, 1999). Irvin and stansbury (2004) suggest 
a list of advantages, distinguishing between those concerning citizens and go-
vernments. Both citizens and governments are likely to learn from each other, the 
former becoming citizen-experts, understanding technically difficult situations and 
seeing holistic, community-wide solutions, while the latter would also benefit from 
receiving education on specific community groups’ positions. also, both citizens 
and governments may have the chance to improve their persuading skills on the 
other part in order to achieve acceptance of its own instances.
However, a number of authors claimed that participatory governance practices 
are not always rational nor exempt from critical issues. as one of the authors re-
marked (antonini and Fini, 2011), one of the most common problems concerning 
public participation is to effectively encourage citizens to concretely participate 
in policymaking (and to political life in general) and it is not unusual for citizens 
to still staunchly refuse to get directly involved in policymaking. participation is 
inevitably selective and it may occur that some individuals recognized as relevant 
participants are considered to be part of the citizenry, while those excluded are 
left without a voice, without a way to express their involvement and enact their 
citizenship (o’neill, 2001; turnhout, Van Bommel and aarts, 2010). Furthermore, 
participation may repress differences requiring citizens to achieve consensus that 
is considered to be a robust basis for high quality and legitimate decisions (Innes 
and Booher, 2003). 
In sum, when given the opportunity to participate in policymaking one cannot 
automatically assume that citizens will chose to do so. Declining rates of citizens, 
participation mean on one hand fewer opportunities for state and local govern-
ments to understand the needs and concerns of their constituents, on the other hand 
less participation enhances itself a cleavage between citizens and politicians in a 
situation of big changes.
the present study aimed at assessing whether expected costs and benefits, and 
factors related to the quality of the relationship between citizens and their public 
administration, such as trust toward the administration and perceived voice, can 
affect citizens’ motivation to participate in public policymaking. 
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Before describing the experimental study, in the following section we will briefly 
review literature concerning these variables.
The rational choice explanation of citizens’ participation
rational choice scholars have typically approached people’s motivation to par-
ticipate in politics (i.e., voting) adopting models based on pure self-interest (e.g., 
aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957; Feddersen and pesendorfer, 1996; ledyard, 1981; 
palfrey, rosenthal, 1985) and expected value (e.g., ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; 
Feather, 1982) thought in terms of collective action. according to such a perspec-
tive, political participation could be considered as the result of a rational costs-
benefits evaluation.
social movement research has typically viewed the motivation to participate 
as a function of the individual as well as collective costs of participation (Klan-
dermans, 1984, 1997; oberschall, 1980; opp, 1989, 2001; stürmer and simon, 
2004). perceived material or psychological costs of participation can reduce pub-
lic willingness to participate: those are usually related to energy level (Fishkin, 
1997), economic loss and time investment (abelson et al., 1995; Grant, 1994). 
similarly, benefits include not only material advantages but also psychological 
and social ones: satisfaction (Hirschmann, 2002), sense of belonging and social 
status rewards (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996).
although the costs approach seems useful to precisely grasp the individual 
determinants of willingness to get engaged, on the other hand such a rational-
choice approach paints an over-individualistic picture. therefore, only focusing on 
individual advantages and drawbacks may not provide an exhaustive framework 
leading to ignore how people’s decisions are influenced by their relationship with 
the administration government as well as the extent to which they believe their 
voice will be heard. 
Trust in government as a tenet of participation
Within public policymaking it is often the government that encourages citizens to 
participate. In this type of participation processes where governments reach out 
to their citizens, it is necessary that citizens trust their government administration 
in order to get actively involved. thus, as trust in authority is an important psy-
chological antecedent of collective behavior (e.g. De cremer and Van Vugt, 1999; 
tyler, 1989; Van Vugt and De cremer, 1999), we will take into account the role of 
trust in predicting citizens’ motivation to participate in public policymaking.
In contemporary political debates and scientific literature on the subject, there is 
a growing recognition on the part of administrators that decision-making without 
public participation is ineffective. although trust in government is a nebulous and 
contested notion (Goldfinch, Gauld and Herbison, 2009), it is inevitably important 
in democratic society, because democracies rely on the voluntary compliance of 
citizens to authorities’ rules (lenard, 2008). In terms of government actions or 
behaviour, trust in government can encompass whether one expects a government 
will act more-or-less in one’s and/or the public’s interest; and/or more-or-less 
legally, legitimately and ethically; as well as perform its jobs adequately (noot-
eboom, 2002). Basically, a trustworthy government is one whose procedures for 
making and implementing policy meet prevailing standards of fairness and which 
is capable of credible commitments.
Furthermore, trustworthiness is also a central tenet of the extent to which 
citizens accept or reject decisions taken by a decision makers (terwel et al., 
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2010). people who know that an authority is trustworthy are more likely to accept 
the decision taken by the authority than people who know that the authority is 
untrustworthy. therefore, one can assume that citizens’ trust in public authorities 
is necessary in order to achieve public consent for political decisions and more in 
general trustworthiness provides a government a stable context where achieving 
public decisions will thus be easier than in a distrusting atmosphere. 
although controversial outcomes have emerged from studies on the relationship 
between perceived trust in institutions and participation, evidences support the 
idea that citizens’ participation can only be developed on the basis of a recipro-
cal trust between people and institutions (alford, 2001; orren, 1997; uslaner 
and Brown, 2005; mannarini, Fedi and trippetti, 2010). From a rational point 
of view (perry and Wise, 1990) citizens are likely to trust their government only 
to the extent they believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures 
are fair, and that their trust of the state and of others is reciprocated. this is the 
condition necessary to produce behavioral compliance with government demands 
even when individual’s costs somewhat exceed individual benefits and even in 
the absence of strong ideological convictions that make costs totally irrelevant 
(levi, 1998).
therefore, building on the claim of a number of authors that trust should elicit 
more participatory behavior than distrust (almond, 1989), we will assess the im-
pact of trust on citizens’ engagement. specifically, we hypothesize that trustwor-
thiness should foster citizens’ involvement in participatory processes, since the 
more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to 
comply with its demands (e.g., levi, 1989, 1997; levi and stoker, 2000; tyler, 
1989, 2006). also, we expect that when citizens trust their administration govern-
ment costs will not be relevant in determining their willingness to participate. In 
fact, in a condition of trustworthiness, costs may be thought as necessary individual 
losses in order to achieve superordinate collective goals.
Voice effect and participation: when citizens’ opinions matter
Voice effect is explained by presuming that a person given an opportunity to ex-
press his/her views will believe that voice will help controlling the outcomes of a 
decision-making process and that these expectations will lead to higher procedural 
fairness judgments (thibaut and Walker, 1975). people value voice because it 
suggests that their views are worthy of hearing and procedures that accord people 
status in this way are viewed favorably. thibaut and Walker (1975) articulated a 
psychological model to explain procedural preferences suggesting that the distri-
bution of control between participants and the third party is the key procedural 
characteristic shaping people’s views about both fairness and desirability.
Furthermore, several experimental and theoretical works introduced the voice 
effect into the analyses of participation showing interesting results. earley and 
Kanfer (1985) reported that voice-based participation in earlier rather than later 
stages of decision making has a stronger, more positive impact on satisfaction and 
performance. similarly, lawler (1975) suggested that having a voice is not only a 
way of being active within the decision-making process: in his view, voice evenly 
overlaps with participation, which means that expressing one’s own opinion is the 
only way for participating in decision-making.
thus, we expect that the extent to which citizens anticipate that their opinions 
will influence the final decision, that is expected voice effect will at least partially 
mediate the impact of costs and trust on citizens’ willingness to participate.
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summarizing, we hypothesized both main effects of trust (positive) and expected 
costs (negative) and an interactive effect of the two variables on citizens’ willing-
ness to participate. moreover, we also expected voice to be a mediator of such an 
interaction effect on willingness to participate.
Participants and design
research participants were one-hundred and ninety-two volunteer students, 66% 
female, mage between 20 and 40 years old (measured on an 20 year-interval scale 
on 4 points, m = 2.07, sD = .687). participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions of a 2 (High vs. low trust) x 2 (High vs. low ex-
pected costs) between subjects design. Willingness to participate in policymaking 
was the main dependent variable. 
Procedure and manipulation of independent variables 
after being given an informed consent, participants were told the purpose of study 
was an examination of participatory governance engagement. then, participants 
were given the prompt of the study: firstly participants were asked to read a sce-
nario and try to identify with it, subsequently they should respond to a number of 
questions. accordingly, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions (High vs. low costs and High vs. low trust in govern-
ment), manipulated through asking them respectively: 
High costs: Try to imagine that regardless your personal interest for the project, 
you will realize that participating will entail high costs. A large amount of time 
will be asked to all participants so that you will have to withdraw your work, 
study or family and personal commitments; moreover, it may occur that clear 
and exact decisions as well as consent with other participants will be hard to 
achieve. Lastly, it may occur conflicts with other participants that may reflect 
into your everyday life. These costs (as well as others that you may imagine), 
will be a necessary effect of such a participation. this manipulation was adapted 
from previous research examining the costs-benefits of political participation 
(Wandersman et al., 1987).
low costs: Try to imagine that regardless your personal interest for the project, 
you will realize that participating will entail low costs. A little amount of time 
will be asked to all participants so that you will not have to withdraw any of your 
work, study or family and personal commitments; moreover, you will be supported 
in achieving clear and exact decisions as well as consent with other participants. 
Lastly, it may occur that relationships with other citizens will benefit from such 
experience. Any possible costs, (as well as others that you may imagine) will thus 
be limited as possible. this manipulation was adapted from previous research exa-
mining the costs-benefits of political participation (Wandersman et al., 1987).
High trust: moreover, the administration government has a good reputation, 
having shown across years a great care for citizens’need: his political model is 
particularly connected with society’s needs which represent a set of guidelines 
for political action aimed to satisfy citizens’ needs. this manipulation was created 
for the purpose of this study.
low trust: moreover, the administration government has not a good reputation, 
having shown across years a lack of care for citizens’need: his political model is 
not particularly connected with society’s needs, appearing more aimed to respond 
to the political concerns rather than to satisfy citizens’ needs. this manipulation 
was created for the purpose of this study.
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after being given the scenario, participants were asked to try to keep focusing 
on such a scenario while responding the subsequent set of questions.
measures
Finally, motivation to participate, manipulation check of trust, expected costs and 
voice were measured. 
– Willingness to participate: specifically participants responded two questions 
(1 not very much, 5 very much) measuring their likelihood to engage in the par-
ticipatory governance process highlighted within the scenario. (1) “Imagining 
to be one of the people described in the scenario, I would be willing to partici-
pate in policymaking as proposed by the depicted administration government”; 
(2) “whether the depicted administration government would be real I would be 
happy to engage in such a policymaking project” (α = .77). 
– Expected costs manipulation check: participants were asked to think about their 
expected difficulties and costs involved in political participation on a 5-point 
scale (1 not very much, 5 very much): (1) “the feeling of frustration from lack-
ing “real” results from participation”; (2) “the need to give up personal and 
family members for participation”; (3) “Interpersonal conflict with others dur-
ing participation”; (4) “Any other kind of costs you imagine” (α = .828). These 
questions were adapted from previous research examining costs of political 
participation (Wandersman et al., 1987).
– Trust manipulation check: participants then completed two-questions mea-
suring trust in the government on a 5-point scale (1 not very much, 5 very 
much): ‘to what extent do you trust the administration government?’ and, ‘to 
what extent do you consider the administration government to be trustworthy?’ 
(α = .96). These questions were adapted from previous research examining trust 
in authorities (de cremer and van Vugt, 1999).
– Voice: participants completed one item measuring voice on a 5-point scale (1 not 
very much, 5 very much): “In the light of the proposal received by the admi- 
nistration government, participating could be a chance to voice my own ideas”.
results
Expected Costs Manipulation check. a 2 (High vs. low costs) x 2 (High vs. low 
trust) anoVa on costs revealed the expected main effect of costs’ manipula-
tion, F(1, 188) = 19.01, p < .001, η2 = .09. more personal costs were expected in 
the high (M = 3.91, SD = .70) rather than in the low costs condition (M = 3.44, 
SD = .81). the anoVa also revealed a main effect of trust, F(1, 188) = 5.91, 
p = .02, η2 = .03, indicating that when high trust was induced participants ex-
pected less costs (M = 3.55, SD = .74) than in the low trust condition (M = 3.80, 
SD = .82). no other significant effects emerged.
Trust Manipulation check. a 2 (High vs. low costs) x 2 (High vs. low trust) 
anoVa was conducted on the score of perceived trust toward the administra-
tion. the main effect of trust, F(1, 188) = 75.78, p < .001, η2 = .29, confirmed 
the adequacy of the manipulation. more specifically, participants in the high trust 
condition reported higher scores (M = 3.41, SD = .78) than those in the low trust 
condition (M = 2.48, SD = .69). no other significant effects emerged.
Motivation to Participate. the 2 (High vs. low costs) x 2 (High vs. low trust) 
anoVa on motivation to participate highlighted a main effect of trust, F(1, 188 ) 
= 14.90, p < .001, η2 = .07, indicating that participants in the high trust condition 
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were more willing to participate (M = 3.84, SD = .91) than those in the low trust 
condition (M = 3.31, SD = .99). 
also, a main effect of expected costs emerged, F(1, 188 ) = 5.35, p = .02, 
η2 = .03. Inspection of means revealed that motivation to participate was more 
pronounced in the low expected costs condition (M = 3.73, SD = .92) rather than 
in the high costs condition (M = 3.41, SD = 1.03). 
more importantly, these effects were qualified by the predicted interaction be-
tween expected costs and trust, F(1, 188) = 3.93, p = .049, η2 = .02. as can be 
noted in Figure 1, in the high expected costs condition, participants were will-
ing to participate especially when they were in the trust condition (M = 3.82, 
SD = .92) rather than distrust (M = 3.03, SD = .98) the administration government, 
F(1, 188) = 17.46, p < .001, η2 = .09. When costs were expected to be low, motiva-
tion was relatively unaffected by trust, F(1, 188) = 1.72, p = .19.
simple effect analysis within the trust conditions showed that the manipula-
tion of costs only affected participants motivation when trust was low, F(1, 188) 
= 9.74, p = .002, η2 = .05, with high expected costs leading to reduced motivation 
(M = 3.03, SD = .98) as compared to low expected costs (M = 3.61, SD = .93). ex-
pected costs did not affect participants motivation when trust was high (F < 1).
Figure 1 motivation to participate as a function of trust and costs
Mediated Moderation Analysis. Voice was highly correlated with motivation 
to participate (r = .58, p < .001). Building on this association, we wanted to test 
whether voice could mediate the impact of the interaction between trust and ex-
pected costs on motivation. to test for the mediated moderation we first regressed 
motivation to participate on the interaction between our independent variables. as 
can be noted in Figure 2, the interaction had a significant impact on motivation 
to participate, β = .13, t = 1.98, p < .05. However, after controlling for voice, the 
interaction between trust and expected costs was not significant anymore, β = .03, 
t = .56, p = .55. this result suggests the presence of a full mediation. 
33
the significance of the indirect effect was tested by mean of a bootstrap mediated 
moderation analysis (Hayes 2013). the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for 
the indirect effect of the interaction did not include zero (lower = .14; upper = .73), 
indicating that the indirect effect was significant.
DIscussIon
the general purpose of this study was to test whether previous findings con-
cerning participation in collective action could be extended to a diverse type of 
participation, specifically within participatory governance. more specifically, we 
expected a rational variable, such as expected costs, would interact with a more 
relational variable, such as trust in government, in predicting citizens’ willingness 
to participate. 
results highlighted a main effect for both costs expectations and trust in govern-
ment, with high costs reducing willingness to participate and high trust increas-
ing it. moreover, these variables interacted in predicting citizens’ willingness to 
participate. that is, when citizens trust their administration government they are 
willing to get engaged within policymaking regardless of costs, but when they do 
not trust the administration they are motivated to participate only if they expect 
low costs for the participation.
Furthermore, results revealed that voice mediated the interaction between ex-
pected costs and trust on willingness to participate. such a result highlighted that 
citizens’ engagement is primarily driven by the expectation that their own opinion 
will be taken into account and will have an impact on the final political decision 
(expected voice).
concerning the limitations of the present study, firstly we are aware that a 
sample of students may not be compared to an enlarged population. Indeed, it is 
possible to imagine that the effect of a costs manipulation may be different for 
another type of population. secondly, as part of the literature on civic engage-
ment focuses on groups processes (simon, 1998; stürmer and simon, 2004), we 
believe that further studies could interestingly analyze the relation between collec-
tive identification processes and the variables used in our study (see for example 
antonini et al., in press). 
Figure 2 mediated moderation analysis 
In brackets is the direct effect of the interaction between the independent variables on 
willingness to participate after controlling for voice. note: * = p<.05; **= p<.01
Voice
Costs x Trust Willingness to







lastly, this study may imply some practical suggestions for public adminis-
trations who want to increase citizens’ participation. trusted governments can 
design participatory practices without worrying too much about how costs while, 
low-trusted ones must necessary design participation focusing on low costs for 
citizens. Finally, both types of administrations might try to construct communi-
cation campaigns by means of which citizens perceived voice is increased, since 
our results show that voice is the ultimate determinant of citizens’ willingness to 
participate.
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SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
In recent decades european politicians have decidedly not been a highly valued or 
well liked social group. post-communist societies, having undergone deep system 
changes, are characterized by a high level of social and political cynicism. A signifi-
cant element of this characteristic is distrust of politics and politicians, and especially 
those people who are in power (leung, Bond, 2004; leung et al., 2002). Kwok leun-
gand and michal Bond, who studied beliefs about human nature and social relations 
in 41 countries, showed that post-communist societies do not believe politicians and 
also more frequently reject the notion that political leadership is based on charisma 
and values. they explain this as an effect of frequent disappointment and cynicism 
from the side of politicians. In polish society cynical thoughts about politics and poli-
ticians have also been salient throughout the past 25 years of democratization. In the 
spring of 2014, 81.5% of adults poles thought that “politics are only an absolute game 
of power and money” and 64.8% believed that “people who go into politics are usu-
ally egoists who are hungry for fame and money”. only 16.7% of respondents agreed 
that “politics serve the people in a democracy” (Radkiewicz, Skarżyńska, 2014). 
It can therefore be said that the negative image of politics and politicians remains 
despite change of the political system.
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aBstract
this article presents a study aimed  at testing the 
relations between specific schemata of the social 
world (pro-aggressive normative beliefs about 
aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, 
and political cynicism) and dispositional aggres-
sion on the one hand, and  the level of approval 
of aggression in politics, on the other hand. on 
the basis of data collected using face-to-face 
interviews, conducted on a representative ran-
dom sample of adult poles (n = 971), structural 
equation modeling (sem) was performed. the 
sem analyses showed the direct effect of dis-
positional aggression on the outcome variable 
(acceptance of aggression in politics) which dis-
appeared when specific schemata of the social 
world were added to the model. pro-aggressive 
normative beliefs turned out to be the most in-
fluential mediator of the relation between dispo-
sitional aggression and outcome variable. the 
impact of social Darwinism was smaller, and 
political cynicism seemed to be weakest (but 
significant). 
Key words:   
approval of aggression in politics,





the consequences of the negative image of current politics and politicians in-
clude the distrust of democratic institutions, moral delegitimization of the entire cur-
rent political and economic order (system), and also social and political passivity 
(Skarżyńska, 2011; Skarżyńska, Henne, 2012). We might also suspect that a cynical 
view of the social and political world leads to hostility and acceptation of various 
forms of aggression directed towards politicians.
tHe role oF  DIsposItIonal aGGressIon anD scHemata 
oF tHe socIal WorlD In  approVal oF aGGressIon In  polItIcs
In our study we look for some predictors of acceptance of different acts of behavio-
ral aggression in political life. the term “aggression” refers to a wide spectrum of 
interpersonal behavior. It is defined as “any behavior intended to harm another indi-
vidual who is motivated to avid being harmed” (Bettencourt et al., 2006). aggressive 
behavior is distinguished from high levels of trait (dispositional) aggressiveness. the 
latter identifies people who are prone to hostile cognitions and angry affect as well 
as a readiness to engage in physical and verbal aggression (Bettencourt et al., 2006; 
Buss, perry, 1992). trait aggressiveness is measured with a self-report assessment, 
such as the Buss-perry Questonnaire (Buss, perry, 1992). In democratic context acts 
of political aggression are inherently illegitimate, but “the specter of political vio-
lence haunts even the most stable democracies” (Kalmoe, 2010, p. 2). In contempo-
rary poland acts of physical aggression are extremely rare: a few physical attacks on 
party-members or their offices have happened in the last years. But we can observe 
a permanent hate speech in media (television, radio and internet), in parliament and 
also in everyday talk. political extremists are more tolerated in polish society than 
in other European countries (Jasińska-Kania, Skarżyńska, 2009). In the macro-level 
approach we can see political aggression as the result of strong polarization of the 
political scene and strong political conflict between the main parties. Polish politi-
cal leaders use violent political rhetoric (metaphors of war and fighting) and such 
behaviors can increase support for political aggression among citizens (Fosterling, 
2005; Kalmoe, 2010).
In our approach to political aggression, we concentrate on some psychological pre-
dictors of approval of different forms of aggression in political life. on the bases of 
several studies we can assume that social support for political aggression is a sig-
nificant predictor for propensity to commit acts of political violence, though other 
factors related to anti-social behavior almost certainly intervene to move citizens 
from violent attitudes to aggressive behavior (crick, Dodge, 1994; Fosterling, 2005; 
Frączek, 2002; Huesmann, Guerra, 1997). So, acceptance for political violence in-
directly identifies individuals (respondents) with a higher propensity for engaging 
in violent political behavior. Individual disposition (propensity) to aggression is as-
sociated with acceptance of aggressive behavior in everyday life. some earlier stud-
ies have found a significant but rather weak relation between trait aggressiveness 
and individual acceptance of observed interpersonal aggression (Huesmann, Guerra, 
1997; slaby, Guerra 1988). there are probably some other variables that mediate the 
relation between individual propensity for aggression and individual acceptance of 
interpersonal aggression. this is the reason why the current study focused not only on 
trait aggressiveness (individual propensity for aggressive behavior in everyday life), 
but also on latent mental structures that can be associated with acceptance of political 
aggression, such as cognitive schemata or abstracted general beliefs about the social 
world and politics.
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normative schemata – self-regulating beliefs about the appropriateness of aggres-
sion in everyday life - play an important role among these social beliefs (Guerra, 
nucci, Huesmann, 1994; Huesman, Guerra, 1997; Kirwil, 2012). these normative 
schemata may stimulate or inhibit aggressive behavior and may also affect emotional 
reactions to other aggressive behavior and lead to approval or disapproval of political 
aggression. Normative beliefs about aggression influence responses in novel situation 
(that require controlled processing) as well as in familiar situations (in which cogni-
tive processing is more automatic) (Huesmann, Guerra, 1997). 
two other cognitive schemata that should lead to acceptance of aggression in poli-
tics are a negativistic social worldview, called social Darwinism (Duckitt, Birum, 
Wagner, du Plessis, 2002; Skarżyńska, Radkiewicz, 2011), and political cynicism 
(Boski, 2009; Leung, Bond, 2004; Skarżyńska, 2015). Social Darwinism is a belief 
set expressed in the conviction that, when dealing with people, one must take into 
account only one’s own good, to be ruthless and vindictive, and to treat people as 
objects to be used for as long as they are useful. power and money are more important 
than honesty and respect for social rule of reciprocity. only those people who lack 
compassion, those who know how to take advantage of others, only the fittest, and 
those most adopted to life in the “social jungle” will survive. this kind of belief ap-
preciates aggression in social and political life as a successful strategy of achievement 
of important life-goals in the “social jungle”, and also as a defensive reaction to the 
“dangerous and threatening life in social jungle” (Hawkins, 1997; sidanius, pratto, 
1999; Skarżyńska, Radkiewicz, 2011).
political cynicism is a set of negative beliefs about politics and politicians, ex-
pressed in the opinion that democratic politics are mainly a cynical game for power 
and money, and not about values; politicians are egoistic, they don’t care about com-
mon social good and treat political opponents not as rivals but rather as enemies. the 
struggle for power and one’s own interest are more important and more salient than 
political competition and looking for social consensus. aggression towards political 
enemies is accepted as a successful form of struggle for power and realization one’s 
own (or the party) interests. this kind of belief is divergent from the understanding 
of democratic politics proposed by theoreticians and researchers of democracy (Dahl, 
1998; post, 2006; sartori, 1994; schumpeter, 1995). as mentioned above, such cyni-
cal beliefs about the democratic politics of today are widespread in poland. a few of 
the reasons for this state of affairs are the sharp and clearly articulated conflict be-
tween political elites, polarization of the political scene, and the significant social and 
ideological divisions in society (Wasilewski, 2010). 
normative beliefs about aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, and politi-
cal cynicism are associated with trait aggressiveness as well as with acceptation of 
interpersonal aggression. so, we can expect that all of these cognitive schemata medi-
ate the relation between dispositional aggression on the one hand, and an approval of 
aggressive behavior in political life, on the other.
The aim of the study presented in the article is to find empirical answer for the fol-
lowing questions: 
1. What is the level of approval of aggression toward politicians and between political 
opponents in polish society?
2. What are the relations between individual level of approval of aggression in po-
litical life and schemata of the social world, meant as: a/ normative beliefs about 
aggression is everyday life; b/ belief in antagonistic nature of the social relations 
– social Darwinism; c/ political cynicism?
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3. What is the relation between dispositional aggressiveness and approval of aggres-
sion in politics?
4. Do these social schemata mediate the effect of dispositional aggression on approval 
of aggression in politics?
We expected that the level of approval of aggression in political life would be posi-
tively related to the specific schemata of the social world, i.e. pro-aggressive norma-
tive beliefs, social Darwinism and political cynicism (hypothesis 1), and would also 
be positively related to dispositional aggressiveness (hypothesis 2). We also hypothe-
sized that pro-aggressive normative beliefs, social Darwinism, and political cynicism 
mediate the effect of individual dispositional aggressiveness on approval of aggres-
sion in political life (hypothesis 3).
metHoD
Participants 
the sample consisted of 971 adults (aged 18+), with 43.6% men and 56.4% women. 
of the respondents, 17.1% had primary and lower education, 21.5% vocational, 35.6% 
secondary and postsecondary, and 25.8% higher education. It is fully representative of 
a random sample of the polish adult population in terms of sex, age, education level, 
place of residence and region. The specification of the sample, the respondent sam-
pling, and the field study were all conducted by CBOS (leader in the field of public 
opinion research and a member of esomar, the european society for opinion and 
marketing research). 
Procedure and Measures 
the study was based on face-to-face interviews using a computer assisted personal 
Interview (capI), that ensured individual randomization of the item order within each 
multiple scale. Respondents had to fill in a number of scales measuring their beliefs 
and level of acceptance of different aggressive behaviors towards politicians. the 
research was conducted in the two last weeks of september 2014.
Approval of aggression in political life was measured with three following scales: 
1/ approval of aggression towards politicians (scale 1): 5-item likert scale with 
4-point agree-disagree responses (Skarżyńska, 2013). The items tap support for threats 
against politicians, using verbal and physical aggression. examples: “Insulting the 
politicians is…”, “taking out one’s anger on the politicians and verbally abusing them 
in public is…”, “saying that polish politicians these days are thieves, murders, traitors 
is…”. The Cronbach’s alpha amounted to α = 0.78.
2/ approval of aggression towards politicians who Hurt the country (scale 2): 
5-item likert scale with 4-point agree-disagree responses (polish version the sup-
port for political Violence scale, Kalmoe, 2010). the items tap support for threats 
against political leaders, politically-motivated property violence, and use of physical 
force against government in situation perceived as politicians hurting the country. 
examples: “When politicians are damaging the country, citizens should send threats 
to scare them straight”, “sometimes the only way to stop bad politicians is with physi-
cal force”. The Cronbach’s alpha amounted to α = 0.85.
3/ approval of aggression between politicians (scale 3): 5-item likert scale with 
4-point agree-disagree responses (Skarżyńska, 2013). The items tap support for dif-
ferent kinds of aggression (verbal and physical) between politicians and their political 
opponents. examples: “the use of physical force by politicians to stop their political 
opponents is…”. The Cronbach’s alpha amounted to α = 0.70. 
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Normative beliefs about aggression – defined as individualistic standards about ac-
ceptability of aggressive behavior – were measured with the shortened noBaG scale 
(Huesmann, Guerra, 1997), adopted to adults (Kirwil, 2012). this 8-item likert scale 
measures general beliefs about appropriateness of different aggressive behaviors in 
everyday life. each item is evaluated on a 4-point acceptation scale. examples: “It is 
oK to say means things to other people”, “It is oK to take your anger out on others by 
using physical force”. The scale is highly reliable: Cronbach’s α = 0.87.
Aggression as a personality trait (dispositional aggression) – was measured 
with the aggression Questionnaire (Buss, perry, 1992). this 29-item questionnaire 
showed internal consistency and stability over time. Factor analysis yielded 4 scales: 
physical aggression (examples: “If somebody hits me, I hit back”, “I have become so 
mad that I have broken things”), verbal aggression (examples: “ my friends say that 
I’m somewhat argumentative”, “I often find myself disagreeing with people”), anger 
(examples: “I have trouble controlling my temper”, “When frustrated, I let my irrita-
tion show”), and hostility (examples: “I’m sometimes eaten up with jealousy”, “I’m 
suspicious of overly friendly strangers”). each item is evaluated on a 5-point scale. 
Reliability of the Aggression Questionnaire is high: Cronbach’s α = 0.85.
Social Darwinism was measured with the 15-item competitive and antagonistic 
worldview scale developed by Duckitt and collaborators (Duckitt, Fisher, 2003). each 
item was evaluated on a 6-point scale. examples: “If you need to be vindictive and 
ruthless to achieve your goals, that is what you should do”, “We live in a world that 
knows no mercy, and you sometimes have to behave mercilessly”. the scale is suf-
ficiently reliable: Cronbach’s α = 0.75.
Political Cynicism was measured with a 10- item balance Likert scale (Skarżyńska, 
2013). each item was evaluated on a 5-pont scale. examples: “politics are an unfair 
game that is only about power and money”, “most democratic policies serve the grater 
good of the citizens” (reverse-coded). The scale is sufficiently reliable: Cronbach’s 
α = 0.73.
Social-demographic variables: age, sex, education level, and place of residence 
were also controlled. 
results
The results section is divided into three parts. The first is a general descriptive analysis 
of the population of poland regarding the level of approval of aggression in politics. 
the next section presents a set of hierarchical analyses regressing different measures 
of approval of aggression in politics on the specific cognitive schemata of the social 
world (normative beliefs about aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, politi-
cal cynicism) after initial control for socio-demographic factors. Finally, the potential 
links between dispositional aggression and approval of aggression in politics will be 
tested. We will use structural equation modeling in order to find out whether this rela-
tionship can be shown as mediated by the specific schemata of the social world.
Approval of aggression in politics: Distributions and descriptive statistics
table 1 depicts inter-correlations among three outcome variables. as one can see, all 
of the indices have considerable positive links (r from .32 to .56) with almost identical 
standard deviations. Based on sample mean values, it can be concluded that the level 
of approval of aggression in politics is rather small in polish society. Beyond such a 
general conclusion it is also worth noting that the most disapproved acts of aggression 
concern aggressive behavior between politicians, while aggression directed against 
politicians from citizens/voters is being perceived as relatively more justified. 
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The approval of aggression in politics – as it is defined by the three measured as-
pects – forms quite homogeneous phenomenon. However, it does not mean that the 
social approval of all the studied acts or manifestations of aggression is equally wide-
spread. some of them are more often accepted, while others seem to be subject to a 
clear social taboo. These specific differences were depicted in Figure 1, which shows 
Table 1 measures of approval of aggression in politics: Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics 
 approval of …  (1)  (2)  m sD min. – max.
aggression in politics (1) 
(scale 1)   1.62 .51  1 – 4
aggression between politicians (2)
(scale 2) .56
***   1.44 .50  1 – 4
aggression towards bad politicians (3) 
(scale 3) .50
*** .32***  1.61 .53  1 – 4
Note. *** p ≤ .001




0 10 20 30 40 50
Hitting, elbowing or throwing objects at
politicians
Violent expressions of objection or negative
emotion towards politicians by damaging
buildings they work at or breaking the…
Taking out one's anger on the politicians and
verbally abusing them in public
Saying that the Polish politicians these days are
thieves, murderers, traitors
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approving responses with reference to separate acts of aggression considered by the 
three outcome variables. 
Comparisons of the responses concerning specific acts of aggression show con-
siderable differences as to their approval. While ‘Insulting the politicians’ or ‘Say-
ing that the Polish politicians these days are thieves, murderers, traitors’ is accepted 
by, respectively, 21.4 and 17.7% of the respondents, behaviors such as ‘The use of 
physical force by politicians to stop their political opponents’ or ‘Hitting, elbowing 
or throwing objects at politicians’ is accepted by, respectively, 2.7 and 2.4% of re-
spondents. In general, respondents seem to be much more inclined to approve verbal 
than physical aggression. roughly, the group approving different forms of verbal ag-
gression amounts to about 15%, while the group approving different acts of physical 
aggression is at about 5%. 
Cognitive schemata of the social world as predictors of approval 
of aggression in politics
the initial step in this section was a look at descriptive statistics of the indices mea-
suring cognitive schemata of the social world. mean values in table 2 point out rather 
low acceptance of aggression in everyday life (m = 1.42) and of Darwinian beliefs 
about the nature of the social world (m = 2.49). these statistics clearly contrast with a 
very high level of beliefs about the cynical nature of politics (m = 3.45). the general 
picture of politics in the perception of polish society appears as full of injustice, self-
interest, ruthlessness etc. However, such a negative view of politics cannot be seen as 
closely related to acceptance of normative aggression (r = .07; p ≤ .05) or to Darwin-
ian social beliefs (r = .11; p ≤ .01). 
Table 2 cognitive schemata of the social world: Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics
 (1)  (2)  m sD min. – max.
normative Beliefs about (1)
 aggression   1.42 .42  1 – 4
social Darwinism (2) .36***   2.49 .53  1 – 6
political cynicism (3) .07*  .11**  3.45 .65  1 – 5
Note. *** p ≤ .001 ** p ≤ .01 * p ≤ .05
table 3 shows three regressions of approval of aggression in politics (for each of 
the three measures) on the set of predictors including normative beliefs about aggres-
sion in everyday life, social Darwinism, and political cynicism. Hierarchical regres-
sion analysis was applied in order to control the cumulative impact of the socio-de-
mographic factors (gender, age, education, and place of residence). therefore, socio-
demographic factors were put into the equation first, and the main predictors were 
added in the second step.
At first, one may note that the set of socio-demographic variables does not contri-
bute considerably to either of the three outcome variables’ variance. only the effect 
of sex appear to be statistically significant: women are slightly less prone than men to 
approve of aggression in politics. The increase of the model’s fit (R2 change) evoked 
by adding the main predictors is quite considerable and similar for all the outcome 
variables. Depending on the form of approval of aggression in politics, r2 rises from 
.18 to .23% over and above the socio-demographic variables. However, individual 
predictors do not share equal contribution to such an impressive increase of r2. un-
doubtedly, the most predictive power is revealed by normative acceptance of aggres-
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sion in everyday life (β from .30 to .36). the positive effect of social Darwinism ap-
pears (β from .17 to .22) in second place, and at the end the positive effect of political 
cynicism should be mentioned (β from .04 to .18). 
In conclusion, we confirmed that one can see different forms of approval of aggres-
sion in politics as a more general political attitude clearly influenced by some specific 
cognitive schemata of the social world. considering the set of studied predictors, this 
approval is highest when accompanied by general acceptance of using aggression in 
everyday life and, to a lesser degree, by a Darwinian view of the social life. the im-
pact of cynical view of politics, as presumably more context-dependent and reactive 
to current politics, seem to be least significant. 
Cognitive schemata as mediators of the relationship between dispositional 
aggression and approval of aggression in politics
as we expected, dispositional aggression (m = 2.13; sD =.55) appeared to be sig-
nificantly associated with the approval of aggression in politics (for scale 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively, r = .25, .23 and .19; all significant at p ≤ .001). In order to test whether 
this relationship can be shown as mediated by the set of specific schemata of the so-
cial world, structural equation modeling (sem) methodology was used. apart from 
correcting for the attenuating effects of measurement error, it first of all allowed us to 
test a general complex model that included (a) both independent and outcome variable 
expressed as the latent variables and (b) the whole set of potential mediators. 
the sem analyses were performed in two steps by IBm spss amos 21.0. First, it 
included only the direct effect of dispositional aggression on approval of aggression 
in politics. With 13 degrees of freedom, it turned out to have a satisfactory goodness 
of fit (CFI = .961; TLI = .917; SRMR = .054; RMSEA = .071), and a substantial size 
of the direct effect (β = .31; p ≤ .001). In the next step the indirect effects of dispo-
sitional aggression on the outcome variable were added in the form of three media-
Table 3 regression analyses: the impact of socio-demographic variables and cognitive schemata 
of the social world on approval of aggression in politics 





towards bad politicians 
(scale 3)
 B β  η2  B  β  η2  B  β  η2
Intercept  .33 .50  .48
Gender -.09  -.08**  .009  -.13  -.13***  .022  -.07  -.06*  .005
age -.001  -.05  .003 -.001  -.02  .001  .00  .001  .000
education  .00  .00  .000 -.009  -.06  .004 -.02  -.10**  .011
place of residence -.003  -.01  .000  .002  .01  .000  .003  .01  .000
normative Beliefs 
 about aggression  .43  .36
***  .126  .43  .36***  .130  .38  .30***  .085
social Darwinism  .16  .17***  .031  .21  .22***  .053  .21  .21***  .042
political cynicism  .14  .18***  .040  .03  .04  .002  .09  .11***  .013
 F df (7; 956) 











Note .*** p ≤ .001 ** p ≤ .01 * p ≤ .05
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tors: normative beliefs about aggression, social Darwinism, and political cynicism. 
With 30 degrees of freedom, the goodness of fit in the mediation model appeared 
slightly less satisfactory but still acceptable (cFI = .920; tlI = .880; srmr = .054; 
RMSEA = .079). The mediators reduced the size of the direct effect to non-significant 
(β = .04; p =.27), meaning that the impact of dispositional aggression on the approval 
of aggression in politics should be seen as almost fully indirect, i.e. mediated by some 
specific schemata of the social word. It is worth noting that inclusion of the mediation 
paths increased the r2 of the outcome variable from .09 to .50. In other words, when 
the approval of aggression in politics is expressed in the form of a latent variable, the 
model of mediation can explain as much as 50% of its total variance. 
statistics in Figure 2 point out normative aggression in everyday life as the most 
influential mediator of the relation between the independent and outcome variable. 
the impact of social Darwinism is smaller, and that of political cynicism seems to 
be decidedly weakest. nevertheless, when tested with sobel’s test for their statistical 
significance, all of them turned out significant (t = 7.76, 6.15, and 3.6, respectively; 
p ≤ .001). 
Figure 2 schemata of the social world as mediators of the effect of dispositional aggression on 
approval of aggression in politics
Note. *** p ≤ .001
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For a final summary we may look at the Proportion Mediated (PM) which indicates 
what proportion of the total effect is mediated by the intervening variable(s) (c.f. Fair-
child, macKinnon, taborga, taylor, 2009). In general, the pm index tells us that the 
cumulative indirect effect of the set of three mediators contributes 87% to the total 
effect of dispositional aggression on the outcome variable. However, this remarkable 
contribution is not shared evenly by individual mediators. therefore, the pm cal-
culated separately show partial mediation of normative aggression in everyday life, 
social Darwinism, and political cynicism on the effects of dispositional aggression on 
approval of aggression in politics amounting to 51%, 28%, and 8%, respectively. 
conclusIon
the results of our study show that the level of approval of aggression in politics is 
rather small in polish society. However, some acts of manifestation of aggression in 
politics are accepted more often than other forms of aggressive behavior. In general, 
respondents seems to be much more inclined to approve verbal than physical aggres-
sion. the same tendency was found in other studies conducted in poland (Kirwil, 
2012) and in the usa (Kalmoe, 2010). 
approval of aggression in politics turned out to be independent of socio-demo-
graphic factors (age, education level, place of residence), except for the small correla-
tion with gender, showing slightly lower aggression approval expressed by women 
than men. so, in that sense, the level of approval of aggression in politic is a “demo-
cratic” phenomenon: it is equally distributed in polish society. 
as we expected, the level of approval of aggression in politics appeared to be clear-
ly influenced by some specific cognitive schemata: normative pro-aggressive beliefs 
(general acceptance of using aggression in everyday life), a Darwinist world view, 
and a cynical view of politics. Dispositional aggression also appeared to be signifi-
cantly associated with the approval of aggression in politics, but its role is mediated 
by the set of specific schemata of the social world. The results of Structural Equation 
modeling (sem) showed that the impact of dispositional aggression on the approval 
of aggression in politics is fully indirect, i.e. it is mediated by the above mentioned, 
specific schemata of the social world. Normative beliefs about aggression in every-
day life turned out to be the most influential mediator. This result confirms the role 
of such normative beliefs in regulation of social attitudes towards aggressive beha-
vior, pointed out in previous research (Huesmann, Guerra, 1997; Kirwil, 2012; slaby, 
Guerra, 1988). 
the impact of social Darwinism appeared to be smaller, and the effect of political 
cynicism was the weakest (but still statistically significant). These results suggest that 
social attitudes towards aggression in politics are rooted in a relatively stable general 
normative beliefs that are formed early and an individual worldview rather than in a 
cynical view of politics, which is presumably more context-dependent and reactive to 
current politics. nevertheless, political cynicism, largely and clearly articulated in the 
society, seems to be important for the political atmosphere in the country and it leads 
not only to higher approval of aggression in politics , but also to political passivity, 
moral delegitimization of the political status-quo, and political aggression (caprara, 
2008; Leung, Bond, 2004; Skarżyńska, 2015). The variables taken into account in our 
sem analysis explained 50 percent of the outcome variable (approval of aggression 
in politics). So, there are some others variables that can influence the level of approval 
of aggression in politics. We suppose that some contextual factors (for instance, rela-
tionships between the citizens and evaluated politicians), as well as ideological prefe-
rences of respondents, can have an impact on evaluation of aggression in politics. 
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IntroDuctIon
In recent decades, the interest of researchers in the field of lifelong development has 
turned increasingly to the adaptive side. systematic research of successful develop-
ment appeared in the 1990s (see Baltes, Baltes, 1990). nowadays, successful deve-
lopment has become a multidisciplinary area that draws inspiration not only from de-
velopmental psychology but also from positive psychology, social psychology, health 
psychology or from sociology.
successful development is often seen as ‘the maximization of gains and the mini-
mization of losses’ (Baltes, staudinger, lindenberger, 1998, p. 1030); as maintain-
ing balance between various characteristics, such as primary and secondary control 
(schulz, Heckhausen, 1996) or assimilation and accommodation (Brandstädter, 1998). 
successful development is related also to continued growth and development in old 
age (ryff, Keyes, 1995), to good health and functioning (rowe, Kahn, 1997) or to ef-
fective functioning in society (see Helson, Wink, 1987).
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aBstract
the aim of the study was to predict adaptive 
social functioning in terms of career stabi- 
lity in middle adulthood based on personality 
and socio-economic variables from childhood/
adolescence and early adulthood. 83 people 
have participated in an ongoing longitudinal 
study started in 1961 (54% women). persona-
lity traits were measured by means of mauds-
ley personality Inventory at the age of 16 years. 
socio-economic variables included information 
about parental socio-economic status and the 
participants’ highest education. career stabil-
ity was established using life History calendar 
method. We distinguish two adaptive career 
lines (stable and changeable) and one non-
adaptive career line (unstable). We have identi-
fied expected but not significant influences of 
socio-economic status on career stability: sta-
ble career is more frequent among people with 
higher education while unstable career line is 
more usual among people with lower education. 
We have found also intergenerational continuity 
in both dimensions of socio-economic status: 
education and occupation (parental ses and 
participant,s ses). as the only personality pre-
dictor of type of career line we have identified 
extraversion in adolescence: changeable career 
is more frequent in extraverts, while unstable 
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current empirical research distinguishes between two aspects (criteria) of success-
ful development: external (objective, social) and internal (subjective, psychological) 
criteria (Baltes, carstensen, 2003; pulkkinen, nygren, Kokko, 2002). external criteria 
that refer to adaptive social functioning are indicated by fulfilment of developmen-
tal tasks or adjustment to social norms. among them is often used family socioeco-
nomic status (caspi et al., 1998), career stability (pulkkinen, nygren, Kokko, 2002), 
academic achievement (Damian et al., 2014) or absence of risk behavior (pulkkinen, 
Feldt, Kokko, 2006). on the other hand, internal criteria that refer to adaptive psy-
chological functioning are indicated by well-being and related constructs such as life 
satisfaction, meaning in life, sense of coherence, self-esteem or self-efficacy (Baltes, 
carstensen, 2003; pulkkinen, caspi, 2002). subjective and objective characteristics of 
successful development are interrelated (Hawkins et al., 2009): career instability and 
particularly unemployment, considerably reduce well-being, life satisfaction and self-
esteem (Kokko, pulkkinen, 1998; rönkä, pulkkinen, 1995). conversely, better educa-
tion, higher socioeconomic status and good occupational status contribute to higher 
levels of well-being (lai, cummins, 2013; schieman, Van Gundy, taylor, 2001).
successful development is also partly determined by the society in which the indi-
vidual’s life is set. this is represented especially by social institutions (political, social 
cultural or educational systems) and a broader socio-cultural context (titma, tuma, 
2005). A unique opportunity for research on macrosocial influences is provided by 
societies in political, economic or cultural transition. change of a society’s condition 
can lead to a change on the individual level (elder, Giele, 2009; silbereisen, tomasik, 
2008). Macrosocial factors significantly influence both psychological and social cha-
racteristics of successful development. In societies in transition this leads to principal 
differences in individual experiences of the young generation and the generation of 
their parents (silbereisen, tomasik, 2008; titma, tuma, 2005). 
Macrosocial transitions tend to affect the social dimension first (Silbereisen, Pin-
quart, tomasik, 2010). research in post-communist countries in central and eastern 
Europe has shown that the downfall of communism led to significant macrosocial 
changes: increase in divorces, emergence of single households (silbereisen, pinquart, 
Tomasik, 2010); unemployment influenced career stability (Mickiewicz, 2010), par-
ticularly among the young population (roberts, 2001). relatively rapid changes also 
occurred in the age at marriage or leaving the parental home (silbereisen, tomasik, 
2008). In comparison, changes in adaptive psychological functioning appeared very 
slowly and gradually (silbereisen, pinquart, tomasik, 2010). 
However, macrosocial changes in the 1980s and 1990s in the post-communist 
countries of central and eastern europe have brought not only negative changes, 
but also positive ones such as free choice of study or free travel abroad (Klicperová, 
Feierabend, Hofstetter, 1997). The influence of macrosocial changes on individual 
successful development depends also on a person,s age. the most extensive losses 
usually occur in elderly people (Hofäcker, Buchholz, Blossfeld, 2010). In contrast, 
young people in their 20s or 30s could use the new social situation to improve their 
lives: they were at the start of their careers; it was much easier for them to change 
career direction, start their own businesses or work abroad (titma, tuma, 2005). 
These findings suggest that successful development has to be studied only in the 
context of a concrete culture and society. In the transitional society we have to be 
careful what characteristics we define as indicators of successful development. Many 
of them can be affected by macrosocial changes. While these variables are surely an 
important focus of longitudinal studies in relatively stable societies (pulkkinen, ny-
gren, Kokko, 2002), it is always advisable to ask what information value they would 
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have in societies which have gone through such fundamental social, economic and/or 
political changes as central and eastern european countries have in the past twenty 
years (see schaie, elder, 2005). 
Current study
research on human development in a changing society faces many pitfalls. the 
number of cross-sectional and especially longitudinal studies dealing with the influ-
ence of macrosocial changes on human development is still relatively small. With few 
exceptions, research is currently prevailing in post-communist countries (silbereisen, 
tomasik, 2008; titma, tuma, 2005). many of these studies are moreover rather so-
ciologically oriented. our study is based on a longitudinal study running since 1961 
in Brno (czech republic). unlike many other psychological longitudinal studies that 
deal with influences of macrosocial change, our research focuses on various psycho-
logical and social characteristics such as temperament and personality, well-being, 
values, socioeconomic status or career stability.
Our first aim was to predict positive social functioning in terms of career stability 
in middle adulthood based on personality and socio-economic variables from child-
hood, adolescence and early adulthood. as an indicator of adaptive social function-
ing, we used career stability because it adequately reflects developmental tasks of 
adulthood – integrating the individual into society through work and acceptance of 
social norms. unstable career line may be connected to higher probability of problem 
behavior and psychological distress (pulkkinen, ohranen, tolvanen, 1999). stability 
of career line that indicates successful integration into society through work is used 
also in other longitudinal studies of successful development (e.g., pulkkinen, nygren, 
Kokko, 2002). 
career stability research shows that personality traits play a substantial role. at 
present, there are a large number of studies dealing with the relation between career 
and adult personality. relations between personality and subjective and objective ca-
reer success were visible throughout adulthood (Judge et al., 1999; ng, Feldman, 
2014), particularly between low neuroticism, high emotional regulation and stable 
career (pulkkinen, ohranen, tolvanen, 1999). other studies point to the relation be-
tween career stability and high agreeableness (Wille, deFruyt, Freys, 2010) or high 
extraversion, especially in women (pulkkinen, ohranen, tolvanen, 1999). unstable 
career, specifically in the context of long-term unemployment, is associated with high 
neuroticism (rönkä, pulkkinen, 1995) and higher openness to experience (Wille, 
deFruyt, Freys, 2010; carless, arnup, 2010). In these studies personality traits such 
as extraversion and neuroticism repeatedly appear as correlates of successful social 
functioning (career stability). We would like to know whether they will also apply in 
the longer term aspect. Therefore, our first hypothesis was that career stability in mid-
dle adulthood would be connected to personality traits in adolescence (extraversion 
and neuroticism). 
other important source of successful career orientation is academic functioning 
(such as school achievement or motivation) (Kokko, pulkkinen, lyyra, 2008). this 
can affect attitudes toward work, job seeking or the incidence of long-term unemploy-
ment (Pulkkinen, Nygren, Kokko, 2002). Regarding these finding, our second hypothe- 
sis is connected to academic achievement. We assumed that higher education would 
be connected to successful social functioning indicated by career stability. 
our second aim was to look on intergenerational continuity in socioeconomic sta-
tus (levels of education and occupation), due to the fact that our participants were 
at the beginning of their family and work adult life, when significant macrosocial 
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changes took place in the czech republic (Velvet revolution in 1989; the dissolu-
tion of czechoslovakia in 1993). other studies exploring intergenerational stability 
in similar conditions discovered a significant gap between generations before and 
after the transition (silbereisen, tomasik, 2008; titma, tuma, 2005). these studies 
are often based on comparison of socioeconomic status (education and occupation) of 
parents (generation before) and participants (generation after macrosocial change). In 
our study these data were also available. therefore, we were interested also in inter-
generational continuity. We would like to know whether intergenerational discontinu-
ity is also manifested in our sample, especially in the area of occupational status. 
metHoD
Sample
the original longitudinal study titled ‘the psychological development of school 
children coming from different social environments’ was carried out by the Insti-
tute of psychology of the academy of sciences of the czech republic between 1961 
and 1980. at the start, the study counted 557 children born between 1961 and 1964 
(50.1% girls). During the longitudinal study, the dataset suffered from attrition as ex-
pected. out of the original number of 557 subjects, less than 350 were examined at the 
age of 16. the decrease of subjects at the age of 16 years was caused by the transition 
from primary school to secondary school. 
In the follow-up study, the original participants were approached with a request 
for participation in the follow-up project. The first wave of research took place be-
tween 2001 and 2005; data were obtained from 83 subjects (mean age at first contact, 
39.7 years, 48 women). a detailed description of the sample in terms of demographic 
characteristics can be found in the study by Blatný, Jelínek and Osecká (2007). The 
life History calendar method was administered in a separate session. this fact is 
reflected in the different number of respondents (N = 74, 41 women) in the corre-
sponding analyses and different mean age of respondents (42.42 years). the second 
wave of investigations within the adult population was done  in 2011, when 76 people 
participated in the study (44 women, mean age 48.1 years).
Instruments
Parents
parental socioeconomic status was indicated by their education and occupational sta-
tus. Information about parents’ education was obtained at the participant’s birth and 
was evaluated for mothers and fathers separately. according to International stan-
dard Classification of Education (ISCED; Czech Statistical Office, 2008) we clas-
sified parental education into four groups: 1 = university education; 2 = high school 
with school leaving exam; 3 = high school without school leaving exam; and 4 = basic 
education. 
Information about parental occupation was obtained when participants were 
10 years old. Occupational status was classified by modified Erikson-Goldthorpe so-
cial class scheme (EGP; Katrňák, 2005) into three groups: 1 = highest level of oc-
cupational status; 2 = middle level of occupational status; and 3 = lowest level of 
occupational status.
Adolescence
at age 16, personality characteristics were measured using the maudsley persona- 
lity Inventory (mpI) (eysenck, 1959). reliability in terms of internal consistency for 
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extraversion and neuroticism scales found in our sample is satisfactory (cronbach`s 
αe = .68; Cronbach`s αn = .86).
Adulthood 
For objective life events we administered life History calendar (caspi et al., 1996, 
modified by L. Pulkkinen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland). This method was used 
to obtain retrospective information about important events from the respondent’s life. 
Two dimensions were taken into account when identifying significant life events: time 
(chronological) and thematic (parallel) level. 
using the data from life History calendar we created a variable characterizing the 
respondents in terms of a lifelong career line (measured in 47–49 years). We classi-
fied respondents’ career lines as stable, unstable or changeable (similar to Pulkkinen, 
ohranen, tolvanen, 1999). We evaluated the stability of a career from 27 years of 
age, to better compare people with different levels of education. a stable career is 
characterized by a job in the same field without periods of unemployment. Change-
able careers occur among people who interrupted their careers to study or left to take 
care of a household (care for children, parents, etc.). If they work in the same field, 
they often change jobs. an unstable career is characterized by high variability of jobs 
together with employment outside the field of attained education. In this group, peri-
ods of unemployment longer than 6 months can occur (not associated with waiting to 
start a new job).
Information about level of education and occupational status led to the formation 
of indicators of participants’ socioeconomic status in adulthood. using data from life 
History calendar, we evaluated the level of education and occupation of participants 
in adulthood (measured in 41–45 years). similar to parental education, we used modi-
fied ISCED classification (Czech Statistical Office, 2008): 1 = university education; 
2 = high school with school leaving exam; and 3 = high school without school leaving 
exam. No participant had basic education. For occupational status we used modified 
EGP classification again (Katrňák, 2005): 1 = highest level of occupational status; 
2 = middle level of occupational status; and 3 = lowest level of occupational status.
Methods of analysis
relations between stability of career line and education as well as relations between 
parental socioeconomic status and participants’ career stability were described by 
multinomial logistic regression analysis. In the context of regression analysis, we 
used the bootstrapping method (1000 samples, percentile based confidence interval). 
For measuring intergenerational (dis)continuity between parental and participants’ so-
cioeconomic status (education and occupation) we used nonparametric correlational 
analysis – Kendall’s tau-b.
results
In the first step of the data analysis, we analyzed the relationship between stability of 
career line and adolescent personality traits (see table 1). extraversion in 16 years was 
a significant predictor of career line. Using Multinomial logistic regression we found 
that the significant personality predictors of career stability include only extraversion. 
the results show that extraversion in adolescence might play an important role in 
prediction of stability of career line in middle adulthood. Higher level of extraversion 
increases the likelihood of the career being changeable, compared to unstable. also 




s education and mother
,
s occupation that were different for stable 
and unstable career line. on the other hand, the relationship between stability of ca-
reer line and one
,
s own education and occupation was nonsignificant. Therefore, we 
can accept our fist hypothesis (connection of career stability and adolescent personal-
ity traits) but our second hypothesis (connection of own education and career stabil-
ity) could not be confirmed.
Table 1 prediction of professional career type at age 50 based on the characteristics of personality 
characteristics in adolescence, education and parental socioeconomic status
predictor χ2(2) significant paired comparisons (p < 0.05) B(se) exp(B)
95% confidence 
interval
extraversion 6.85* changeable vs. unstable .29 (.13) 1.34 (1.04; 1.72)
neuroticism .26
education 1.42
father,s education 18.30** stable vs. unstable -3.97 (1.99) .20 (.00; 0.94)
father,s occupation 8.95
mother,s education 5.38
mother,s occupation 11.94* stable vs. unstable 6.75 (2.72) 850.39 (4.12; 175692.52)
** .01 level of significance; * .05 level of significance
Level of significance of overall model is acceptable (χ2 = 45.63; df = 28; p = .02; cox and snell 
pseudo r2 = .56; nagelkerke r2 = .64).
We further focused on intergenerational continuity between parental and partici-
pants’ socioeconomic status indicated by the level of education and by occupational 
status. We found intergenerational continuity in both dimensions of socioeconomic 
status. In the dimension of education it was τb = .23 (with father´s education; n = 69) 
and τb = .40 (with mother´s education; n = 71), both at the level p < .01. In the dimen-
sion of occupational status it was τb = .19 (with father´s occupational status; n = 63) 
and τb = .21 (with mother´s occupational status; n = 64), both at the level p < .05. 
regarding these results we cannot accept our third hypothesis about low intergenera-
tional continuity.
DIscussIon
In comparison with other longitudinal studies exploring the area of social functioning 
conducted in more stable societies (e.g. Jyls; Feldt et al., 2005), we have found dif-
ferences mainly in the career area: the results of our study suggest that occurrence of 
changeable career line was more frequent in our sample and it was understood in more 
positive terms. other studies connect extraversion with stable career line (Kokko, 
Bergman, pulkkinen, 2003), but our results indicate the relation between extraversion 
and changeable career. 
one of the possible explanations could be the macrosocial changes occurring in 
the czech republic at the end of 1980s and early 1990s: In 1989 it was the so-called 
“Velvet revolution” that is connected to downfall of the communist regime in former 
czechoslovakia and in 1993 it was the dissolution of czechoslovakia to become the 
czech republic and slovakia. at this time our participants were in their young adult-
hood – establishing their careers and families. therefore they were much more sensi-
tive to their social environment than in other stages of life (silbereisen, chen, 2010). 
In the work context, societal changes led to the transformation of industry and priva-
tization of state companies (Svejnar, 1999). These changes have contributed signifi-
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cantly to the diversification of career trajectories that were quite uniform before the 
“Velvet revolution” of 1989. people got a chance to experiment more – to establish 
their own businesses, work abroad and try new, unusual or previously untested pro-
fessions (Krebs, 2007). Also, our participants perceived the year 1989 as a significant 
source of change, particularly in relation to entrepreneurship, life abroad or to free 
entry to the monastic order (Pilátová-Osecká, 2003).
Despite these important macrosocial changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
that occurred in the czech republic, we have found intergenerational continuity in 
both dimensions of socio-economic status. unlike other longitudinal studies that 
focused on social adaptation (silbereisen, tomasik, 2008; titma, tuma, 2005) we 
have not found a significant difference between parental and participants
,
 level of 
education and occupation. our results are more inclined to the so-called ‘matthew 
effect’ (Damian et al., 2014): children with better educated parents with high occu-
pational status have the opportunity to develop their skills and talents in various ex-
tracurricular activities or have more supportive learning environments. these chil-
dren tend to internalize the higher aspirations of their parents, especially regarding 
education level and occupational success (caspi et al., 1998; Dubow et al., 2006; 
pulkkinen, Feldt, Kokko, 2006). one of the reasons for this stability could be that 
no significant changes in the educational system appeared in the Czech Republic 
(for comparisons see the former educational systems in West and east Germany) 
(Vondracek et al., 1999).
In research on people living in a changing society, researchers often find that the 
family environment plays a less significant role in life course development than hu-
man agent factors (such as aspirations or self-efficacy) (Titma, Tuma, 2005). We, on 
the other hand, have found intergenerational continuity also in the influence of paren-
tal education on their children’s career lines. these results are more similar to stable 
societies where the influence of family background is more significant (Caspi et al., 
1998; Damian et al., 2014). 
l ImItatIons 
the limitations of the study stem from the relatively low number of subjects for 
whom the necessary data for analysis of hypothesized relationships were available. 
although the research sample was quite large at the beginning of the longitudinal 
study (over 500 children), we managed to contact only a relatively small portion of 
the original sample in adulthood. the sample attrition rate was, apart from standard 
factors, definitely affected by the long time span between the end of the original 
research (in middle adolescence of the respondents) and the initiation of the new 
follow-up study in middle adulthood. the relatively low number of respondents to 
some extent limits the validity of the conclusions made  on the basis of inferential sta-
tistics procedures. In connection with sample attrition a self-selection bias occurred. 
participants in the follow-up study had a slightly higher level of intelligence in child-
hood and adolescence in comparison with people who didn’t enter the new study, in 
terms of personality traits however, no differences between these two groups were 
found. 
 In our study we were limited also by areas studied especially in the original study 
(childhood and adolescence). especially in the area of adaptive social behavior in 
adolescence (risk or problem behavior) we had not available any data. our model of 
adolescent predictors of adult social adaptive functioning was therefore limited only 
to personality characteristics and level of education. 
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Issue
According to Kasser and Ryan (1993), fulfilment of important life goals results in in-
creased life satisfaction. Intrinsic life goals, such as like self-actualization or spiritua-
lity, are positively related to subjective well-being (sWB), whereas the relationship 
between extrinsic goals, like pleasure or money, and sWB is more complex (mar-
tos, Kop, 2012; Rijavec, Brdar, Miljković, 2006; Skarżyńska, 2003; Zawadzka et al., 
2015).
among extrinsic life goals, the ‘materialistic triad’ - comprised by fame, wealth 
and image – attracts researchers’ particular attention (Kasser, 2002). these mate-
rialistic goals, in addition to materialism or the importance of possessing goods in 
life (richins, Dawson, 1992), are associated with decreasing levels of life satisfac-
tion (Kasser, 2002) and increasing levels of psychological entitlement (twenge, 
campbell, 2009). the current paper focuses on the examination of relationships 
between the materialistic triad, sWB and entitlement. We distinguish between he-
donic and eudaimonic well-being (Deci, ryan, 2008; Waterman, 1993) and focus 
both on cognitive and affective components of hedonic well-being (Diener, em-
mons, Larsen, Giffin 1985). Social well-being is regarded as important aspect of 
eudaimonic well-being (Keyes, 1998; Keyes, schmotkin, ryff, 2002). therefore, 
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aBstract
In the current paper, the relationship between 
materialistic aspirations (fame, money and 
image) and psychological entitlement (active, 
passive and revenge) is examined. addition-
ally, the possible mediating role of hedonic and 
eudaimonic well-being are considered. sem 
analysis conducted on polish students sample 
(n = 153) revealed that materialism was posi-
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materialism was direct and unmediated by sub-
jective well-being. These findings are discussed 
in reference to the culture of materialism and 
narcissism in relation to central and east euro-
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we pay particular attention to the idea that materialism results in higher expecta-
tions toward others as expressed in entitlement and by it could decrease sWB. 
Further, we differentiate between healthy and pathological forms of entitlement 
(lessard et al., 2011; tomlinson, 2013), as we adopt three-dimensional model of 
entitlement, conceptualizing active, passive, and revenge forms of the concept 
(Piotrowski, Żemojtel-Piotrowska, 2009; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2015a). We 
assume that if the expectations toward others are realistic (i.e. healthy entitlement), 
then sWB increases. conversely, if the expectations are unrealistic and exagger-
ated (i.e. pathological entitlement), then sWB decreases, especially in relation to 
the social functioning of the individual.
Materialism and Subjective Well-being 
subjective well-being is a broad phenomenon (see Kim-prieto et al., 2013 for review). 
Deci and ryan (2008) proposed a distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic un-
derstanding of sWB. Hedonic well-being is based on pleasure and positive emotional 
balance, while eudaimonic well-being is based on self-realization, searching for the 
meaning in life and being important part of the society (ryff, 1989; ryff , singer, 
2013). positive interpersonal relationships represent one of the core dimensions of 
psychological well-being in ryff’s model (1989). Keyes (1998) proposed social well-
being as a key part of eudaimonic well-being and further developed the theory and 
measurement of this part of sWB. social well-being resulted in positive evaluation of 
self in social contexts (Keyes, 1998). 
life satisfaction is included by some scholars within the hedonic concept of subjec-
tive well-being (e.g. Deci, ryan, 2008; Diener et al., 1985), yet others posit it to be the 
outcome of hedonia and/or eudaimonia (e.g. Boski, 2009; sirgy, 2012). In the current 
study, we regard life satisfaction as a cognitive component of hedonistic well-being 
(Diener et al., 1985). according to Kasser (2002), materialism is negatively related to 
life satisfaction. However, pursuit of extrinsic goals is not always negatively related 
to lower life satisfaction. In former communist countries or less affluent societies, for 
example, extrinsic goals are unrelated or positively related to life satisfaction (see 
Zawadzka et al., 2015 for review). 
Inconsistent findings on the relationship between materialism and SWB have many 
possible sources. one of them is related to conceptualisation of sWB. typically, sWB 
is operationalized as a life satisfaction (see Hudders, pandelaere, 2012 for review). 
satisfaction with life is a cognitive component of sWB. However, the affective com-
ponent is also important (Diener et al., 2010). since materialism is related to social 
motives (Fitzmaurice, comegys, 2006), especially to status consumption (eastman et 
al., 1997; roberts, 2000), social well-being represents another aspect of human func-
tioning where negative or positive impact of materialism could manifest itself. 
materialism seems to be destructive not only for life satisfaction, but also for social 
relations, since it is related to egoistic behaviors or even greed (Belk, 1988; Kasser, 
2002). materialistic extrinsic goals are self-oriented and intrinsic, like community-
oriented interests or affiliation are other-oriented, which is especially important for 
having satisfying relations with others (Grouzet et al., 2007; schwartz, 1992). Froh et 
al. (2011) found contrasting results between gratitude (as example of intrinsic goals) 
and materialism (as expression of external goals) in relation to life satisfaction and 
social integration. However, the negative relationship between materialistic aspira-
tions and social integration was indirect. this study suggests that materialism could 
not affect social well-being directly. 
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Materialism and Psychological Entitlement 
one of materialism’s dark sides is a higher level of psychological entitlement (twenge, 
Campbell, 2009), which is defined as a sense that individual is entitled to more and 
deserves more than others (campbell et al., 2004). twenge and campbell (2009) as-
sumed that materialism is related to lower life satisfaction and a higher level of nar-
cissistic entitlement. psychological entitlement is positively related to competitive 
behaviours, egoistic attitudes in romantic relationships, and narcissism (campbell et 
al., 2004). However, this relationship seems to be limited to pathological narcissistic 
entitlement, since it is based on unrealistic demands, which is contrary to psychologi-
cal or healthy entitlement, as it is based on positive self-esteem and realistic expectan-
cies toward others (ackerman, Donellan, 2013).
Generally, analyses of the relationship between materialism and entitlement suffer 
from oversimplifying the concept of entitlement. apparently, there are many forms 
of entitlement and the most recent research has begun to adopt a more complex un-
derstanding of this phenomenon (Lessard et al., 2011; Tomlinson, 2013; Żemojtel-
piotrowska et al., 2013) or at least to admit this complexity (ackerman, Donellan, 
2013; tomlinson, 2013). In the current research, we adopt a multidimensional model 
of entitlement as a set of three attitudes: active entitlement, passive entitlement, and 
revengefulness (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013, 2015b). This model includes both 
healthy and adaptive forms of entitlement (i.e. active and passive) related to self-
worthiness and self-assertion (active entitlement) with expectations about community 
based on social solidarity norms (passive entitlement) and maladaptive, vindictive 
forms based on exaggerated and fragile self-esteem (revenge entitlement). active en-
titlement is defined as the promotion of self-interest and self-reliance in achieving life 
goals. It is positively related to psychological entitlement as described by campbell 
et al. (2004), but is less pathological, as it is not related to Neuroticism (Żemojtel-
piotrowska, piotrowski, 2011) and egoistic attitudes towards romantic relationships 
(Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Baran, 2014). Passive entitlement is based on the 
belief that other people and institutions have certain obligations toward the self. It 
demonstrates the social solidarity norm (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, 2011a). 
revenge entitlement is an expression of the protection of self-interest in situations 
where other people violate it (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013). 
 Materialism, Subjective Well-being, and Entitlement
the current research employed sem modelling to examine paths between materialistic 
goals, hedonic well-being, social well-being and entitlement. to date, limited research 
has been conducted that examines relationships between the sense of entitlement and 
sWB, and all have been conducted in the of the workplace (cooklin, rowe, Fisher, 
2007), sex differences (mcGann, steil, 2006), or child and adolescent behaviours 
(rothman, steil, 2012). recent research indicated the absence of a negative relation 
between healthy forms of entitlement (i.e. active and passive) and hedonic well-being 
(it was positive for active entitlement and insignificant for passive), and confirmed a 
negative relationship in relation to revenge entitlement (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 
2013, 2015c). a positive relationship between materialism and entitlement was also 
detected (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013). For this reason, we expect direct posi-
tive relationships between materialistic aspirations and active and revenge entitlement 
(Hypothesis 1). since our study is conducted in poland, which is a post-transitional and 
materialistic society, we predicted a positive relationship between materialistic goals 
and hedonic well-being (Hypothesis 2a). the same is assumed for social well-being, 
since fulfilment of materialistic goals in a materialistic society could be positively re-
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lated to status building and satisfaction with own position in society (Hypothesis 2b). 
as such, we assume that healthy forms of entitlement are positively related to hedonic 
well-being. more precisely, active entitlement is predicted to be positively related 
to hedonic sWB (Hypothesis 3a) and passive entitlement to be positively related to 
social well-being (Hypothesis 3b). revenge entitlement is predicted to be negatively 
related to hedonic and social well-being (Hypothesis 3c). Finally, we assume an indi-
rect effect of materialism on entitlement via hedonic and social well-being for active 
entitlement (Hypothesis 4). Concurrent with earlier research (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et 
al., 2013), no relationship between passive entitlement and materialism was identified 
and it is possible that this result will be replicated. Because prior research was based on 
different methodology (general attitude toward possessing goods), it is also possible 
that a positive relationship between materialistic aspirations (including also fame and 
image) and passive entitlement will be established. However, it could be conditioned 
by the mediating role of social well-being (Hypothesis 5), in pursuit of materialistic 
(i.e. extrinsic) aspirations could increase social well-being in a materialistic society 
and, ultimately, result in higher expectations toward others based on positive percep-
tion of one’s own position within a social group. We do not expect a direct relationship 
between hedonic well-being and passive entitlement, since passive entitlement is not 
an expression of personal dissatisfaction (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013).
metHoD
Participants
One hundred and fifty-three students from Gdansk University (psychology and com-
puter sciences) and the university of social sciences and Humanities in poznan 
(psychology) participated in the current study. participants included 74 men and 
79 women ranging in age from 18 to 47 years old (Mage = 21.68, SD = 3.54). students 
participated voluntarily. 
Procedure and Measures
participants completed the questionnaires in two separate sessions in order to effec-
tively mask the purpose of the study. In the first session, participants responded to 
a set of items related to personality. these included the entitlement Questionnaire 
(eQ) and several other methods, not reported here. In the second session, which was 
conducted two weeks subsequent to the initial session, items related to sWB and 
materialism were completed. Initially, students were asked to sign a form indicating 
their individual student numbers received at the beginning of studying. to protect 
confidentiality, these data were ultimately destroyed in order to ensure anonymity for 
participants. since the eQ measures personality traits and, as such, have high stability 
over time, this relatively long delay did not affect the results. 
Materialism. to measure materialism levels, we used the Aspirations Index (Kass-
er, ryan, 1993; polish adaptation Zawadzka et al., 2015), items referring to wealth, 
fame, and image. In each case, a single is measured by five items describing particular 
life goals (e.g. To be very wealthy; To effectively hide the effects of aging; To be known 
by many people). participants were asked how important a particular goal is for them, 
to what extent they believe that they have chance to attain this goal, and to what ex-
tent they have already attained this goal. participants answered on 7-point scale, from 
1 – definitely no, to 7 – definitely yes. to determine the materialism level we calculated 
one global score for all materialistic goals by averaging scores for particular aspira-
tions. reliability of scale was .78 (cronbach’s alpha).
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Hedonic Well-being. In order to measure subjective well-being, we used the Posi-
tive and Negative Affect Schedule (panas; Watson, clark, tellegen, 1988, polish 
adaptation Brzozowski, Watson, clark, 2010) to examine affective component of 
sWB and Satisfaction with Life Scale (sWls; Diener et al., 1985, polish adaptation 
Juczynski, 2001) to examine cognitive components. next, we used one combined in-
dicator of SWB, since in preliminary analyses they were significantly correlated and a 
higher-order eFa with a one-factor solution allowed for explanation of 51.17% of the 
variance, we had no separate predictions for affective and cognitive components of 
sWB as separate variables. the reliability of the composed indicator was .51 (cron-
bach’s alpha).
In the present study, the 20-item version of the panas was implemented. the 
panas scale consists of 20 adverbs describing emotions. ten of these are related to 
positive affectivity, and ten to negative affectivity. In order to measure general affect, 
participants were asked to indicate how they “usually tend to feel.” responses were 
ranked on a 5-point scale (from 1 – never to 5- very often). the sWls consists of 
5 items, each measuring general satisfaction with one`s life. In present study, we used 
it as a measure of the cognitive aspect of sWB. participants answer the questions on a 
5-point scale (from 1- I disagree to 5 – I agree). scale has demonstrated high validity 
and reliability (e.g. Diener et al., 1985).
Social Well-being. the Social Well-Being Scale (sWBs; Keyes, 1998, polish 
adaptation Karaś, Najderska, Cieciuch 2013) was used as a measure of social func-
tioning. This 33-item scale serves as a measure of social well-being, defined as self-
assessment of an individual’s social functioning. participants answer questions on a 
5-point scale (from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree). reliability of the scale 
was .79 (cronbach’s alpha).
Entitlement. to measure entitlement attitudes, we used entitlement Questionnaire 
(EQ, Piotrowski, Żemojtel-Piotrowska, 2009). In current study, we used a 15-item 
form, with 5 items per each type of entitlement as defined earlier (i.e. active, passive, 
and revenge, exemplary items are for active subscale (ae): I deserve the best; It is 
necessary to claim what you deserve; I often demand to be treated properly; for passive 
(pe): Everybody has the right to expect help from the state when in need; Disadvan-
taged persons deserve institutional help; The state should take care of the livelihood 
of the poorest; revenge (re): Someone who hurts me cannot expect my sympathy; 
I have difficulty forgiving harm done to me; I don’t forgive the wrongs I have suffered), 
as it was successfully validated in Poland and internationally (Żemojtel-Piotrowska 
et al., 2015, 2015a). participants answered questions on 6-point likert-type scale, 
ranging from 1 – definitely disagree, to 6 – definitely agree. the validity of scale is 
confirmed (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013; 2015b). Reliabilities of scales measur-
ing ae was .81, pe .90 and re .82 (cronbach’s alpha) respectively.
results
Statistical Analyses
We constructed a model to estimate structural path coefficients between constructs. 
materialism, subjective well-being, and social well-being were represented as average 
scores for total scales since the number of participants did not allow for examining 
more complex model. We allowed for correlations between three subscales of the en-




In the structural model, we predicted social well-being (socWB) and hedonistic 
well-being (HWB) with materialistic aspirations, active and revenge entitlement (see 
Figure 1). We expected a positive relationship between active entitlement and HWB 
(and possibly–socWB) and a negative relationship between revenge entitlement and 
socWB (and possible – HWB). Finally, we expected indirect effect materialism on 
passive entitlement by socWB. 
The proposed structural model fits the data well, meeting popular cut-off criteria: 
.05 for standardized root mean square residual (srmr) and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) for good fit and .08 for adequate fit and with comparative 
fit index (CFI) equal .95 for good fit and .90 for adequate fit (Lance, Butts, Michels, 
2006). The model fit indices for structural model presented at Figure 1 are as fol-
lows: : χ2 (4) = 7.33 p = .120, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .074 (90% confidence interval 
[.000 .157]), pclose = .258, srmr = .041. they could be assessed as good.
Figure 1 structural equation model (standardized estimates) 
structural model with materialism predicting active, passive and revenge entitlement with 
hedonistic well-being and social well-being as mediators. Model fit: χ2 (4, 153) = 7,33 p = .120, 
CFI = .978, RMSEA = .074 (90% confidence interval [.000 .157]), pclose = .258, SRMR = .041.
Impact of Materialistic Aspirations on Entitlement. congruent to Hypothesis 
1, materialism directly affected both active entitlement (β = .26, p < .001) and re-
venge entitlement (β = .26, p < .001), but did not directly affect passive entitlement 
(β = .00, n.s.). However, total effects for materialism on three dimensions of en-
titlement were all positive, congruent with Hypothesis 1, 4 and 5. total effects of 
materialism on active entitlement is moderate (β = .35), but total effects for revenge 
entitlement (β = .14) and passive (β = .07) are weak. 
Impact of Materialistic Aspirations on SWB. results supported Hypothesis 2a, 
as materialism was positively related to HWB (β = .23, p = .003), similar to findings 
obtained in other post-communist countries. congruent to Hypothesis 2b, materialis-
tic goals were also positively related to SocWB (β = .20, p = .011). 
Impact of Subjective Well-being on Entitlement. congruent with Hypotheses 
3a and 3b, active entitlement was directly and positively related to HWB (β = .26, 
p < .001) and passive entitlement was directly and positively related to socWB 
(β = .31, p < .001). Hypothesis 3c was supported only partially, as revenge entitlement 
was strongly negatively related to social well-being (β = -.51, p < .001) and unrelated 
to hedonic well-being (β = .00, n.s.). positive aspects of entitlement were positively 
related to both aspects of subjective well-being and to the more dysfunctional aspect, 





















Materialistic Aspirations, Subjective Well-being and Entitlement. In an effort 
to determine whether hedonic and social well-being are significant mediators of the 
relationship between materialistic aspirations and active and passive entitlement, we 
used process macro for spss (preacher, Hayes, 2008). results for mediational analy-
ses with the bootstrapping procedure are presented in table 1. 
Table 1 Indirect effects of materialistic apsirations on active and passive entitlement, 
mediated through hedonic and social well-being 
estimate se
materialism → hedonic well-being 
→ active entitlement .49 (.24 .74) .13
materialism → social well-being → active 
entitlement -.22 (-.50 .05) .14
materialism → hedonic well-being → passive 
entitlement -.25 (-.59 .08) .17
materialism → social well-being → passive 
entitlement .76 (.39 1.13) .19
note. results obtained by bootstrapping procedure (n = 1,000), with 95% confidence intervals pre-
sented in parentheses.
congruent with predictions of the mediating effect of HWB, a relationship between 
materialistic aspirations and active entitlement was detected (Ie = .49, p < .001) and, 
as a result, the total effect of materialism on active entitlement was moderate (β = .35, 
p < .001). materialistic aspirations affected active entitlement both directly and indi-
rectly, via HWB, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 4. relationship between materialistic 
aspirations and passive entitlement was fully mediated by socWB (Ie = .76, p < .001), 
supporting Hypothesis 5. 
DIscussIon
the current study aimed to examine interrelations between materialistic aspirations, 
subjective well-being (both hedonic and eudaimonic), and entitlement. First, our find-
ings support the thesis about the positive relationship between materialism and entitle-
ment. Furthermore, similar to other eastern and central european (ceeu) countries, 
we found a positive relationship between materialistic aspiration and well-being. this 
positive relationship was related both to hedonic well-being and to social well-being. 
Finally, we found that the relationship between materialistic aspirations and healthy 
forms of entitlement was mediated by subjective well-being.
Our findings could be seen as unexpected at first glance. Twenge and Campbell 
(2009) argued that focus on materialism among american youth results in higher le-
vels of entitlement and this, in turn, results in higher dissatisfaction. However, the 
polish (and ceeu as a whole) cultural context could set different conditions for the 
attainment of materialistic goals, as noted in research conducted in former post-com-
munist countries (Zawadzka et al., 2015). In comparison, the us is a post-material-
istic and affluent country focused on materialistic aspirations that could be socially 
undesirable, costly and related to higher social competition and envy (Froh et al., 
2011). on the other hand, post-communist countries are materialistic and focused on 
economic development (Inglehart, 2000). For this reason, if individuals are success-
ful in their attainment of materialistic goals, it could result in higher hedonism and a 
better social position that is reflected in higher social well-being. Finally, we based 
our assumptions on a three-dimensional model of entitlement, which assumes the 
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existence of healthy (i.e. active and passive) and unhealthy (i.e. revenge) aspects in 
formulation of expectations toward others. For this reason, everything that enhances 
people’s positive self-evaluation and happiness, as reflected in the attainment materi-
alistic goals, could in turn enhance active pursuit toward achieving one’s own goals 
and promote self-interests (i.e. active entitlement). the same seems to be true for 
passive entitlement, since higher expectations toward others could stem from positive 
evaluation of the social environment, including trust toward others and positive evalu-
ation of one’s own position in society. For this reason, individuals who successfully 
attain materialistic goals have higher social well-being and they are more prone to 
formulate expectations toward other people and institutions. 
In our study, materialism was positively related to passive entitlement only indi-
rectly, as this relationship was fully mediated by social well-being. However, materi-
alistic aspirations have some social costs, as they are directly related to revenge enti-
tlement. This finding supports the thesis formulated by Twenge and Campbell (2009) 
that focuses on the ways in which materialism can be socially costly. 
conclusIon 
Our study was conducted on a student sample, which is probably more affluent and 
successful than the average person in polish society. For this reason, the generaliza-
tion of obtained results to other age cohorts is problematic. this study was also cross-
sectional in character. For this reason, any casual predictions cannot be fully justified 
and the current findings should be treated as preliminary. Despite these limitations, 
obtained results are consistent with findings obtained by other researchers in East-
ern european context. current study does not offer explanation what is the process 
responsible for such relationship. However, complex relationships between materia-
listic aspirations, entitlement, and sWB supplement this picture. materialistic aspira-
tions are not only profitable for individuals, but they have some costs, namely revenge 
entitlement. these results suggest that attainment materialistic aspirations could be 
associated with competition and over-protection of self-interest. Further studies could 
employ more overt measures or evaluated behavioural manifestations of entitlement, 
like expectations of higher salaries (among working adults) or higher degrees (among 
students), selfish functioning in romantic relationships and many others. On the other 
hand, successful attainment of materialistic goals could positively influence self-es-
teem or feeling of agency, which supports adaptive strategies for promotion of self-
interest and achieving other, not only materialistic, life goals. 
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aBout Democracy anD Its  unDerstanDInG
In survey studies respondents are often confronted with questions such as „What do 
you think about ‘X phenomenon’?” or „How do you evaluate ‘X phenomenon’?” 
answers to questions of this kind can be reasonably interpreted as long as the sub-
jective ways of understanding ‘X phenomenon’ by respondents and researcher are 
identical. In their research arsenal, the public opinion research center (cBos) and 
social Diagnosis project have the following questions (statements to which respon-
dents take a stance): „Democracy has an advantage over other forms of governments”, 
„sometimes undemocratic governments can be more desirable than democratic go- 
vernments”, „For people such as me, it is not relevant whether the government is demo- 
cratic or undemocratic”. these statements are systematically applied (see cBos, 
2003, 2010; Czapiński, Panek, 2009, 2011). Based on the answers to these questions, 
conclusions about support for democracy in poland and its eventual changes are for-
mulated. Furthermore, it turns out that democracy systematically meets with lesser or 
greater, yet mass support. However, the functioning of democracy in poland is not so 
enthusiastically evaluated (cBos 2010, p. 3), and we cannot forget that people can 
understand commonly used abstract concepts (such as democracy) in different ways 
and even in a way that is contradictory to its dictionary definition (see Rosenberg, 
WHAT SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY MAY 
MEAN WHEN WE KNOW HOW DEMOCRACY 
IS COLLOQUIALLY UNDERSTOOD
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aBstract
research carried out in states where democracy 
is not strongly established shows that democ-
racy is sometimes understood in a way that is 
incompatible with its dictionary definitions.
the subject of this article is the ways of under-
standing democracy in poland in times of de-
mocracy consolidation. the results of psycho-
logical and sociological research carried out in 
poland since 1993 till 2010 are presented. It was 
found that besides the way of understanding de-
mocracy compatibly with its dictionary defini-
tion, democracy was colloquially understood 
as a welfare state. Democracy also turned out 
to be understood as a religious state or a state 
cultivating national values. these colloquial 
meanings might combine with each other (e.g. 
democracy as welfare religious state). Data sug-
gest that prevalent ways of understanding de-
mocracy might be dictated by the current shape 
of the political scene. Ways of understanding 
were discovered to be very weakly dependent on 
parameters of social position and demographic 
variables. the diversity of ways of understand-
ing democracy was explained firstly by the sub-
stantial complexity of democracy itself making 
it difficult to grasp, and secondly by prevalent 
subjective notions of a “good state”.
It may be said that the study of support for de-
mocracy – in order to be valid – should take into 
consideration the colloquial that democracy is 
understood by ordinary people.
Key words: 
democracy consolidation, 
ways of understanding of democracy,
support for democracy, 
welfare state, 
religious state
address correspondence to: kkorzeniowski@psych.pan.pl
the extended polish version of this article is going to be published in ‘przegląd psychologicny,.
68
Ward, chilton, 1988). that is why we have to be extremely cautious when formulat-
ing conclusions based on the mentioned questions. We must first precisely look at 
different, including colloquial, ways of understanding democracy. let us focus on a 
few problems concerning its exact defining.
If we observe that in colloquial language the term „democracy” can have different 
meanings, then it is impossible not to notice that it also has different meanings given 
by, as one could think, specialists, scientists and politicians. It is worth remembering 
that scientists focus mainly on analyzing different existing forms of democracy and the 
different meanings ascribed to them, while politicians create these different forms and 
meanings. as we know, democracy is – etymologically – the power of the people. at 
this point caution is recommended. In his critical analyses of six ways of understanding 
the term people, G. sartori aptly notes that democracy could mean totalitarianism based 
on some of those understandings (sartori, 1998). authors distinguish many forms of 
democracy: liberal, direct, participatory, social, radical, cosmopolitan, deliberative, and 
others (see Dryzek, 2004; Kurki, 2010, norris, 2011; reykowski, 2007; Wasilewski, 
2007). a few axial features of democracy are also being distinguished (see Dryzek, 
2004; norris, 2011; payne, 2009; sartori, 1998), but will not be brought up here for 
obvious reasons. It is pointed out that two flagship values of democracy – freedom and 
equality – are in opposition. J. thomassen explains the uneasy cohabitation between 
them by citing their different historical roots, as they emerged in different times and 
places. Freedom was an axial value of the english revolution, and for the French revo-
lution it was equality (thomassen, 2007). It is no wonder that the category of essen-
tial contestability is being applied to democracy given its many traditions, forms, and 
understandings. l. Whitehead states that essential contestability „in general refers to 
the idea that a term can have many meanings at a given moment of time” (Whitehead, 
2002, p. 14). according to J. n. Gray, essential contestability means that concepts are 
not only contested in a historical sense, but that in principle it is impossible to conclu-
sively decide on the correct application of the concept (Gray, 1977, p. 338). prevailing 
over terminological confusion, m. Kurki tries to explain democracy using the terms 
pluralization and contextualization. He points out that the observed variety of forms of 
democracy and meanings of this concept results from the social, historical and political 
conditionings in which particular democratic systems emerged and exist (Kurki, 2010). 
J. Keane expressed similar thoughts in his indigenization theory, according to which 
democracy inevitably adapts itself to the specific local conditions in which it develops 
(Keane, 2009; according to norris, 2011, p. 148). at this point, the results of a. sche-
dler’s and R. Sarfield’s research should be mentioned. They observed a phenomenon 
of support for the abstract term of democracy with rejection of the empirical core of 
liberal democracy, and distinguished a few kinds of „adjective democrats”: intolerant, 
paternalistic, homophobic, and excluding (Schedler, Sarsfield, 2007).
analysis of ways of understanding democracy is not a separate and strongly based 
trend in research conducted by Western authors living in democratic countries. this 
seems equally understandable as the lack of research concerning understatement of 
the term „clear air” in countries without natural environment contamination. empiri-
cal findings concerning ways of understanding democracy appeared as an aside to 
research on acceptance or support for democracy, especially when more sophistica-
ted measures than simple survey methodology were applied (see canache, mondak, 
seligson, 2001). a second source of inspiration are democracies that were born in 
recent decades. so-called post-communist countries seem to be especially popular 
research areas. We will focus on systematic research concerning ways of understand-
ing democracy conducted in poland in the further part of this article. comparisons of 
69
residents of eastern and Western lands of united Germany require special attention. 
r. rohrschneider conducted extensive research on German residents and members of 
parliament. according to him, general support for rules of democracy was similar in 
both parts of the country. However, in some specific terms (e.g. tolerance or plural-
ism acceptance) Western Germany transcended over eastern parts. this difference 
also concerned members of parliament (r. rohrschneider, 1999). the understanding 
of democracy in eastern and Western lands were studied by r. I. Hofferbert and 
H. D. Klingerman. They observed that eastern Germans regarded definitional attributes 
of welfare state as discriminants of democracy more often than western Germans. In 
other words, their understanding of democracy as ,,protection of socio-economic con-
ditions” was stronger (Hofferbert, Klingerman, 2001). 
research conducted in russia between 1998 and 2003 by e. carnaghan is also 
of particular interest. she applied a method of intensive ethnological interviews to a 
small group consisting of 60 persons. Her interest was not so much in the representa-
tiveness of the respondents as in the most accurate recreation of their course of think-
ing. It turned out that the political thinking of her respondents was characterized by 
significant fluency and ductility. The author formulated the following conclusion: “not 
only can we not be sure that respondents mean what researchers mean when they talk 
about democracy, we cannot even be sure that they mean what they say they mean” 
(carnaghan, 2011, pp. 690-691).
A specific kind of race can be noticed in studies of democracy. On the one hand, 
scientists have struggled for years with the complexity of the term and phenomenon of 
democracy, and people’s colloquial representations about what democracy is. on the 
other hand, politicians are an eternally living and everlasting source of the high and 
constantly growing level of this complexity. In this field, politicians from the so-called 
real socialism camp are especially responsible for it. another name for this camp was 
,,people’s democracy”, though it is commonly known that it had little in common with 
democracy and especially the ,,power of the people”. let us remember an interesting 
linguistic experiment attributed to mao Zedong. He claimed that the order brought 
by him to china, obviously called democracy, has an advantage over Western liberal 
democracy. the latter is usually described as ,,power of the people”, while china’s 
system was ,,power for the people”. In other words, democracy was used to define an 
autocratic state that posed as a welfare state and took away its citizens responsibility for 
themselves, their community and country. This definition is supposedly derived from 
the confucian tradition of china (see norris, 2011, shi, 2000), but today it bears mainly 
the mark of newspeak. M. Guida describes a different modification of the meaning of 
democracy shared by chosen turkish muslims. their ,,concept” includes elections and 
representative institutions, but there is no place for pluralism, tolerance, and citizenship 
(Guida, 2010), which makes place for a special meaning of democracy concept.
this elaboration is not based on any theory. We will try to conduct an empirical in-
vestigation to identify the ways of understanding democracy and their changes during 
the time of transformation and system consolidation of democracy in poland.
colloQuIal Ways oF  unDerstanDInG Democracy. 
polIsH stuDIes
First psycho-social research
The ways of understanding democracy by Poles were first studied in 1993. This was 
precursory research, so it requires a little more attention. J. reykowski, the leader of 
this research project, justified its necessity as follows: ,,To understand the attitudes 
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towards democracy and behaviors towards it, it is necessary to know how this concept 
is represented in the minds of so-called regular people, because the fate of democracy 
is ultimately up to them” (reykowski, 1995, p. 23).
the selection of the sample was purposive – the project’s authors intended to 
investigate persons who were contrasted on the dimensions of: financial situa-
tion (good-bad), political commitment (active-passive), and education (high-low) 
(see chmielewski, 1995). as for measuring the ways of understanding democracy, 
J. reykowski’s original D scale was applied. It consisted of 54 characteristics of 
the socio-political system. One third of them were definitional features of a demo-
cratic system, called democracy’s markers. The rest of them were nonspecific terms 
(e.g. describing other, indifferent to democracy social orders) that characterized un-
democratic systems. every characteristic was evaluated on a 4-step scale (0 – had 
nothing to do with democracy, 3 – best defines democracy).
Factor analysis revealed four basic colloquial meanings of the democracy concept. 
these were (we use the original terminology):
– ,,Efficient welfare state” (17.3% of explained variance) – e.g. Protection of worker’s businesses, 
Protection of pensioners and retired people, Medical care for everyone
– ,,Democratic relations (values)” (1.8% of variance) – e.g. Majority takes into account minority 
laws, Jews and Ukrainians – Polish citizens – same rights as Poles, Those who have advantage 
cannot impose their opinion
– ,,Democratic institutions” (6.5% of variance) – e.g. Free elections, State consequently obeys the 
law, Independent courts
– ,,Ideological state” (4.3% of variance) – e.g. Youth raised in the spirit of religion, Dominance 
of Christian values, Traditions of ,,Solidarność” are nurtured, Reliance on national traditions 
(reykowski, 1995, p. 29–30)
the most general conclusion was that ,,... people differ when it comes to the subjec-
tive meaning that they attribute to democracy...” (reykowski, 1995, p. 51). Further-
more, it turns out that ,,... political freedom is a desirable system feature mostly for 
those who feel that under these conditions they can ,,control the situation”; those who 
do not have this feeling expect something different from the system – protectiveness.” 
(1995, p. 52). subjective or colloquial ways of understanding democracy that do not 
demonstrate compliance with dictionary definitions deserve special attention. ,,A se-
cond form (of understanding democracy – ,,welfare state” – K. K. ) depends on treat-
ing democracy as a system that has to guarantee every member of society basic rights 
and decent standards of living” (1995, p. 52). However, the most interesting way of 
understanding democracy was identifying it with an undemocratic, closed and ideolo-
gized system. this indicates that the term democracy can be used to describe a system 
that not only has little in common with democracy, but is also antidemocratic. 
Continuation of research with the use of the D Scale
Further research using J. Reykowski’s D Scale was conducted by K. Jaśko and 
m. Kossowska (2008) in 2007, a time at which democracy was already consolidated 
in poland.
using factor analysis, the authors distinguished three ways of understanding de-
mocracy. Items loaded with a strength >=.30 were taken into account when inter-
preting factors. The first factor might be interpreted as ,,autocratic national-catholic 
welfare state”. the second factor, ,,state of law”, loaded the so-called markers of de-
mocracy, descriptions of democratic institutions, and values. the third one was ,,na-
tional-catholic state”. another matter is also worth mentioning: despite the fact that 
the authors assumed the existence of several distinct ways of understanding democ-
racy, they – it is not clear why – calculated the value of Cronbach’s α for the whole 
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D scale, which consists of diagnostic statements for all – supposedly distinct – ways 
of understanding democracy. The value of Cronbach’s α amount to .91 (Jaśko, Kos-
sowska, 2008, p. 249), which means that all ways of understanding democracy – con-
trary to the primal assumption – were highly correlated. this result supports the use 
factors as indices of ways of understanding democracy.
at this point it is impossible to arbitrate the basis of differences among the results 
of research using the D scale in 1993 and 2007. However, one issue is beyond any 
doubt. since the beginning of the system transformation, democracy has been un-
derstood by poles in several ways. let us stress that some of these ways are in strict 
opposition to dictionary definitions of democracy. The proposed above reinterpreta-
tion of K. Jaśko’s and M. Kossowska’s results seems to indicate that some patterns 
of understanding democracy detected by J. reykowski became mixed or articulated 
more strongly. 
During the last decades, research was also conducted on representative samples by 
the reputable public opinion research center (cBos).
Research on support and ways of understanding democracy conducted 
by CBOS
Before we present the results of research on ways of understanding democracy, let 
us introduce some data related to poles’ attitudes towards democracy based on direct 
questions in which the term ,,democracy” was used explicite. cBos conducted this 
research for many years on representative samples, which allows for observation of 
changes over time. Let us concentrate on reports coming from the twenty first century. 
one of the systematically asked question was: ,,Do you agree or disagree with the 
statement that democracy has an advantage over every other way of government?” In 
2006–2010, the percent of people who agreed (definitely or moderately) was between 
66 and 72 percent, while those who did not agree were between 13 and 17 percent 
(there were also people who did not have an opinion or refused to answer this ques-
tion). 
another question repeated in cBos’s surveys was: ,,Do you agree with the state-
ment that undemocratic governments can sometimes be more desirable than demo-
cratic ones?” In 2002–2010, the distribution of responses for this question was subject 
to major fluctuations. 31–52 percent of respondents agreed with it while 30–48 per-
cent did not.
If we treat these casually presented results seriously we should say that two thirds 
of polish citizens support democracy, around half of them see the advantages of un-
democratic ways of governance, and that the “polish way” of democracy meets with 
disapproval. We will return to this issue in the summary of this article.
Researchers from CBOS were clearly aware of the significance of studying ways 
of understanding democracy and took on the task. they confronted their respondents 
with the question ,,Which of the listed features do you find important in recognizing a 
country as democratic and which are unimportant?” and then asked for an evaluation 
of several dozen features concerning the functioning of state, society, authorities, etc. 
(cBos: 2010, p. 15). research of this kind was conducted in 2003 and 2010, and fac-
tor analyses were performed for each research wave. the authors obtained such ways 
of understanding democracy as: ,,rule of law, civic liberties”, ,,egalitarian welfare 
state”, ,,liberalism, self-governance, freedom of choice”, and ,,collectivism”. some 
variability and stability in the results is worth noting. Significant differences seemed 
to rely on the fact that the ,,rule of law” factor transferred into fourth place in 2010 
while the ,,Prosperity, egalitarianism, welfare state” factor moved into first position. 
72
this could mean that ,,prosperity and welfare state” was a more distinctive designa-
tum of democracy in pole’s consciousness in 2010 than it was in 2003. conversely, 
this could apply to ,,rule of law”. the last place was permanently occupied by the 
,,collectivism” factor, which bears some marks of populism.
the choice of statements in this research requires special attention. Firstly, these 
statements were connoted with positive or neutral affect. secondly, different forms 
of democracy predominated other kinds of statements – those describing un- or anti-
democratic systems were not included. researchers did not give their respondents a 
chance to reveal ways of understanding democracy that were the opposite of it. there-
fore, they distinguished at most colloquial ways of distinguishing different forms of 
democracy (from a number of statements that were less or more – but mostly more 
– accurate markers of democracy).
oWn researcH
Method of measuring ways of understanding democracy
the method applied in both studies was patterned on J. reykowski’s original D scale, 
but it was significantly shorter. We used 12 statements, four for each distinguished 
way of understanding democracy:
– democracy as a democratic state (markers of democracy):
Everyone can publicly express (his/her) beliefs.•	
Majority takes into account minority’s laws.•	
Every citizen has the same electoral laws.•	
There are many political parties with different programs.•	
– democracy as a welfare state:
The state provides for decent living conditions for everyone.•	
The state guarantees education for everyone who wants it.•	
Everyone is allowed to benefit from healthcare.•	
The state helps the poor and those who earn less money.•	
– democracy as a religious-national state:
In raising children, religious commandments are being obeyed.•	
Polish Catholic traditions are being nurtured.•	
For all Poles, the nation is the supreme value.•	
Poland is truly independent.•	
the listed statements were randomly mixed in the questionnaire. In the correspond-
ing part of the interview, a pollster read the following instruction: ,,It is said that for 
many years around the world, including poland, democracy prevails. there are, how-
ever, discussions and arguments about what a democratic system really is. We ask you 
to tell us what, according to you, democracy is. I will read different statements and ask 
that you tell me if they correctly and accurately characterize a democratic state. We 
can speak of democracy if…” at this point a pollster read four statements, noted the 
answers, repeated ,,We can speak of democracy if…”, read the next four statements, 
etc. the procedure of repeating these parts of the instruction was included to remind the 
respondents of the aim of the research and to avoid e.g. evaluating the statements in light 
of the current situation in poland. respondents marked their answers using the standard 
scale: ,,I definitely do not agree – I do not agree – I agree – I definitely agree”.
The first study was conducted on a representative sample consisting of 1522 adult 
poles. It was carried out by the social research laboratory (pBs). the second study 
was conducted in 2010 on a representative sample of 800 persons by 4p research 
mix. capI procedure was used in both studies.
73
results
to discover ways of understanding democracy – in compliance with existing tradition 
– we performed factor analysis with Varimax rotation. In the research from 2002, the 
determinant value was .023 and Kmo measure statistic was .867, which allows us to 
recognize this solution as reliable. obtained results are presented in table 1.
Table 1 results of factor analysis on ways of understanding democracy in 2002
Matrix of rotated componentsa
component
1 2 3
the state provides for decent living conditions for everyone .804
everyone can publicly express his/her beliefs .525 .504
the state guarantees education for everyone who wants it .795
majority takes into account with minority‘s laws .699
In raising children, religious commandments are being obeyed .849
Everyone is allowed to benefit from healthcare .699
polish catholic traditions are being nurtured .846
every citizen has the same electoral laws .720
For all poles, the nation is the supreme value .407 .481
the state helps the poor and those who earn less money .763
poland is truly independent .426 .416
there are many political parties with different programs .811
percent of explained variance 29.39 16.39 14.13
The solution presented in Table 1 explained 59.91% of variance, with the first factor 
mostly loading items diagnostic for democracy understood as a welfare state. It also 
loaded the ,,majority takes into account minority’s laws” statement with comparable 
strength, which seems to also express a care for those endangered by helplessness. 
The other two items loaded by the first factor expressed values of national commu-
nity. this factor can be interpreted as “democracy as a communal welfare state”. the 
second factor mostly loaded items expressing religious norms and values and the item 
,,For all of poles, the nation is the supreme value”. It seems that it could be interpreted 
as ”democracy as a religious-national state”. the third factor – loading three of the 
four markers of democracy – was ,,democracy as democratic state”; however, this was 
with the addition of nation worship.
We tested whether the distinguished ways of understanding democracy depend on 
an individual’s location in the social structure. It turned out that understanding de-
mocracy as a communal welfare state does not depend on sex (F(1, 1520) = .01, ns.), 
age (r = -.02, ns.), education (F(9, 1512) = .79, ns.), father’s education (F(9, 1512) = 
= 1.24, ns.), income of household (r = .05, ns.), or income per capita (r = .02, ns.). 
It slightly depends on the size of place of residence (F(5, 1516) = 3.64, p < .005, 
η2 = .01), and was the strongest in small cities (20-50 thousand residents). under-
standing of democracy as a religious-national state was stronger among women 
(F(1, 1520) = 11.55, p < .0001, η2 = .05), elderly persons (r = .17, p < .0001), less edu-
cated persons, (F(9, 1520) = 9.05, p < .0001, η2 = .05), persons having less educated 
fathers (F(9, 1520) = 8.85, p < .0001, η2 = .05), persons having less household income 
(r = -.12, p < .0001) and income per capita (r = -.13, p < .0001), and persons living in 
villages and in smaller cities (F(5, 1516) = 18.77, p < .0001, η2 = .06). understand-
ing democracy as a democratic state was stronger among men (F(1, 1520) = 2.52, 
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p < .001, η2 = .02), persons with better education (F(9, 1512) = 4.5. p < .0001, 
η2 = .03), persons having better educated fathers (F(9, 1512) = 2.52, p < .01, η2 = .02), 
persons having larger income in household (r = .12, p < .0001) and per capita (r = .09, 
p < .005), and persons living in larger cities (F(5, 1516) = 3.22, p < .005, η2 = .01). 
We did not observe any connections between this kind of understanding of democracy 
and age (r = -.04, ns.).
Table 2 results of factor analysis on ways of understanding democracy in 2010
Matrix of rotated componentsa
component
1 2
the state provides for decent living conditions for everyone .588
everyone can publicly express his/her beliefs .758
the state guarantees education for everyone who wants it .592
majority takes into account minority’s laws .515 .525
In raising children, religious commandments are being obeyed .827
Everyone is allowed to benefit from healthcare .695
polish catholic traditions are being nurtured .791
every citizen has the same electoral laws .724
For all poles, the nation is the supreme value .543 .506
the state helps the poor and those who earn less money .602
poland is truly independent .667
there are many political parties with different programs .643
percent of explained variance 29.73 27.18
the results of factor analysis performed on data from 2010 are presented in table 2. 
the determinant value was .006 and Kmo measure was .911, which also allows us to 
recognize this solution as reliable.
the presented two-factor solution explained 56.92% of variance. It turned out that 
the first factor mostly loaded every marker of democracy, but also items diagnostic for 
welfare and national state. let us call this factor ,,democracy as a homely democratic 
state”. the second factor mostly loaded items expressing religious norms and values, 
and secondly items diagnostic for welfare state and the statement ,,poland is truly inde-
pendent”. this factor could be interpreted as ,,democracy as a religious-welfare state”.
as previously, we tested relationships between ways of understanding democracy 
and indicators of individual’s location in social structure. It turned out that understand-
ing of democracy as a homely democratic state did not depend on sex (F(1, 798)= 
= 1.56, ns.), age (r = -.07, ns.), education (F(6,793) = 1.95, ns.), income (r = - .04, 
ns.), income per capita (r = .04, ns.), or place of residence (F(7,792) = 2.55, ns.). 
The only significant relationship was between this way of understanding democracy 
and father’s education (F(6,793) = 5.03, p < .0001, η2 = .04), but this result is hard 
to interpret. understanding democracy as a religious-welfare state turned out to be 
stronger among women (F(1, 798) = 6.55, p = .01, η2 = .01) and less educated persons 
(F(6,793) = 3.63, p < .001, η2 = .03). there was no relationship between this way of 
understanding and age (r = .06, ns.), father’s education (F(6,793) = 1.5. ns.), income 
of household (r = -.08, ns.), income per capita (r = -.01, ns.), or size of place of resi-
dence (F(7, 792) = 2.43, ns.). 
It may be worth noting that in in the given time frame of this research the best ex-




The presented results of research conducted in Poland show a significant variety of 
ways of understanding democracy. The first imposing conclusion may be that Poles’ 
representations of what democracy is can sometimes be very distant from dictionary 
definitions. It turned out that the most popular way was understanding democracy as 
a welfare state. this is supported by the number of factors (results of factor analy-
ses) interpreted in this way and the percent of explained variance by these factors, 
which can be read as the power of organizing content concerning ways of governing 
democratic order. this was also noticeable in the cBos research (especially in 2010), 
in which markers of welfare state predominated among statements evaluated by the 
respondents. as we mentioned earlier, seeing democracy as a welfare state is a phe-
nomenon characteristic for post-communist countries in which the democratic system 
is not strongly rooted. However, it is hard to decide whether it should be assigned to 
the legacy of a rightly passed system or perceived difficulties of the transformation 
process. 
In research conducted using J. reykowski’s D scale (and its mutations), it turned 
out that democracy can be understood as an undemocratic system that is dominated 
by a monosystem of national or christian values. moreover, in our research it turned 
out that understanding democracy as a democratic system was systematically ,,en-
riched” by national content. It is worth asking whether this formula of colloquial 
understanding of democracy is a feature of the polish socio-political mentality. Wide 
cross-cultural research could answer it. 
We observed that more or less accurate ways of understanding democracy, i.e. 
those in which markers of democracy predominated, occurred more often among 
persons located higher or in more beneficial positions in the social structure. These 
results bring us close to answering a question about sources of inaccurate ways of 
understanding democracy. this attempt will be preceded by a short introduction. 
It is commonly known that democracy as polyarchy (see Dahl, 1971) is an incredibly 
complex system and comprehending it requires well-developed, or as p. norris would 
call it, enlightened political knowledge (norris, 2011, p 152). J. reykowski showed 
that the immanent feature of democracy is existence of antinomies (e.g. majority-mi-
nority, conflict-consensus, autonomy-obedience, law-conscience). Cognitive coping 
with these antinomies is possible when an advanced level of cognitive development is 
achieved, i.e. the ability to coordinate opposite perspectives, achieving an operational 
or more preferably systemic level of cognitive development (reykowski, 1993). peo-
ple with larger cultural capital were closer to an accurate understanding of democracy, 
while people with smaller cultural capital coped with understanding democracy dif-
ferently. This exemplifies that people understand democracy as far as they are able. 
unable to deal with the cognitive requirements imposed by democracy, they chose op-
tions that were simpler, clearer, devoid of nuances, and sometimes closer to populism. 
They most frequently identified democracy with a welfare state or national-religious 
state (or both altogether).
let us also remember that for many people the process of democratization was a 
painful or even traumatic process for quality of life (see sztompka, 2000). the ex-
perience of deprivation could have led to a narrowing of their cognitive perspective, 
hindering the recognition of democracy’s nuances and fostering simpler solutions. 
It seems that deficits of cultural capital on the one hand and of economic capital on 
the other can make this process significantly harder. It is worth noticing, however, that 
it seems a great simplification to attribute the level of support for democracy only to 
whether one is a winner or a loser (see Blais, Gelineau, 2007).
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Broadly speaking, the way that a person/pole understands democracy has several 
sources. Democracy as an abstractive term or slogan has support from the majority of 
society, and presumably – in its opinion – describes a just, fair, and safe arrangement 
of a state. However, when an individual cannot cognitively cope with the principles of 
democratic functioning they are forced to make simplifications. In this case the easiest 
way is to refer to standards of normal or ideal conditions. The first case was described 
by rosenberg, Ward, chilton (1988). they noticed that less politically sophisticated 
americans perceived democracy as a system that they saw every day. When it is not 
clear whether outside our window there is democracy, we are left with an idea/stan-
dard of ideal condition, what we consider as ,,just, fair, or safe arrangement of state”. 
In other words, individual knowing/believing that democracy is good while being 
unable to fully comprehend it makes a specific projection and associates this term 
with an arrangement of state that is assess as just, fair, and safe. This perfectly fits the 
welfare state ,,power for the people”, realization of proven through the years, i.e. con-
servative values or applying populistic ,,brigand Janosik strategy”. therefore, we can 
take a risk and express the statement that in conditions lacking democratic traditions, 
every form of governance could be called “democratic” as soon as it is perceived as 
just, fair, and safe. this sentence sounds banal but it could have remarkable conse-
quences. We know of many examples in which the banner of democracy is carried by 
advocates of un- or antidemocratic order. 
It seems that it is worth considering one of the presented results. In 2010, our own 
research revealed two ways of understanding democracy: ,,democracy as a homely 
democratic state” and ,,democracy as a religious-welfare state”. these ways relate 
to two dominant political projects that are responsible for deep polarization of the 
political scene in Poland. The first one was proposed and implemented by the Civic 
platform and the second propagated by law and Justice (and their acolytes) as the 
Fourth Republic of Poland. In the first, values and democratic procedures were em-
phasized but there was also a place for national sentiments. the second project main-
ly proposed a centralized welfare state and commitment to conservative and therein 
christian values. the presented results show an interesting and perhaps unknown to 
this day phenomenon. It is obvious that polarization of the political scene can set 
preferences and political tastes. now, it turns out that it could also be responsible for 
the structure/content of political concepts in the colloquial mentality of citizens. this 
result could be treated as a contribution for reflections on ways of understanding de-
mocracy and their variability.
the article seems to have a rather pessimistic resonance – the term ,,democracy” 
can have many meanings including those that are simply undemocratic. In addition, 
as we mentioned when presenting data from cBos, the evaluation of democracy in 
Poland is not very positive (see Czapiński, Panek, 2011, p. 283). As a matter of fact, 
the evaluation of democracy in poland is not as bad as direct declarations expressed 
in surveys seemingly indicate. let us look at the following lists. as we already know, 
in 2010 CBOS presented a list of features that was used to investigate the defining of 
a system as democratic. these eight are the most important markers of democracy in 
the opinion of respondents (markers of welfare state are in bold):
– equality before the law (3.88)
– assurance of equal chances for education for children from all families (3.88)
– selection of the best for ruling the country (3.86)
– protection of personal liberties (3.86)
– government care for prosperity of citizens (3.81)
– freedom of expressing views and self-organization (3.79)
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–	 financing	of	medical	care,	science,	culture	by	the	government	(3.79)
– government assurance of decent living conditions for the poorest (3.73) (cBos, 
2010, p. 19).
It turned out that half of the most ,,important for recognizing a country as demo-
cratic” attributes were markers of a welfare state. cBos researchers presented the 
same list of features to the respondents, asking them about the degree of realization 
of these characteristics in poland. the list of the eight most popular features in this 
ranking was as follows (markers of democracy are in bold):
– freedom of choosing a place of residence at home or abroad (3.41)
– freedom of expressing beliefs and self-organization (3.05)
– a possibility of choice between political party programs (2.99)
– submitting to the will of the majority by the minority (2.99)
– activity of citizens in public life (2.95)
– protection of personal liberties (2.90)
– responsibility of the government for economic life (2.74)
– protection of minorities’ rights (2.74) (cBos, 2010, p. 19).
This time, it turned out that among the eight most efficiently realized characteristics 
there were seven markers of democracy. the whole thing seems to present itself as 
follows. poles realize that many markers of democracy are realized in poland. It does 
not, however, have a significant influence on their evaluation of democracy in Poland 
because, according to them, democracy is primarily a welfare state and welfare state 
markers did not appear on the list of well realized features. at this point we could refer 
to the previously cited conclusion of ellen camaghan.
one of the reasons why researchers were interested in ways of understanding de-
mocracy was a phenomenon of acceptance or support for democracy. at the end, let 
us remember an already cited sentence which could be a motto of this article: ,,to 
understand the attitudes towards democracy and behaviors towards it, it is necessary 
to know how this term is represented in the minds of so-called regular people, because 
the fate of democracy is ultimately up to them” (reykowski, 1995, p. 23).
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IntroDuctIon
People’s participation in a country’s politics is vital for democracy to flourish. Most 
often, the construct of political participation is referred to as a wide spectrum of politi-
cal activities (e.g. Lamprianou, 2013; Skarżyńska, 2002) aimed at engaging citizens 
in the political process and influencing the actions and policies of governing bodies. 
studies investigating political participation in a variety of countries and political sys-
tems frequently note a systematic difference between genders, labeled as a “gender 
gap” (e.g. norris, 2004; Inglehart, norris, 2000).
sociologists and political scientists examining electoral behavior suggest that wo-
men engage in different forms of political participation than men. this so-called “tra-
ditional gender gap” can be described in the following ways: women vote less fre-
quently than men; women routinely vote more frequently for conservative candidates 
whereas men tend to cast their votes more often for political left candidates (although 
recently, a slow reversal of this pattern has been observed in developed countries); 
women less often join organized political parties and men more often hold prominent 
positions in political organizations; and when evaluating political campaigns, women 
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pay more attention to „compassion issues” (e.g., pro-choice/pro-life, welfare and edu-
cational concerns) than to „tough issues” (war on crime, military spending) (see Bern-
stein, 2005; Hill, 2003; norris, 2004; norris, Inglehart, 2000; Whitaker, 2008). these 
gender differences in political behavior are typically explained by socialization factors 
based on culturally sanctioned gender stereotypes presenting politics as a male domi-
nated sphere of life. relevantly, women usually express less interest in politics, exhibit 
lower political self-efficacy, and their attention to „compassion issues” is attributed 
to shared emotional fate as citizens of lower socio-political standing in society (see 
Bernstein, 2005; Hill, 2003; studlar, allister, Hayes, 1999).
Studies of voting behavior conducted in Poland within the first decade following the 
collapse of the communist system (1989–2000) also documented the presence of „the 
traditional gender gap” (Siemieńska, 2003). However, data collected ten years later by 
Oniszczenko, Jakubowska and Stanisławiak (2011) showed that women between the 
ages of 18 and 24 years exhibited higher levels of liberal social and moral attitudes 
than women within ages 36 and 64 years, as well as all men, regardless of their age. 
Both age groups of women expressed similar attitudes toward economic issues and 
supported state interventionism in the country’s market process. thus both genera-
tions of women revealed leftist orientation in the economic domain, yet differed along 
the liberal-conservative dimension in terms of their preferences concerning social and 
life style issues. Interestingly, there were no generational (i.e., age) differences among 
men in their socio-political attitudes.
oniszczenko et al
,
s (2011) investigation uncovered generational difference in ideo-
logical and political preferences among polish women. the observed pattern of results 
suggested that a historically significant process of systemic transformation in Poland 
may have exerted the most influence on ideological consciousness of the youngest 
generation of women. the political and economic transformation of post-communist 
poland continues; hence, the question of similarities and differences in political par-
ticipation of poles is very relevant a quarter-century after the 1989 (partly free) parlia-
mentary elections. Do the levels of political activism differ between women and men? 
Do the levels of political activism differ across ages?
polish democratic transformation resulted in a change of the societal and political 
condition of women (for more see, oniszczenko et al., 2011). In its doctrine, the pre-
ceding communist system offered gender egalitarianism, but in reality it functioned 
only in the domain of employment. the presence of women in the labor force was 
pervasive but simply because the salaries of their working husbands were not suf-
ficient to maintain one-income households. The “gender pay gap” was evident, and 
female gender discrimination in social and political spheres was accepted because it 
was sanctioned by patriarchal and catholic cultures of female subjugation (Domański, 
1999; Siemieńska, 2003).
a striking example of male domination in sociopolitical life in poland was the ab-
sence of any women during the negotiations known as the “polish roundtable talks,” 
although 50% of activists in the Solidarity (“Solidarność”) opposition were female 
(radiukiewicz, 2010). there were practically no feminist organizations in poland un-
til 1990, and the awareness of feminist ideas among polish women was low at the 
onset of the democratic transformation (Siemieńska, 2003). Now, after 25 years of 
dramatic political and social changes, the feminist movement is very prominent and 
issues of gender equality are publically debated. consequently, there is a greater sense 
of empowerment and a larger representation of women in high echelons of political 
organizations and government, both at local and national levels. at the time of this 
writing, for example, the prime minister of poland is a female and several women are 
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heads of major ministries and cities. taking under consideration this dedicated con-
cern for gender equality in contemporary poland, it may be reasonable to suggest that 
the gender gap in political participation among younger poles, who were politically 
socialized along with the transformation, may be disappearing (i.e., hypothesis 1). 
political science and sociological work informs that the nature of political involve-
ment and activism often reflects specific generational experiences directly associated 
with ideological milieus and historical events influencing the lives of their contem-
poraries. This shared political context reflected in similar political preferences and 
behaviors of a generation is referred to as a “generation or period effect” (e.g. norris, 
2003; schatz, 2002). the post-1989 changes in poland have been a salient and long-
lasting economic, social, and political evolution that, throughout significant altera-
tions of life conditions, could have also influenced political consciousness and activity 
across different age cohorts collectively witnessing and participating in these pro-
cesses. Hence, particularly interesting is the question of whether age or generational 
effects on political involvement among contemporary poles could have aligned along 
differential political socialization processes operating during the bygone era of the to-
talitarian communist regime versus the ongoing period of democratic and free market 
economy transformation.
the transformation to democracy in poland changed the life style of its citizens, 
including their system of values, attitudes toward work, family, social connections, 
and money (e.g. Jasińska-Kania, Marody, 2003; Jasińska-Kania, 2013). Demands 
for retraining, expectations for growth of professional skills, threats of unemploy-
ment, and greater complexity of health care and retirement systems contrasted starkly 
with the relative plainness and stability of the offerings of the ex-communist govern-
ments. poland’s membership in the european union introduced large segments of the 
polish population to uncharted territories of social, political, and cultural diversities 
(e.g., Czapiński, Panek, 2011; Domański, 2010; Jakubowska, Kaniasty, 2014a). 
A direct consequence of these benefits and liabilities of transformation is that the 
youngest post-1989 generation has been socialized within a diametrically different po-
litical reality from that of their parents and grandparents who reached their adulthood 
and/or older ages under a communist regime. Following these lines of description of 
the contemporary political context in poland, it may be reasonable to propose that the 
gender gap in political participation could be moderated by the generation (i.e., period, 
age) effect. In other words, political behavior of younger females and males may differ 
from the political participation of their older counterparts due to the dramatic ideologi-
cal and economical divergences in their life experiences (i.e., hypothesis 2).
present investigation of the role of gender and age in explaining political participa-
tion and activism among poles will consider psychological factors that are less often 
examined within sociological and political science frameworks. prior studies with 
polish citizens that investigated various predictors of political participation suggest, 
for example, that moral legitimization of actual economic and political systems, posi-
tive beliefs about the world, and low levels of perceived threat are associated with 
greater participation in political life. on the other hand, moral delegitimization of 
a political system, negative beliefs about the world, and propensity of see the word 
as dangerous are associated with lower political participation (Skarżyńska, 2012a, 
2012b; Skarżyńska, Henne, 2012). 
Our earlier findings (Kaniasty, Jakubowska, 2014) showed that subjective evalua-
tions of the influence politics exerted on people’s lives (i.e., stress appraisals of politi-
cal events) affected their satisfaction with life and other indicators of psychological 
well-being. the challenges resulting from the political and economic transforma-
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tion undoubtedly presented themselves as potential stressors, both as loses and gains, 
that may have a facilitating and/or inhibiting influence on the levels of political en-
gagement. although there are many ways of coping with stressors, two overarching 
strategies are used (lazarus, Folkman, 1984). people may adopt a problem solving 
approach whereby they engage in activities aimed at removing or reducing the source 
of stress (e.g., demands for increasing the minimum wage, appeals for health care or 
educational reforms); in the political milieu, such action would entail more political 
action and protest. conversely, people may adopt emotion-focused coping strategies 
attempting to reduce the negative emotional responses associated with stressors. such 
a defensive stance might lower political activity and is likely to be accompanied by 
psychological egocentrization and venting. anxieties and distress ensuing from dis-
advantaged life circumstances may be buffered by collective political activity and/
or reframing one’s political standing in a society, resulting in differential levels of 
political self-efficacy, interest in politics, or direct engagement (e.g., Fromm, 1965; 
Hobfoll, 1998; Kruglanski, et al, 2009). therefore, in addition to examining the roles 
of gender and age and their joint effect on political participation, the present study will 
account for a number of psychological predictors of engagement in political life such 
as, the presence of life stressors, satisfaction with life, as well as various psychological 
resources assessed purposely within the context of politics (e.g., political interest, po-
litical self-efficacy, sense of anomie, subjective stress appraisals of political events). 
these factors were shown as relevant for predicting political participation, political 
attitudes, and social-psychological well-being in earlier analyses with this data set 
(Jakubowska, Kaniasty 2014a; 2014b; Kaniasty, Jakubowska, 2014) and are only in-
cluded in the present analyses to help examine the gender and generation/period influ-
ences on political participation in the most conservative manner.
metHoD
Sample
a nationwide random sample of 400 adults was selected using a probability quota 
sampling strategy and interviewed face-to-face via capI method (computer assisted 
personal interviewing) in respondents’ homes in november and December, 2011. the 
average length of the interview was 35 minutes.
participants were 53% female (n = 210) and the mean age of the sample was 44.54 
(SD = 16.36, range 18 – 86). Fifty three percent of the sample attained elementary or 
vocational education (n = 210), 31% completed high school or a few years of post-
high school education (n = 124), whereas 16% of respondents reported receiving a 
college degree (n = 65). our sample was also representative of respondents’ place of 
residence in terms of population size: 38% of participants lived in villages (n = 150), 
24% in towns up to 50,000 in population size (n = 95), 16% resided in cities with up to 
200,000 inhabitants (n = 65), and the remaining 22% of the respondents lived in larger 
cities with a population size greater than 200,000 (n = 90).
Political participation: The outcome variable
The index of political participation was created based on a sum of affirmative respon-
ses to 14 dichotomous (yes/no) questions sampling a variety of political behaviors. 
three items asked about routine and cyclical electoral behaviors (voting in presiden-
tial, parliamentary, and local elections), whereas the remaining items concerned legal 
non-electoral political participation (i.e., running in parliamentary elections, running 
in local elections, signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, membership in a 
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major party, membership in a trade unions, attending public forums with politicians, 
signing protest letters, writing protest letters, participating in legal strikes, member-
ship in a fringe party not represented in the parliament; see Jakubowska, Kaniasty, 
2014b). the scores of the actual index of political participation utilized in the present 
analyses ranged from 0 to 8 because the frequency of engaging in more than 8 politi-
cal behaviors was very minimal (i.e., values between 8 and 14 were collapsed into one 
category). the sample mean was 2.91 (SD = 1.60; Mdn = 3.00).
Predictors of political participation
Four sociodemographic factors were included in the main analyses. our focal vari-
ables were respondents’ gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and age, which was scored in 
years. additionally, respondents’ educational attainment was classified into 4 levels, 
and the place of their residence (i.e., population size) was grouped into 5 categories.
two variables assessed the perceived stressfulness of respondents’ lives. Perceived 
stress, defined as the degree to which respondents appraised various situations and 
demands in their lives as exceeding their ability to cope, was assessed by 2 items from 
the perceived stress scale (pps; cohen, Kamarck, mermelstein, 1983; “In the last 
30 days, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal 
problems?”; “In the last 30 days, how often have you felt that things were going your 
way?”; r = .40). answers were scored on a 5-point scale (0 = never, 1 = almost never, 
2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = very often; M = 1.64, SD = 0.68).
the satisfaction with life scale (sWls) was used to assess respondents’ global 
cognitive judgments of satisfaction with their lives (Diener, et al., 1985). a sample 
item is: “I am satisfied with my life.” Responses to this Likert-type items ranged from 
“1” (= strongly disagree) to “7” (= strongly agree). In the present sample, the average 
sWls score (the sum of 5 items) was 18.76 (SD = 5.11) and its alpha reliability coef-
ficient was .81.
Five predictor variables reflected psychological resources within the context of 
politics. Interest in politics was measured with one item: “people have different levels 
of interest in politics. How much are you interested in politics? (1 = not at all - I am 
practically not interested in it, to 5 = a great deal, I pay careful attention to almost 
everything that is happening in politics). answer options “4” and “5” were recoded 
into one category (M = 2.64, SD = 0.90). 
Political self-efficacy was measured by a 9-item revised sociopolitical control 
scale (spcs-r, peterson et al., 2006). two examples of items are: “I would rather 
have a leadership role when I’m involved in a group project;” “It is important to 
me that I actively participate in local issues.”. the statements were answered using a 
5-point likert-type response option format (1 = definitely disagree, 3 = neither disa-
gree nor agree, 5 = definitely agree). the score of the scale represented the mean of 
items (M = 3.32, SD = .60), and it had a reliability coefficient of .80.
Sense of anomie, generally defined as feelings of alienation, normlessness, distrust, 
and meaninglessness, were assessed with a 4-item scale (see Korzeniowski, 2002). 
the items were modeled on questions from various frequently used scales of aliena-
tion and anomie (e.g., Dean, 1961; srole, 1956). a sample item is: “the only thing 
one can be sure of today is that there is nothing one can be sure of” (1 = definitely disa-
gree to 4 = definitely agree). The internal reliability coefficient of the average score 
(M = 2.64, SD = .65) on this scale was .80.
Stress appraisals of political events were assessed with the Warsaw appraisal of 
political stress Inventory (WapsI), developed as a general measure of perceptions or 
appraisals of the degree to which ordinary and public political events are judged as 
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taxing or burdensome (Kaniasty, Jakubowska, 2013; 2014). a list of 24 political life 
stressors was created to represent potentially stressful events of varied duration, sever-
ity, and scope. the inventory incorporated events that could be considered as: traumas 
(e.g., “possibility of a foreign terrorist attack”), life change events (e.g., “elections”), 
chronic stressors (e.g., “the widening of the gap between the rich and poor”), macro 
system stressors (e.g., “economic crisis”), nonevents (e.g., “inability to solve national 
health care issues”), and hassles/irritations (e.g., “lies of politicians”). the instruc-
tions asked respondents to express their judgments about the extent to which listed 
political events unfavorably or favorably influenced their own personal lives and the 
life of the country. respondent answers were scored on a 7-point scale (from – 3 to +3) 
and were subsequently recoded so that the high (positive) score would indicate a more 
unfavorable (negative) appraisal of political events. the combined average of the 
48 items referring to the negative influence of political events to the self (24 questions) 
and the country (24 questions) was 1.61 (SD = .83, cronbach alpha = .97). 
Defensive behaviors index was created based on 6 dichotomous (yes/no) items 
that referred to excessive behaviors aimed at protecting oneself and family against 
the possibility of experiencing serious consequences of a politically-laden event 
(e.g., “I avoid foreign travels because of a possibility of terroristic attack,” “I keep a 
stock pile of food in case of food price increases,” “I keep my savings in foreign cur-
rency in case of economic crash in poland”). the index of defensive behaviors was 
recoded to have a range of 0 to 4 (M = 1.64, SD = .68).
results
a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to examine relative contributions of 
11 predictor variables and the Gender X Age interaction in explaining the variance in 
political participation. all predictor variables accounted together for 27.00% of the 
variance in political participation, F (12, 387) = 11.96, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .25. 
The first block of a hierarchical regression included the two focal predictor variables, 
gender and age, and two control variables, education and place of residence. these 
variables explained 6.2% of the variance in respondents’ reports of their political par-
ticipation behaviors, F (4, 395) = 6.50, p < .001. (When both gender and age were en-
tered together in the first step on the model, the amount of the variance they explained 
equaled to 3.4%, p < .001).
The influence of gender approached the routine .05 level of statistical significance 
(p = .064). men engaged more often in political participation than women. older age 
was significantly associated with greater participation in political activities (Table 1). 
persons with higher educational attainment reported more political activity, as did 
respondents who resided in more populated communities.
The influence of two life stressfulness measures, perceived stress and satisfaction 
with life, was statistically significant and explained an additional 3.9% of the variance 
in political participation, F (2,393) = 8.47, p < .001. respondents who perceived more 
stress in their lives in the last 30 days engaged in political activity less frequently. the 
score of satisfaction with life was not significantly associated with the outcome vari-
able.
Five psychosocial resources relevant for the context of respondents’ political activi-
ties explained together 16% of the variance, F (5, 388) = 16.74, p < .001. not surpri-
singly, respondents who had more interest in politics and/or expressed higher levels 
of self-efficacy reported a higher frequency of engaging in political participation. Per-
sons whose appraisals indicated that common political events exerted negative influ-
ence on their lives and the life of the country were also involved in politics to a greater 
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extent. likewise, people with higher score on the index of defensive behaviors were 
more politically engaged. The Beta coefficient for sense of anomie was negative and 
approached statistical significance (p = .072).
In the final step (Block 4), the term for the join effect between gender and age 
(i.e., a cross-product of the centered constituent measures) was entered and its con-
tribution to the explanation of the variance in political participation was statistically 
significant, ∆R2 = .010, F (1, 387) = 5.47, p = .020. the interaction was plotted and 
statistically explored using the process tool for spss (Hayes, 2013). the values 
for age used in the plot were based on values corresponding to 10, 25, 50, 75, and 
90 sample percentiles. as seen in Figure 1, the level of political participation increased 
Table 1 predicting political participation: results of a hierarchical regression analysis
predictor Beta (β) t-value p ≤
Block 1
 Gender -.09 -1.86 .064
 age .19 3.89 .001
 education .15 2.92 .004
 residence (population size) .10 1.99 .047
Block 2
 Gender -.10 -2.04 .042
 age .20 4.04 .001
 education .12 2.39 .017
 residence (population size) .08 1.62 .106
 perceived stress -.19 -3.83 .001
 satisfaction with life .02  <1 
Block 3
 Gender -.03 <1 
 age .21 4.23 .001
 education .03 <1 
 residence (population size) .05 1.10 .273
 perceived stress -.08 -1.71 .089
 satisfaction with life -.02 <1
 Interest in politics .12 2.47 .014
 Political self-efficacy .30 6.03 .001
 sense of anomie -.08 -1.80 .072
 stress appraisals of political events .09 1.96 .050
 Defensive behaviors .17 3.66 .001
Block 4
 Gender -.04 <1
 age .21 4.56 .001
 education .03 <1 
 residence (population size) .05 1.18 .238
 perceived stress -.09 -1.79 .074
 satisfaction with life -.02 <1
 Interest in politics .12 2.40 .017
 Political self-efficacy .29 5.85 .001
 sense of anomie -.08 -1.80 .073
 stress appraisals of political events .08 1.79 .074
 Defensive behaviors .17 3.84 .001
 Interaction between Gender and age -.10 -2.34 .020
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with age (i.e., main effect) for both genders. This effect was statistically significant 
for males (t = 4.76, p < .001) but only approached statistical significance for females 
(t = 1.84, p = .066). as routinely described in the literature, the gender gap of lesser 
political activity among females emerged as statistically significant, beginning with 
the age of 56.6 years (t = -1.97, p = .05; values shown in Figure 1: age 58, t = -2.04, 
p = .042, age 67, t = -2.30, p = .022). Men in their mid-fifties or older engaged in more 
political activities than their female peers.
Inspection of table 1 shows that, when all predictors were included in the model, 
the following variables had statistically significant Beta coefficients for predicting po-
litical participation: age, interest in politics, political self-efficacy, defensive behav-
iors, and, of course, the gender by age interaction. 
Supplementary Analyses
two additional regression analyses using the same model were conducted with two in-
dices of political participation as outcome variables that separated electoral behaviors 
(range 0-3, M = 2.33, SD = 1.03, value of 3 for 65% of the sample) and non-electoral 
behaviors (range 0-4, M = .56, SD = 1.10, value of 0 for 73% of the sample). In the 
regression model predicting voting behavior, the following variables were statistically 
significant in the final block: age (β = .16, p = .001), perceived stress (β = -.18, p < .001), 
interest in politics (β = .12, p =.022), political self-efficacy (β = .12, p = .027), sense of 
anomie (β = -.09, p = .049), and stress appraisals of political events (β = .28, p < .001). 
The interaction between gender and age was not statistically significant.
In the regression model predicting non-electoral political behaviors the following 
variables were statistically significant in the final block: age (β = .15, p = .002), place 
Figure 1 Interaction between age and gender
(Based on values at sample percentiles of 10, 25, 50, 75, & 90)
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of residence (β = .09, p = .053), political self-efficacy (β = .31, p < .001), stress apprais-
als of political events (β = -.14, p = .049)  and defensive behaviors (β = .22, p < .001). 
The join effect between gender and age was also statistically significant (β = -.10, 
p = .027) and it revealed the same pattern of regression lines as the one presented in 
Figure 1. the gender gap in political participation involving activities other than com-
mon voting emerged among respondents the later part of middle adulthood.
although the results of regression analyses clearly showed a strong main effect of 
age on political participation, for descriptive purposes only, we also conducted post 
hoc multiple mean comparisons. this was an additional attempt to unearth the “ge-
neration or period effect” in our data. When considering the distribution of age, our 
sample opportunely divided into three relevant age groups: young people between 
ages of 18 and 33 years (n = 127), people ranging between ages of 34 and 53 (early 
middle age to middle age, n = 142), and people older than 54 years of age (late mid-
dle age and older age, n = 131). the youngest group basically grew up during the 
post-communist transformation in poland (the oldest respondents in this group were 
10 years old in 1989), the middle age group entered their adulthood before the onset 
of post-communist transition (in 1989 their ages ranged between 11 and 30 years), 
and the oldest group included respondents whose entire early adulthood spanned dur-
ing the reign of the communist regime (the youngest respondents in this group were 
31 years old in 1989). the tukey HDs tests revealed that the youngest group was 
significantly lower on the total score of political participation (M = 2.55, SD = 1.54) 
than both older groups. the middle age and older age groups were not statistical-
ly different from each other (M = 3.01, SD = 1.53; M = 3.15, SD = 1.69; respec-
tively). A follow-up one-way ANOVA analysis showed a significant linear trend, 
F (1,397) = 9.07, p = .003, suggesting that, as age increased, the participation in vari-
ous political activates increased proportionately.
DIscussIon anD conclusIon
results of the present study that analyzed data collected in the fall of 2011 provided 
some support for the “generation or period effect” in political participation of poles. 
the youngest respondents, entering their political lives during the post-communist 
transformation, were less politically active than middle aged and older citizens. these 
findings are congruent with those reported by other Polish investigations (e.g., Sza-
franiec, 2011). Furthermore, our results are also consistent with empirical accounts 
of lackluster political engagement of youngest generations that have been observed in 
other countries (e.g., putman, 1996; twenge, campbell, Freeman, 2012; Zukin, et al., 
2006). However, the strong linear trend observed in Poland is definitely different from 
curvilinear relationships between age and political involvement found in analyses of 
political participation in western democracies. In those countries, citizens in the mid-
dle age group were shown to be politically more active than both younger and older 
generations (e.g. norris, 2003; schatz, 2002). 
Any generational variance is usually explained in terms of specific conditions and 
demands associated with different developmental stages of life. In the case of poland, 
however, these differences seem to be a direct result of the democratization process 
that began in 1989, which has been a concurrent backdrop in the lives of young peo-
ple. the lower level of political participation among our youngest participants may 
indicate their low level of moral legitimization of political system in poland (cf. the 
system justification theory, e.g., Jost, Banaji, Nosek, 2004).
Skarżyńska’s (2012) analyses on a representative sample of Poles documented that 
evaluations of poland as “the best country to live in” increase with age. Favorable 
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attitudes toward poland are concomitant with moral system legitimization and col-
lective authoritarianism expressed as a belief that cohesion and goals of a national 
group supersede individual needs. on the other hand, among young poles, perceived 
favorability of their homeland as “the best place to live in” is lower, as is the level 
of moral system legitimization. consequently, younger people exhibit lesser beliefs 
that authorities serve the interests of citizens, that collective resources are distributed 
justly, and/or that the government and its agents represent the entire nation. these 
unfavorable assessments of the political milieu in poland could be one of the reasons 
why many young poles are reticent to involve themselves in politics and prefer to 
focus on more hedonistic and egocentric aspects of life (szafraniec, 2011). It remains 
to be seen whether this lack of political involvement among polish young adults is a 
result of the post-communist political transformation or if it simply represents a more 
universal disinterest in political and civic life observed also in established democra-
cies (e.g., Howe, strauss, 2000; twenge et al., 2012).
the main goal of the present study was to examine both gender and age differ-
ences in political participation. the pattern of results clearly showed that the gen-
der gap in political participation was dependent on the generation effect (i.e., period, 
age). systematic empirical assessments show that political participation in poland is 
low in comparison to other post-communist countries (Czapiński, Panek, 2014). For 
example, on average only 46% of eligible voters in poland participate in parliamenta-
ry elections whereas voter turnout in other european new democracies ranges around 
76% to 82% (Cześnik, 2007). 
nevertheless, the present study documented that participation in political activities 
increased with age for both genders, but a clear gender gap of lower participation among 
women significantly emerged in late middle adulthood. The levels of overall political 
participation among younger and middle-aged poles were similarly low for both gen-
ders. It is important to note that this particular gender difference did not emerge when 
electoral behavior was examined. In this respect, our results are congruent with research 
findings concerning voting behavior in established democracies such as the USA, UK 
and other western european countries (e.g., Hill, 2003; Inglehart, norris, 2000). accord-
ing to these studies, the gender gap at the voting booths exists no longer.
Men in their mid-fifties engaged more in legal non-electoral political activities than 
women. Again, this finding should not be surprising because it likely reflects the con-
sequences of historically engrained, and potentially culturally universal, stereotype of 
female disinterest and lower competence in politics. moreover, at this stage of their 
lives, men typically have more resources at their disposal than women, such as more 
money, time, or status, and less interpersonal obligations, and it may simply be easier 
for them to increase their involvement in politics. the cultural stereotype of politics 
being a male domain and greater availability of men may make them attractive targets 
for recruitment into politics in their later years.
It should be noted, however, that we do not claim that our findings necessarily sug-
gest that women in later life are disengaging from political activities. In this study, 
women from the older age groups were more politically involved than both younger 
women and men. Indeed, the lack of gender gap among younger poles may speak 
very little about an improvement in gender egalitarianism of that generation. rather, 
our findings distressingly showed that both younger females and younger males are 
equally reticent to engage in the political life of their country beyond a simple act of 
voting. this, of course, is not only a polish problem.
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clustering people based on their group membership is one of the inherently human 
propensities (tajfel, 1978). once people are assigned to – in a given context relevant 
– social groups, activation of stereotypes – characteristics typical for given groups – 
ensues (Devine, 1989). The content of group stereotypes can be influenced by se-veral 
mechanisms. Beliefs about groups’ typical characteristics are partially formed as re-
sult of comparison with other relevant groups (Kervyn et al., 2008; realo et al., 2009; 
terraciano et al., 2005). the aim of our research was to determine mechanisms shap-
ing the content of ingroup stereotypes in contrast to relevant outgroup stereotypes. 
We focused on the mirroring effect whereby ingroup stereotype is rated as opposite to 
outgroup stereotypes. employing the Five Factor model for ratings of stereotypes, we 
examined the dimensions on which mirroring occurs. 
tWo tHeoretIcal FrameWorKs For researcH 
on stereotype content
In psychological research, stereotypes describing traits typical for a social group are 
usually studied within two conceptual frameworks. The first, a social psychological 
one, represents the Stereotype Content Model (scm; cuddy, Fiske, Glick, 2007; Fiske 
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aBstract
1. Objectives. the aim of our study was to 
examine mirroring in national stereotypes of 
five Central European countries. Mirroring 
describes a phenomenon whereby people rate 
their ingroup characteristics as opposite to cha-
racteristics typical of a relevant outgroup. 
2. Sample and setting. 2,241 participants from 
austria, the czech republic, Germany, poland 
and slovakia rated their national ingroup stereo- 
type and outgroup stereotypes of the four other 
countries on the national character survey 
(ncs, terracciano et al., 2005). 
3. Hypothesis. mirroring will occur primarily 
against dominant Germany. 
4. Statistical analysis. We compared each of 
the national ingroup stereotypes with the corre-
sponding national outgroup stereotypes. Profile 
agreement was calculated as an intraclass cor-
relation (Icc) across the 30 ncs scales. 
5. Results. the results showed a clear presence 
of mirroring in the three slavic but not in the two 
Germanic countries. mirroring was most pro-
nounced on traits mapping onto the fundamental 
dimensions of social perception – agreeableness/
warmth and conscientiousness/competence. 
However, participants contrasted their ingroup 
against outgroup stereotypes also on neuroti-
cism, extraversion and openness to experience. 
6. Study limitation. the correlational design 
did not allow for conclusions about stages of 
stereotype formation at which mirroring occurs. 





Five Factor model, 
stereotype content model
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et al., 2002). the scm contains two fundamental dimensions of social perception, 
namely warmth and competence ascribed to different extent to ingroup and outgroups. 
these two dimensions are predicted by intergroup competition – or the lack of it – re-
sulting in perceived warmth and status differences resulting in perceived competence. 
the scm postulates that ingroups and various outgroups fall within different cells 
based on the four combinations of high and low levels of warmth and competence. 
the combination of high warmth and high competence is typically reserved for in-
groups. outgroups receive more ambivalent stereotypes – positive on one dimension 
but negative on the other (e.g., elderly as high on warmth and low on competence; 
rich as low on warmth and high on competence), or are stereotyped as low on both 
dimensions (e.g., welfare recipients). 
the other, a personality psychology framework for studying stereotypes, is based 
on the Five-Factor model (FFm; Digman, 1990; mccrae, John, 1992). the FFm 
is widely accepted hierarchical model of personality traits ordered into dimensions 
commonly labeled neuroticism (n), extraversion (e), openness to experience (o), 
Agreeableness (A) and Conscientiousness (C). Within FFM, stereotypes are defined 
as personality traits attributed to typical representatives of a certain social category 
(e.g., nation, gender, age). 
mecHanIsms sHapInG InGroup stereotype content
In the “Personality Profiles across Cultures” project, participants from 49 cultures 
rated their national ingroup stereotypes and national stereotypes of a typical u.s. citi-
zen (terracciano et al., 2005). the results showed that canadian participants rated a 
typical canadian as agreeable but not assertive, in an exact opposite to how they rated 
a typical u.s. citizen (i.e., disagreeable and assertive). thus, in certain personality 
characteristics, canadians contrasted their national stereotype to how they perceived 
u.s. citizens. realo et al. (2009) compared ingroup stereotypes rated by participants 
from six countries in the Baltic sea region with their views on a typical russian. 
their study determined a similar tendency to contrast national ingroup stereotypes 
with russian outgroup stereotypes in estonia, lithuania and Finland. contrasting in-
group stereotypes to outgroup stereotypes was termed mirroring (realo et al., 2009; 
terracciano at al., 2005). 
a systematic differentiation between stereotypes of two distinct groups was re-
corded also within the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002). While dominant 
groups are perceived as high on competence but low on warmth, subordinate groups 
are perceived as low on competence but high on warmth. this effect was coined com-
pensation (Kervyn et al., 2008; Kervyn, yzerbyt, Judd, 2010) whereby two social 
groups are perceived as opposite on the two basic dimensions of social perception. 
In other words, when rating two social groups, people tend to perceive one of the 
groups as high on one dimension (e.g., competence) and low on the other dimension 
(e.g., warmth). employing a compensatory mechanism, the other group is then viewed 
as low on the first dimension (i.e., competence) but high on the other (i.e., warmth). 
up until now, there has been surprisingly little effort to interrelate the two theoreti-
cal frameworks for study on content of stereotypes. Despite this lack of comparison, 
we believe that both frameworks share several important assumptions. Within the 
Five-Factor model, facets of agreeableness (a) and extraversion (e.g., e1: Warmth) 
correspond to warmth that maps onto the quality of interpersonal relations. Facets of 
conscientiousness (e.g., c1: competence) correspond to competence that relates to 
fulfilling of tasks and duties. At the same time, we believe that in a complex percep-
tion of social groups other dimensions than just warmth and competence might play a 
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role. In order to capture a more nuanced view of ingroup and outgroup characteristics, 
we employed the Five Factor Model with five basic dimensions on which groups can 
be assessed. this way, we can examine compensation on the two dimensions as part 
of a more general phenomenon – mirroring – on the Five-Factor dimensions.
tHe present researcH
In the present study participants from five Central European countries (Austria, the 
czech republic, Germany, poland and slovakia) rated their ingroup national stereo- 
types and outgroup national stereotypes of the other four countries. For the first time, 
the current research employed a full ingroup – outgroup design whereby partici-
pants from all involved groups rated all other groups comprised in the given study. 
this way, our research surpasses the design of previous studies that used a crite-
rion of a single dominant country against which ingroup stereotypes were contrasted 
(e.g., realo et al., 2009; terracianno et al., 2005). this comprehensive approach al-
lowed us to determine conditions under which mirroring occurs in ecologically valid 
settings of relations between five existing groups.
metHoD
Participants
Altogether, 2,241 university students (75% women) from five Central European coun-
tries (austria, the czech republic, Germany, poland, and slovakia) rated national 
ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. the austrian sample consisted of 396 students, age 
range 18–65 years (M = 25.02, SD = 7.20; 75% women); the czech sample of 726 
students, age range 18 – 54 years (M = 23.16, SD = 4.98; 75% women); the German 
sample of 329 students, age range 18 – 63 years (M = 23.73, SD = 5.00; 70% women); 
the polish sample of 281 students, age range 17 – 53 years (M = 22.7, SD = 3.64; 86% 
women) and the slovak sample of 509 university students, age range 16 – 66 years 
(M = 24.39, SD = 6.58; 76% women). 
Procedure and Materials
the national character survey (ncs, terracciano et al., 2005) was used for the rat-
ings of national ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. ncs consists of 30 bipolar items 
intended to parallel the facets of the neo personality Inventory (neo-pI-r, costa, 
mccrae, 1992). For example, a facet of neuroticism, n3: Depression, was assessed 
by asking how likely, on a five-point scale, a typical country representative is de-
pressed, sad and pessimistic versus content and optimistic. six items represent each of 
the five major dimensions of personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness 
to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness). the ncs was already available 
in czech, German, polish, and slovak (terracciano et al., 2005). the questionnaires 
were administered online. All participants completed the NCS five times for their 
ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. In each subsample, respondents first rated a typical 
member of their own country and subsequently typical country representatives of the 
remaining four countries presented in a random order. 
Data Analysis
Using the profile-correlation approach, we first compare the whole profiles of ingroup 
and outgroup stereotypes. Based on the overall differences between ingroup and out-
group stereotypes, we adopt a more in-depth approach and focus on relevant charac-
teristics on which mirroring occurs. In order to eliminate spurious correlations called 
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the “generalized other” (cronbach, 1955) all ncs stereotype scores were converted 
into t-scores (M = 50, SD = 10) using mean scores and sDs of national stereotype rat-
ings from 3,989 participants in 49 different cultures (terracciano et al., 2005; for more 
detail about standardization see Hřebíčková, Graf, 2014). Profile agreement was cal-
culated as an intraclass correlation (Icc) across the 30 facets, using the double-entry 
method (Griffin, Gonzales, 1995) with the p-value based on the non-doubled n of 30. 
Double-entry intraclass correlations are similar to pearson’s correlations but besides 
profiles’ shapes they are also sensitive to differences in profile elevation, and scatter, 
thus being more conservative than pearson’s r (mccrae, 2008). Internal consistency, 
factor structure and interjudge reliability of the ncs ingroup and outgroup stereotypes 
are provided in Hřebíčková and Graf (2014) and Graf, Hřebíčková, Petrjánošová and 
leix (2015). 
results
In order to determine the presence of mirroring, we compared the profiles of national 
ingroup stereotypes of five Central European countries with four outgroup stereotypes 
as rated by participants from the same countries (e.g., we contrasted austrian ingroup 
stereotype rated by austrian participants with czech, German, polish and slovak out-
group stereotypes rated by austrian participants). mirroring of ingroup and outgroup 
stereotypes shows in negative intraclass correlation (Icc) between two stereotypical 
profiles. We found seven significant negative ICC (out of twenty; see Table 1). All of 
the significant ICC were present in the three Slavic countries where participants mir-
rored their national stereotypes against other slavic or the two Germanic countries.
Table 1 Intraclass correlations between five national ingroup stereotypes and corresponding 
national outgroup stereotypes 
outgroup stereotypes:
Ingroup stereotypes:
austria czech republic Germany poland slovakia
austria .00 .45* .23 .09
czech republic -.36* -.13 .17 -.40*
Germany .01 -.28 -.24 -.13
poland -.13 -.66*** .02 -.47**
slovakia -.40* -.50** -.36* .03
Notes. all stereotype ratings were standardized using international norms (terracciano et al., 2005). 
Iccs indicating mirroring are printed in italics. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
the most distinctive evidence of mirroring showed in the Slovak subsample. slo-
vak participants rated their ingroup stereotypes in contrast to how they rated czech, 
austrian and German stereotypes. With respect to stereotypes of the two Germanic 
countries, slovak participants rated their ingroup stereotype as higher on Warmth (e1), 
openness to Fantasy (o1), openness to Feelings (o3) and all facets of agreeableness 
(a1–a6) (see Figure 1). on the other hand, slovak participants perceived typical Ger-
mans and austrians as less neurotic (n), more assertive (e3) and conscientious (c) in 
comparison to a typical slovak. similarly to typical Germans and austrians, slovak 
participants perceived typical czechs as less neurotic, less agreeable and more asser-
tive than typical slovaks (see Figure 1). 
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Czech participants mirrored their national ingroup stereotype against austrian and 
slovak outgroup stereotypes in all characteristics of the Five-Factor model (see ta-
ble 1 and Figure 2). a typical austrian and slovak were perceived as less neurotic 
(n), more extraverted (e), more open to experience (o) and more agreeable (a). 
a typical austrian was also rated as more conscientious (c) than a typical czech. 
thus, czech participants ascribed socially undesirable characteristic to their typical 
country representative while ascribing socially desirable traits to representatives of 
the two neighboring countries, comparable in size. 
Figure 1 Profiles of Slovak ingroup stereotypes, German, Austrian and Czech outgroup stereotypes 










Figure 2 Profiles of Czech ingroup stereotypes, Slovak and Austrian outgroup stereotypes 
rated by czech participants
Polish participants mirrored their ingroup stereotype against the two slavic, but 
not Germanic countries (see table 1 and Figure 3). mirroring against the two slavic 
neighbors occurred on three out of five stereotypical dimensions. While Polish par-
ticipants perceived polish, czech and slovak stereotypes similar with respect to 
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levels of extraversion and conscientiousness, in the three other characteristics they 
rated czech and slovak outgroup stereotypes in more socially desirable way. typical 
czechs and slovaks were perceived as less neurotic (n), more open to experience (o) 
and more agreeable (a). 
Figure 3 Profiles of Polish ingroup stereotypes, Czech and Slovak outgroup stereotypes 
rated by polish participants
Austrian ingroup stereotypes correlated positively with German outgroup stereotypes. 
austrian participants perceived their own country stereotypes and stereotypes of the oth-
er German speaking country as similar while the three slavic countries did not represent 
relevant groups for comparison. similarly to austrian subsample, also German partici-
pants did not feel the need to draw a firm line between ingroup and outgroup stereotypes, 
as shown in no evidence for mirroring in either of the German speaking subsamples.
DIscussIon
In our study, we compared national ingroup and outgroup stereotypes of five Central 
european countries. We found the mirroring effect of national ingroup stereotypes 
against national outgroup stereotypes in three countries – the czech republic, poland 
and slovakia. the slovak subsample demonstrated the most pronounced pattern of 
mirroring. slovak participants rated slovak ingroup stereotype in contrast to how they 
rated outgroup stereotypes of the two Germanic countries and their czech neighbors. 
Independent slovakia was founded in 1993 and probably still is under the construc-
tion of national identity where differences between ingroup and relevant outgroups 
might be exaggerated in strive for group distinctiveness (Brewer, 1999; Plichtová, 
Lášticová, Petrjánošová, 2009). Although the Czech and Slovak Republics were es-
tablished as independent successor states of the former czechoslovakia at the same 
time, the more intense need of slovaks to delimit themselves against the neighboring 
countries can be also due to other factors. the position of slovakia in the central 
european region is rather marginal. slovakia is geographically located in its most 
eastern part, moreover, it belongs to relatively smaller european countries. similar 
characteristics apply to estonia in the Baltic sea region where the mirroring was most 
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notable in comparison with other Baltic sea countries (realo et al., 2009). this means 
that mirroring is to be expected in groups that have stronger need for distinctiveness. 
the other two countries where we found mirroring were the czech republic and 
poland. our results suggest that mirroring occurs in lower status groups (e.g., post-
communist countries with lower economical standards, new eu members). Following 
this argument, German and austrian participants living in countries with developed and 
stable democratic political system and higher economic prosperity did not polarize their 
ingroup stereotype against any of the compared four countries. even the fact that austria 
is a relatively small country did not contribute to austrian participants’ need to contrast 
their ingroup stereotype towards the world power in the region – Germany. on the con-
trary, austrian participants rated austrian ingroup and German outgroup stereotypes as 
converging, which represented the only positive profile correlation in the full ingroup-
outgroup design of five countries. Future research can examine whether the tendency 
of austrian participants to see their ingroup in accordance with German outgroup holds 
even if other, perhaps for austrian participants more relevant countries are used as point 
of reference for ratings of ingroup stereotypes. similarly, future studies can examine 
whether mirroring in German participants occurs when more relevant groups, such as 
other world powers, constitute the context for meaningful intergroup comparison.
although Germany is a dominant european power, czech and polish participants 
did not mirror their ingroup stereotype against German outgroup stereotype either. 
the ground for the lack of mirroring against Germans was the tendency of czech and 
polish participants to ascribe negative characteristics to their ingroup stereotype. as 
a result, the low level of agreeableness/warmth was to be found not only in the Ger-
man outgroup stereotype but also in the czech and polish ingroup stereotypes. thus 
in our study, the pattern of mirroring did not follow predictions of intergroup bias 
(Hewstone, rubin, Willis, 2002) – ascribing positively perceived personality traits to 
ingroup (i.e., ingroup favoritism) and negatively perceived personality traits to out-
groups (i.e., outgroup derogation). 
In our research we attempted to interconnect the two theoretical accounts dealing 
with content of stereotypes – the five factor model and the stereotype content model. 
the mirroring of slovak ingroup stereotype against austrian and German outgroup 
stereotypes followed the pattern predicted by the compensation mechanism described 
within the scm framework (Kervyn et al., 2010). slovak participants rated their in-
group stereotype as higher on warmth/agreeableness and lower on competence/con-
scientiousness. at the same time, they rated outgroup stereotypes of both wealthier 
countries as high on competence/conscientiousness and low on warmth/agreeable-
ness. on the other hand, the subsamples from the czech republic and poland did not 
show the full pattern of differentiation predicted by the compensation mechanism. 
Czech and Polish participants coming from less affluent countries contrasted their 
ingroup stereotypes against the more affluent Germany on Conscientiousness. How-
ever, participants from both countries did not compensate for the lack of ingroup 
competence with higher levels of warmth. thus, based on economic indices, czechs 
and poles acknowledged the prominent position of Germany in the central euro-
pean region. on the other hand, ingroup derogation present in czech and polish sam-
ples when participants rated ingroup stereotype low not only on competence but also 
warmth did not allow for the compensation mechanism to occur.
the stereotype content model predicts the level of competence and warmth based 
on group status and competition between groups. nevertheless, status and competi-
tion can be more easily estimated in groups considered within scm: the unemployed, 
the rich, housewives or ethnic minorities. It is more difficult to infer the status of dif-
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ferent countries with similar level of economic prosperity where other factors such as 
history come into play. It is even more difficult to assess the level of competition be-
tween nations in situations where no overt conflicts are taking place. Compensation, 
representing an extension of scm, occurred only in limited number of cases in our 
research on national stereotypes. our results indicate that mirroring might be a more 
general mechanism yielding valid predictions about group differentiation beyond the 
compensation mechanism.
another reason for the lack of compensation might be a different design used in our 
study where participants simultaneously rated five groups, unlike previous research 
where only two groups were rated simultaneously (Kervyn et al., 2008, 2010). the 
simultaneous rating of more than two groups might not accentuate the opposing traits 
typical for comparison between two specific groups to the same extent as two-group 
design, thus weakening the compensatory mechanisms. Furthermore, participants ra-
ted stereotypes on more differentiated FFm-based characteristics that do not represent 
only two main dimensions of social perception, possibly leading to a less distinct pat-
tern as compared to compensation found in previous research. 
the basic dimensions of social perception represented by agreeableness and con-
scientiousness in our study served participants as relevant dimensions for contrasting 
ingroup and outgroup stereotype. However, in our data, mirroring was present also 
on other dimensions of FFm, namely openness to experience and neuroticism. neu-
roticism contrasts adjustment or emotional stability with maladjustment of emotional 
instability. In our study, mirroring occurred on neuroticism when ingroup stereotypes 
were rated as more neurotic than outgroup stereotypes. In line with prediction drawn 
from ingroup favoritism, one would expect that neuroticism as a negative characte-
ristic will be rather ascribed to outgroups than one’s ingroup. Finding the opposite in 
our and other studies (terracianno, mccrae, 2007) might be due to the fact that people 
have more opportunities to witness signs of negative emotions in ingroup members 
based on daily interactions with them as compared to relatively more scarce contact 
with outgroup members. 
In order to summarize the outcomes of our study, we found mirroring of national 
ingroup stereotypes in three out of five countries under study. Thus, it is not a uni-
versal mechanism always shaping the content of ingroup stereotypes. the tendency 
to contrast the ingroup stereotype against outgroup national stereotypes was present 
in groups with lower social status and weaker economic indices. past studies have 
identified mirroring only in countries that differentiated themselves from a dominant 
neighbor (i.e., canada against the u.s. in terracciano et al., 2005 or Baltic sea coun-
tries against russia in realo et al., 2009). our research showed that mirroring is not 
confined to cases where people wish to draw a firm line between representations of 
their ingroup and one dominant outgroup relevant for comparison. 
Furthermore, our study showed that mirroring, as compared to compensation, is a 
broader mechanism influencing the content of ingroup stereotypes on other than just 
two dimension of social perception. Our results confirmed that there are other dimen-
sions on which participants systematically differentiate their ingroup from relevant 
outgroups. neuroticism was to higher extent ascribed to ingroup stereotype than out-
group stereotype in the three slavic countries, resulting in systematic mirroring on 
this dimension. In a similar way, ingroup stereotypes were rated low on openness to 
experience as compared to outgroups, showing in mirroring on openness in the slo-
vak, czech and polish sample. tentatively, we can expect that different groups will 
mirror their stereotypes on different dimensions based on the broader background of 
particular intergroup settings created by history, politics, geography or economics. 
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However, more research employing FFm for ratings of group stereotypes in different 
settings is needed in order to formulate more general conclusions regarding the occur-
rence of mirroring in stereotype ratings.
reFerences
Brewer, m. B. (1999): the psychology of 
prejudice: Ingroup love and outgroup hate? 
Journal of social Issues, 55, 429-444.
costa ,  p.  t. ,  mccrae, r. r. (1992): revised 
neo personality Inventory (neo-pI-r) and 
neo Five-Factor Inventory (neo-FFI) pro-
fessional manual. odessa, Fl, psychological 
assessment resources.
cronbach, l. J. (1955): process affecting 
scores on “understanding others” and “as-
sumed similarity”. psychological Bulletin, 
52, 177-193.
cuddy,  a.  J .  c. ,  Fiske,  s.  t. ,  Gl ick, p. 
(2007): the BIas map: Behaviors from inter-
group affect and stereotypes. Journal of per-
sonality and social psychology, 92, 631-648.
Devine, p. G. (1989): stereotypes and preju-
dice: their automatic and controlled compo-
nents. Journal of personality and social psy-
chology, 56, 5-18.
Digman, J. m. (1990): personality structure: 
Emergence of the five-factor model. Annual 
review of psychology, 41, 417-440.
Fiske,  s.  t. ,  cuddy,  a.  J .  c. ,  Glick, 
P. ,  Xu, J. (2002): A model of (often mixed) 
stereotype content: competence and warmth 
respectively follow from perceived status and 
competition. Journal of personality and so-
cial psychology, 82, 878-902.
Graf ,  S. ,  Hřebíčková,  M.,  Petr jánošová, 
m.,  leix, a. e. (2015): Češi a jejich sousedé. 
Meziskupinové postoje a kontakt ve střední 
Evropě. Praha, Academia.
Griff i in ,  D. ,  Gonzales , r. (1995): cor-
relational analysis of dyad-level data in the 
exchangeable case. psychological Bulletin, 
118, 430-439.
Hewstone,  m.,  rubin,  m.,  Wil l is , H. 
(2002): Intergroup bias. annual review of 
psychology, 53, 575-604.
Hřebíčková,  M.,  Graf , S. (2014): Accuracy 
of national stereotypes in central europe: 
outgroups are not better than ingroup in cn-
sidering personality traits of real people. eu-
ropean Journal of personality, 28, 60-72. doi: 
10.1002/per.1904. 
Kervyn,  n. ,  yzerbyt ,  V. ,  Demoulin, 
s. ,  Judd, ch. m. (2008): competence and 
warmth in context: the compensatory nature of 
stereotypic views of national groups. european 
Journal of social psychology, 38, 1175-1183.
Kervyn,  n. ,  yzerbyt  V. ,  Judd, ch. m. 
(2010): compensation between warmth and 
competence: antecedents and consequences 
of negative relation between the two fun-
damental dimensions of social perception. 
european review of social psychology, 21, 
155-187.
mccrae, r. r. (2008): a note on some mea-
sures of profile agreement. Journal of Person-
ality assessment, 90, 105-109.
mccrae,  r.  r. ,  John, o. p. (1992): an in-
troduction to the five-factor model and its ap-
plication. Journal of personality, 60, 175-215. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00970.x.
phalet ,  K. ,  poppe, e. (1997): competence 
and morality dimensions of national and eth-
nic stereotypes: a study in six eastern-euro-
pean countries. european Journal of social 
psychology, 27, 703-723.
poppe, e. (2001): effects of change in Gnp 
and perceived group characteristics on na-
tional and ethnic stereotypes in central and 
eastern europe. Journal of applied social 
psychology, 31, 1689-1708. 
poppe,  e. ,  linssen, H. (1999): In-group fa-
voritism and the reflection of realistic dimen-
sions of difference between national states 
in central and eastern european nationality 
stereotypes. British Journal of social psy-
chology, 38, 85-102.
Plichtová,  J . ,  Lášt icová,  B. ,  Per t já-
nošová, M. (2009): Konštruovanie slov-
enskosti vo verejnom priestore. [construct-
ing slovakness in public space.] Bratislava, 
Kabinet výskumu sociálnej a biologickej 
komunikácie SAV.
realo,  a. ,  all ik ,  J . ,  lonnqvis t ,  J .  e. , 
Verkasalo,  m.,  Kwiatkowska,  a. , 
Kööts , l. et al. (2009): mechanisms of the 
national character stereotype: How people in 
six neighbouring countries of russia describe 
themselves and the typical russian. european 
Journal of personality, 23, 229-249.
tajfel , H. (ed.) (1978): Differentiation Be-
tween social Groups. london, academic 
press.
terracciano,  a. ,  abdel-Khalek,  a.  m., 
ádám, N. ,  Adamovová,  L. ,  Ahn,  C. 
K.,  ahn,  H.  e t  a l ., (2005): national char-
acter does not reflect mean personality trait 
levels in 49 cultures. science, 310, 96-100.
terracciano,  a. ,  mccrae, r. r. (2007): 
perceptions of americans and the Iraq inva-
sion: Implications for understanding national 
character stereotypes. Journal of cross-cul-
tural psychology, 38, 695-710.
100
Československá psychologie 2015, vol. LIX, Supplement 1
Neighboring nations often have difficult relations, because their history is filled of 
wars and transgressions against each other. poland and her largest neighboring states, 
offer a good exemplification of this thesis. Germany and the Soviet Union became 
aggressors against poland in september 1939, marking the outbreak of World War 
II. many atrocities, including crimes against humanity were committed by each of 
the occupants. However, during the seventy years since the end of WWII these two 
countries went in opposite directions in their relations with victims, including poland. 
Germans became pacifists, trying to amend the past wrongs, by paying reparations and 
reconciling with their victims. russians, on the other hand, created an empire by an-
nexing many small eastern european nations, and transforming many other countries 
of the region to satellites of the soviet union. the communist system was labeled 
friendship and cooperation, but it so existed only as a surface propaganda. twenty 
DIFFICULT NEIGHBORHOODS: 
WRESTLING WITH THE HISTORY OF POLISH – GERMAN 
AND POLISH – RUSSIAN RELATIONS
MARTA PENCZEK-ZAPAŁA, PAWEŁ BOSKI
University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw
aBstract
this paper reports three studies on polish - Ger-
man and polish - russian relations in the con-
text of their difficult history (World War 2 and 
communist oppression), as well as process of 
reconciliation between the nations. the paper 
addressed questions and hypotheses on mecha-
nisms responsible for constructive coping with 
the past, through apologies by the perpetrators 
and forgiveness on the side of their former vic-
tims. Bilateral relations with poland’s’ neigh-
bors had opposite trajectories after World War 2. 
In case of Germans, initial hostility was slowly 
transformed into friendship and cooperation in 
european union and nato. at the same time, 
reparations to victims of the nazi were paid by 
Germany. Based on earlier literature it has been 
hypothesized that their apology, if seen as genu-
ine, will facilitate forgiveness and dissociate 
intergroup forgiveness from perception of in-
group harm. the opposite trajectory character-
izes polish - russian bilateral relations, where 
communist rule and oppression were depicted 
as friendship. We hypothesized that such situ-
ation would lead to cynicism and thus hinder 
forgiveness and empathy.
Research findings (Study 1) reflect these deve-
lopments: Germans are seen as more remorseful 
and are more forgiven than russians. In order 
to inspect the relationship between remorse and 
forgiveness, a study that followed an experi-
mental design was conducted. Its results sug-
gest that the effect of apologies and their since-
rity was found in study 2 as facilitating factors 
to forgiveness felt by poles’ also, the impact of 
the magnitude of harm was buffered  by these 
conciliatory moves by German leaders. study 3 
concerned a situation of insincere reconciliation 
in polish-russian relations. results show that 
such situation leads to cynicism and inhibits for-
giveness, as well as compassion toward victims 
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five years after the fall of communism, Russians have not yet admitted having com-
mitted crimes against the neighboring nations, let alone apologized for them. In the 
current paper we show how these two ways of addressing the past influence willing-
ness to forgive the former enemies, and attitudes toward them.
Emotional effects of intergroup transgressions
We have learned, from social Identity theory, that people tend to perceive themselves 
through membership in different groups. such auto-categorizations are important for 
individual identity while intergroup relations evoke strong emotions. For example, if 
one nation becomes a victim of other’s transgressions, the individual may feel threate-
ned and therefore fear appears. also, members of a victimized group are likely to be 
angry with the aggressors and they want to retaliate (Brown, Wohl, exline, 2008). 
these negative emotions and action tendencies may last even for decades and accross 
generations.
However, with time, such feelings may subside leaving place for forgiveness, which 
is often defined in terms of letting go of negative emotions and willingness to retaliate 
(Hanke, 2009). It also diminishes prejudice against the former transgressor, and may 
lead to pro-outgroup behaviors, such as acceptance of outgroups losses and suffering 
during the conflict (Tam et al., 2008).
Are apologies and remorse facilitators of intergroup forgiveness?
Based on Western philosophy and research on psychology of interpersonal conflict 
and reconciliation, it has been assumed that offering apologies by a transgressing 
group should lead to intergroup forgiveness. However, thus far researchers have 
failed to obtain unanimous confirmation of this assumption (e.g. Philpot and Hornsey, 
2008). The most interesting study in the field was conducted by Philpot and Hornsey 
in 2011. these autors asked participants, if the historical transgressor has apologized. 
Answers to these questions were inadequate, and, more importantly, did not influence 
forgiveness. the only result reported was on perceived outgroup remorse, which was 
a strong predictor of intergroup forgiveness. also, evaluation of the apologies proved 
to be important: their genuineness correlated with more outgroup remorse and inter-
group forgiveness.
earlier studies on intergroup apologies were often conducted in reference to small-
er transgressions, and in a different sociopolitical context. this means that the groups 
in question did not necessarily share a common border or have had a long complicated 
history which is commonplace for nations in europe. also, country-states that share a 
land border have more need for cooperation, as well as have more tools for exercising 
power (and transgress) against each other. therefore their process of reconciliation 
may be harder and encompass more variables. the psychology of reconciliation be-
tween Poland and its neighbors: Germany and Russia is so difficult to study, because 
the harmful facts to which this process must refer cover the tragic events of WWII: 
from its day one to its very end.
Intergroup reconciliation in context of Polish-German relations
Germans have committed many atrocities and crimes against humanity during World 
War 2 against Poles. In the first decades which followed, the two nations remained at 
distance and bitterness; the wounds were fresh and polish grievances remained largely 
unanswered. Germany, on the other hand, did not come to terms with the loss of its 
eastern territories and population expulsions.
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However, since the fall of the communism, the situation has changed dramatically. 
Germans recognized the permanent character of the border with Poland, issued official 
apologies, and paid financial reparations to former slave laborers of the Third Reich. 
this reconciliation process coincided with poland accession to the european union, 
where the two nations have become active partners in all domains of social life. this 
context is essential for the current research probing the difficult past. Hanke (2009) 
shows that such positive closure of the past, facilitates intergroup forgiveness on the 
societal level. We may also discuss effects of apologies on individual attitudes.
our aim is to study the chain process whose starting point is German apology for 
the harms inflicted on Poles while forgiveness granted by Poles is its end result. So 
far we have shown, how repent may influence forgiveness, but up to date researchers 
seemed to omit the problem of interaction between perception of ingroup victimiza-
tion and outgroup remorse, as well as their impact on forgiveness.
the path postulated above may suggest that in order to forgive, a group has to for-
get about harms it has experienced from the hand of another. However, often it is not 
the case: the outgroup is forgiven, but ingroups suffering is still remembered. In our 
opinion it is possible, because remorse allows the victims to see current outgroup as 
transformed and therefore different from the transgressor. therefore we may expect 
an interaction between perception of harm inflicted by the Nazi and Germans remorse: 
relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness should appear only if 
Germans are not seen as remorseful (hypothesis 1).
Polish-Russian relations: From mock friendship to open animosities
While seventy years after the end of WWII, polish-German relations are exemplary of 
a successful reconciliation, and constructive cooperation, the developments in poland’s 
relations with Russia point to the opposite direction. Starting from their officially declared 
communist friendship covering up soviet despotic dominance and transgressions, the 
neighbors moved (i) through some attempts towards reconciliation during the Gorbachov-
yeltsin transformation, corresponding with the collapse of communism, to (ii) a freeze 
changed into (iii) an open animosity along the fifteen years of Putin’s leadership.
The political context of the current conflict in Ukraine is essential for understand-
ing the dramatic change in polish - russian bilateral relations (ranging from economic 
sanctions to cancellations in cultural exchange). This conflict is also of importance for 
the return to antagonistic interpretations of historical events centered around World 
War II, such as: the joint aggression of ussr and Germany’s against poland, in 1939; 
the atrocities like Katyń murder; the meaning of the 1945 victory over the Nazi, and 
its aftermath. Interpretations of these events are largely incompatible of both sides: 
russia did not apologize for crimes committed by nKVD and the red army. they 
rather claimed that they had liberated east european nations and were their friends. 
russia has not been regretful for the post-war stalinist dictatorship forcefully induced 
upon nations of the region, either.
For decades, the alternative version of history was communicated unofficially, through 
the narratives of family, friends, and opposition groups. We posit, that the discrepancy 
between propaganda (words) and reality (deeds) is the origin of cynicism (Bond, le-
ung, au, tong, chemonges-nielson, 2004), which arises along as a tendency to seek 
hostile or egoistic motives behind all, even seemingly friendly and helpful behaviors 
(Więckowska, Boski, 2007). This way of explaining the world is also related to low 
interpersonal trust (singelis et al., 2003). as research on intergroup forgiveness suggest, 
trust is positively related to forgiveness. therefore we may expect that social cynicism 
is negatively correlated with intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 3).
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the act of forgiveness changes attitudes toward the transgressing party from en-
mity to more positive ones, as well as to charity behaviors (see mccullough, tsang, 
emmons, 2004). therefore we may expect that poles who have forgiven russians, 
care more for russian victims of World War 2 (hypothesis 4).
Overview of current studies
Intergroup forgiveness has its roots in history of relations between groups: past trans-
gressions, and remorse that may have followed. In the current studies we show how 
these two elements may influence current relations between formerly conflicted na-
tions. In study 1 we show differences between perception of russians and Germans 
in reference to magnitude of injustices inflicted upon Poles, as well as their remorse 
and polish willingness to forego the negative emotions. In study 2, we further ex-
plore problem of remorse showing how its genuineness may influence forgiveness, 
and harm-forgiveness relationship. In study 3, based on polish-russian relations, we 
demonstrate the mechanism of cynicism in polish-russian/soviet relations, adversely 
affecting forgiveness and empathy.
stuDy 1 :  polIsH –  German anD polIsH –  russIan relatIons 
as  seen tHrouGH tHe lens oF  surVey stuDIes
Research questions and hypotheses
Our first study addressed problem of perception of Germans and Russians in light of 
the past harms and reconciliation. We wanted to compare poles’ opinions on the mag-
nitudes of transgression and remorse of their two neighbors.
Participants
the study was performed on a nation-wide sample of 1006 poles, age 18–79 
(M = 43.34, SD = 15.22), 49% male. participants were interviewed using a computer 
survey platform and recruited using a nation-wide panel ariadna (with over 80 000 
registered verified users), rewarding respondents for the participation with points that 
could be exchanged for gifts.
Measures
Magnitude of harm was measured with 3 items asking about existence and severity of 
transgressions against poles committed by Germans and russians. Both scales proved 
to be reliable (α = .69).
Perceived remorse was measured by 8 questions addressing different behaviors of 
the transgressing nations (i.e. “Germans have apologized for their crimes”, “russians 
have paid reparations to their victims”). It was reliable both for Germans, and rus-
sians (α = .89).
Forgiveness towards Germans was assessed with 4-items scale (i.e. “I have forgi-
ven Germans for atrocities of World War 2”, “We should forgive Germans for atroci-
ties of World War 2”, “We should put aside negative feelings toward Germans that 
are caused by World War 2”, “I have forgiven Germans their past transgressions”). 
respondents assessed on a 5-point scale, to what degree they agree with these state-
ments. The items formed a reliable scale (α = .88). In order to measure forgiveness 
toward Russians, we used the same questions substituting “russians” for “Germans” 
and they concerned Katyń murder instead of World War 2. This scale was also reli-
able: α = .89.
all variables were measured on scale from -2 (not at all) to +2 (a lot).
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Results and discussion
as the main goal of the current study was to determine differences between percep-
tions of history of harm and reconciliation in polish-German and polish-russian re-
lations, we have conducted a series of t-tests for dependent variables. as it can be 
seen in Figure 1, both neighbors of Poland are seen as having inflicted large harms 
to poles (M = 1.43 for Germans and M = 1.25 for russians). However, contrary to 
the expectations, respondents saw Germans as source of more harm than russians 
(t1005 = 8.63; p < .001). at the same time descendants of the third reich are seen as 
more remorseful (t1005 = 22.39, p < .001). What is interesting, participants were not 
sure if the German remorse was sufficient (the mean M = 0.14 did not differ sig-
nificantly from 0), whereas Russian attitude was seen as unsatisfactory (M = -0.55). 
at the same time participants were more willing to forgive the Western than the east-
ern neighbors of poland (M = 0.60 and 0,17 respectively).
Table 1 correlations between measured variables
 1 2 3
harm .48*** - .24 *** - .20 ***
remorse - .21 *** .45*** .49***
forgiveness -.18*** .52*** .62***
Notes: N =1006
Results for Germans are above the diagonal and for the Russians below.
*** p < .001
Figure 1 magnitude of harm, remorse and willingness to forgive – comparison of attitudes toward 
Germans and russians
In the next step, we have conducted a series of correlations between measured vari-
ables. their results that are shown in table 1, stand in line with our predictions: mag-
nitude harm is moderately negatively related to perceived outgroup remorse (r = -.24, 
p < .001 for Germans and r = -.21, p <. 001 for russians) and forgiveness (r = -.20, 
p < .001 for Germans, and r = -.18, p < .001 for russians). Forgiveness and perceived 
remorse are strongly positively related to each other (r = .49, p < .001 for Germans, 
and r = .52, p < .001 for russians). Interestingly, the same measures used for different 
contexts correlate strongly with each other.
Results of the current study show that Germans are seen as having inflicted more 
harm upon poles than russians, but at the same time, they are seen as remorseful and 
poles are more forgiving towards them. It seems that remorse plays crucial role in 
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forgiveness, since it is a strong correlate of forgiveness in case of both transgressing 
groups.
stuDy 2 .  role oF  apoloGIes  In  oVercomInG 
HIstorIcal enmIty
Hypotheses
In study 1 Germans were seen as having committed worse crimes against poles than 
russians, but at the same time, they were more forgiven. they were also seen as more 
remorseful. this suggests that outgroup remorse plays an important role in letting go 
of past harms and resentments.
Inconsistency in earlier research does not allow us to formulate a hypothesis con-
cerning a direct effect of apology on intergroup forgiveness. However, genuineness 
of the act, as well as general attitude of the transgressing group seem to influence the 
process of getting from harm caused resentment to intergroup forgiveness. Based on 
earlier literature, we have also asked the question about relationship between ingroup 
harm and outgroup remorse in the reconciliation process. If the magnitude of required 
remorse is proportional to the magnitude of harm, remorse should mediate the rela-
tionship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 1). as we have 
argued, there is another possibility: that outgroup apology breaks the relationship be-
tween ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 2).
Method
participants were instructed to read a short text before answering questions concern-
ing their perception of polish-German relations. to trigger knowledge about apology, 
they read fragments of speech by the German chancellor merkel, where she accepts 
responsibility of Germans for the atrocities of the nazi era. In a non-apology condi-
tion students read a text about peace treaty of Gorlitz signed by Germany and poland 
in 1950, where blame or war atrocities were not mentioned.
after the manipulation, participants answered a series of questions that referred 
to the read text. three items addressed problem of genuineness of apology (α = .60). 
a higher value denotes more genuine repent. next, participants answered questions 
used in study 1 concerning their perception of intergroup harm (α = .63), and for-
giveness (α = .90) as in Study 1. also perceived outgroup remorse was measured. as 
earlier, this scale did not address a single act, but rather a general attitude of Germans. 
This scale also proved reliable (α = .84).
Participants
the study was conducted among 158 students of Warsaw university and university 
of social sciences and Humanities in poznan. participants were 19 to 40 years old 
(M = 24.07; SD = 5.98). majority (56%) of the students were women.
Results
Effects of reading about apology. In the first step we checked effects of reading about 
Germans, apology using a series of t-tests. In Figure 2, which summarizes the results, 
we can see that indeed speech of chancellor merkel was seen as genuine and was 
better evaluated than the peace treaty (t155 = 9.38, p < .001). However, the acceptance 
of blame had no effect on perception of general attitude of Germans (t155 = -0.56, 
p > .05) or forgiveness (t155 = -0.32, p > .05). there was also no effect of manipulation 
on perceived harm inflicted upon Poles by the Nazi (t155 = 0.152, p > .05).
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Analysis of mediation. In the next step we were interested in relationships between 
variables by conducting a series of correlations. their results suggest that genuine-
ness of repent correlates with perception of outgroup remorse (r = .36, p < .001) and 
intergroup forgiveness (r = .32, p < .001), but not with magnitude of harm (r = -.14, 
p > .05). also, forgiveness was related to perception of harm (r = -.35, p < .001), and 
to Germans’ remorse (r = .50, p < .001).
We hypothesized that perception of outgroup remorse should mediate the relation-
ship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness. since perception of harm is 
not related to evaluation of apology, the latter variable cannot be considered a media-
tor of the relationship between perceived ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness. 
Also general outgroup attitude is not a significant mediator (CI = [-.25 ; .05]. thus 
results falsify hypothesis 2.
Moderating role of outgroup conciliatory behaviors. the last hypothesis in the 
current study concerned the effects of outgroup remorse on the relationship between 
ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness. In order to verify it, first we have conducted 
analysis of correlations for both groups separately. as table 2 shows, correlation be-
tween magnitude of harm and intergroup forgiveness differs between groups (r = -.47; 
p < .001 for peace treaty, and r = -.25, p < .05 for speech of Merkel). In order to check 
if the difference is significant we used procedure designed by Hayes (2012). It shows 
that the assignment to group significantly moderated the relationship between ingroup 
harm and intergroup forgiveness (∆R2 = .02, F1,153 = 4.02, p = .047).
Table 2 correlations between variables in 2 conditions
 1 2 3 4
Genuineness of apology – -.15 .25* .34**
Harm -.18 – -.19 -.47***
remorse .59*** -.01 – .45**
Forgiveness .41** -.25* .54*** –
Notes. above the diagonal are results of the group that read about the peace treaty n = 80. Below the 
diagonal are results for the group that read speech of angela merkel. n = 78
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Figure 2 levels of measured variables in 2 experimental groups
Discussion
In study 2 we show that an act of penance itself does not foster forgiveness. Its percep-
tion as genuine, on the other hand, plays an important role in evaluation of outgroup 
remorse and intergroup forgiveness. this results may explain differences between 
107
results obtained in earlier studies: if apology is seen as insincere, it does not foster 
intergroup forgiveness. 
However, appearance of apology had an effect on the relationship between ingroup 
harm and intergroup forgiveness: when participants were reminded of Germans apo-
logies, evaluation of injustices committed by the nation had less influence on willing-
ness to forgive.
STUDY 3 .  FORGIVING KATYŃ AND COMPASSION WITH SOVIET 
solDIers’ War memorIals 1
Hypotheses
We have already discussed that with the lack of positive evidence of remorse from the 
Russian side, it should be more likely to find negative predictors of Polish forgiveness 
and compassion. We have concentrated on two constructs of intergroup relations: dis-
crepancy between propaganda, and reality and cynicism. our theory predicted that this 
discrepancy (between the objective and experienced) should predict the level of cyni-
cism in reciprocal relations. the linkage was expected more relevant on the subordinate 
side of such dyadic relationship; which was poland in that case. next, cynicism should 
hinder the forgiveness-compassion potential among the victims’ descendants (hypoth-
eses 3 and 4). We consider cynicism as a mediator of the negative historical experience 
(word-deed discrepancy) on humane orientation to the former perpetrators.
Measures
We asked Poles to evaluate bilateral relations with Russians in five decades of the 
second half of the 20th century, ending with the first years of the 21st. the propagandist 
and reality aspects were separately assessed with fifteen bipolar seven point scales 
(e.g. fair - unfair; mutually profitable - exploitative; friendly - hostile). results found 
a huge gap between the propagandist upbeat and the experienced facets of reality dur-
ing the stalinist period, diminishing gradually towards the end of the communist era 
and during transformation (see: Boski et al., 2009).
cynicism was measured with the use of well-known photographs of their time, 
portraying interactions of public figures from the two countries (politicians, sport 
champions, astronauts). Inner dialogues were assigned to those characters’ minds, 
reflecting friendly or cynical (ulterior) motives. An example of the latter dialogue, 
taking place between secretary leonid Brezhnev being welcomed in Warsaw by his 
counterpart, edward Gierek follows:
B: A good attempt of yours, Gierek! These Polacks greet me as a Russian tsar, 
which is as it should be; and they have enough brains to know who their real 
boss is! 
G: OK., Leonid looks to be content with this mockery which I have staged for him, 
so he should melt down at the bargaining table, later today. 
the expected relationship between reality discrepancy and cynicism was strongly 
confirmed both at group level along the time frame (decades) and at the level of indi-
vidual measures: the wider the reality gap open, the higher the cynicism.
For the purpose of this paper, two measures related to forgiveness and intergroup 
compassion were selected from the original dataset. The first one was derived from 
the thoughts and feelings associated with Katyń massacre and lie. The two highly 
1 Study 3 was conducted over 10 years ago and was partially reported in Boski, Biłas-Henne, and 
Więckowska (2009) but the findings referring to forgiveness and compassion (empathy) appear in 
this paper for the first time.
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correlated items were: “I feel a need to forgive them”; and “there is a need for our 
move: We forgive you and we ask for your forgiveness”. the other variable was 
based on measures of feelings and thoughts regarding the Warsaw cemetery-mau-
soleum honoring Soviet soldiers who gave their lives fighting the German troops 
on polish soil2. a scale of thirteen positively worded items had a high reliability 
(α = .87); e.g.: A spiritual link, praying for their souls; Brotherhood in arms and soli-
darity; Gratitude towards the Soviet soldiers. 
Results
a mediation model was proposed such that reality discrepancy and cynicism were 
expected to be negative predictors of Katyń forgiveness, which in turn was expected 
a positive predictor of compassion (empathy) related to the military mausoleum. re-
sults of the mediation model are presented in figure 3. They are highly supportive for 
our theoretical reasoning.
Figure 3 A mediation model of influence reality discrepancy, cynicism and forgiveness toward 
russians on compassion in polish – russian relations
Notes: N = 302; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .,05; t = tendency
all three mediation paths from reality Discrepancy to red army cemetery 
Compassion are significant. Reality discrepancy is particularly effective as the 
origin predictor of all other variables. still, cynicism mediates its impact on war 
memorial compassion, including the double mediation through Katyń forgiveness 
(CI = [-.008 ; -.0002]). Thus, our hypotheses 3 and 4 are clearly confirmed. The 
distortion of a harmful historical reality brings about high levels of cynicism which 
inhibits positive humane tendencies among poles. also, forgiveness for harm af-
flicted to own group, is a condition for compassion towards outgroup’s victims.
General DIscussIon
Intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation has become an emerging topic in political, 
cross-cultural, and historically oriented psychology. this pull factor does not come 
from within psychology, but it constitutes a response of academic circles to sui generis 
political processes. our statement bears many important implications. the most im-
portant of them is the necessity of considering cultural – historical context in any 
study which sets comparative goals. thus, we are facing a true dilemma: comparisons 
broaden our conceptual horizons and the level of generalization; but at the same time, 
comparisons may be difficult or impossible, because context variables make them 
so. essential for these contextual variables are political acts of apology and remorse; 
symbolic gestures by political leaders that push the process of reconciliation to the 
citizens who become participants in our studies.
2 This is one of difficult symbolic problems left as a legacy of communism in Poland and in other 
post-communist countries. there exist strong political tendencies to remove these monuments from 
the public space, where they served the purpose of manifesting soviet dominance. War memorials 
are usually spared in such debates, though.
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polish – German and polish – russian relations could be seen as an ideal situation 
for this kind of research. yet, our three studies have clearly shown that any direct 
comparison is impossible at this time, because political process in both cases swerved 
in different directions. We have witnessed a progressed process of reconciliation be-
tween Germany and poland; the two neighbors became close allies in many euro-
pean and world issues. the two-way road between Berlin to Warsaw is fast, easy and 
non-eventful. at the same time, the distance between moscow and Warsaw has been 
extended in all possible dimensions. alliance, however limited has been replaced by 
open antagonism. The conflicting present time froze the difficult and unsolved past.
Our research findings reflect these general considerations. With Germany, real acts 
of penance expressed by political leaders, and their perception as genuine, contribute 
to poles’ forgiveness, and diminish the negative impact of harm on forgiveness. this 
process can be seen as gradual restoration of moral order. 
since a similar process of reconciliation between poland and russia has not been ini-
tiated, it is impossible to refer to any analogous or modeling events in polish - russian 
relationships. With no apologies, forgiveness is suspended in a cultural vacuum. If real-
ity distortions are interpreted as a concealed harm, we get a very strong evidence, that it 
works as a hindrance to forgiveness and compassion, aided by cynicism, which emerges 
from this discrepancy. nostalgia after old good times (i.e. communism) cannot be seen 
as a sound base for relationship improvement. yet, close cultural distance between po-
land and russia (House et al., 2004; Boski, 2009) should not be overlooked either.
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IntroDuctIon
In 1899 Rudolf Kjellén introduced the concept of geopolitics in scientific language. 
In over 100 years of existence, geopolitics went through some of the most compli-
cated experiences, but remained at the same time one of the most flexible sciences. 
Geopolitics, while continuing to be considered an extended method, as a study “com-
missioned” by political interest, gradually comes out of these patterns and becomes 
a support for possible solutions to about all issues raised by politics. seen initially as 
the study of the relationship between power and territory, it gradually began to also 
include economic, social, cultural, and demographic aspects. the recent dynamics of 
geopolitical science approaches is also accentuated by the current socio-economic 
and political context. We live in a world marked by profound changes. Within only 
70 years humanity has experienced a range of changes in all aspects. the end of 
the second World War resulted in a bipolar world governed by a set of relatively 
well-defined international relations. Instead, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the geo-
political map knows great changes. International relations are dominated by intense 
dynamics, hegemonic entities interchange and the bipolar world becomes, at least for 
now, multipolar. this new world has changed in the last 25 years not only in its demo-
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aBstract
the research is focused on the analysis of the 
migration phenomenon in romania, in terms of 
the geopolitical effects it has produced. migra-
tion from romania is relevant given its size; cur-
rently about 13% of the population is outside the 
country. this situation is the result of the events 
of the past 25 years: the opening of borders 
in early 1990, traveling visa-free in schengen 
areas granted to romanian citizens in early 
2002; romania’s accession to the european 
union in 2007; the total elimination of labour 
market restrictions for romanians, beginning 
January 1, 2014. these steps have generated 
specific patterns of migration: immediately af-
ter 1990, there was ethnic migration, economic 
migration started after 1995, and economically 
unmotivated migration, which we call cultural 
aspiration migration, started after 2010.
the article explores the effects of romanian mi-
gration in quantitative, demographic, economic 
and political terms. Migration flows and their 
direction are highlighted quantitatively and de-
mographically. From an economic point of view, 
we considered the positive and negative aspects 
of Romanian migration. As a benefit, we note 
the phenomenon of remittances and the positive 
effect on GDp. a drawback is represented by the 
negative effects on the social security system. 
Politically, we highlighted the influences of Ro-
manian migrants in setting the political scene in 
the country.
The findings show that Romanian migrants have 
a significant role in shaping Romanian realities. 
Their influence is significant both economically 
and politically.
the research uses statistical data provided by 
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graphic composition but also in terms of borders, number of states, etc. For example, 
in 1990, in europe, there were 39 states. In 2014, there were 50 recognized sovereign 
states. to these are added six more territories partially recognized. From 1980 until 
2012, the continent’s population increased from 695 million to 742 million inhabit-
ants (population Division of the Department of economic and social affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat, 2013). The number of immigrants has grown significantly 
over the past 25 years. For example, 50 years ago, the share of foreign born on the 
overall population in Germany and spain (two of the favorite current destinations 
for migrants) was below 1% (Dustmann, Frattini, 2011). at present, however, this 
level is of 14.5% in Germany and 13% in spain. By comparison, the us had a level 
of 13.6% in 1900, and currently the level is 12.5%. In fact, for a long time, europe 
was only a source of migrants. Since the 1500s, migration flows were mainly directed 
from europe to america, africa, asia and oceania. (altman, 1995; Heffernan, 1995; 
lucassen, 1995; tinker, 1995). subsequently, the nineteenth century is marked by 
flows to Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, migrants coming 
mainly from Britain, Italy, norway, portugal, spain, and sweden (Ferenczi, 1929; 
massey, 1988). migratory movements were slowed by the First World War, the Great 
Depression of the late 20s and then the second World War (massey, 1995). the direc-
tion changes in the 60s, europe becoming a destination, but mainly for non-european 
citizens. the phenomenon was caused primarily by the disappearance of overseas 
colonies held by Britain, the netherlands, portugal, and spain. these countries are the 
main destinations of migrants coming to europe. the largest groups come from out-
side europe, about 1.8 million people from north africa, Indochina (former French 
colonies), 1 million from the colonies in africa held by portugal and about 300,000 
from the former Dutch colonies in the east Indies. a smaller number of migrants come 
to europe from the former British and Belgian colonies in africa (emmer, lucassen, 
2012). To these migration flows is added migration for work, especially to Germany. 
this country, with a diminished active population after the second World War en-
couraged migrants coming for work. In the 60s came mostly turks and, to a smaller 
number, serbs. In fact, the serbs are the only nationals of a communist country who 
during the cold War had the right to free movement. at that time, the movement of 
persons on the route east-west was restricted because of the ideological asymmetries 
that dominated the two military-political blocs. the only population movements on 
this route (except serbs, mentioned above) were those of illegal migrants, i.e., those 
who illegally crossed the border of communist states in order to reach the West.
the phenomenon acquires new features in the 90s when europe became marked by 
intense migratory intracontinental flows. The geopolitical and social context created 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall significantly shaped migration, opening the possibility 
of movement of people from eastern europe to Western europe. the fall of the Iron 
curtain allowed the free movement of population from eastern europe to the West. 
subsequently, the dissolution of the ussr in 1991 and the war in yugoslavia between 
1990 and 1994 have led to new waves of migration. the phenomenon, somewhat 
timid at first, due to more restrictive legislation conditions, accelerated with EU en-
largement and the liberalization of the labour market for its citizens. the continuous 
increase in the number of migrants has made it become an important phenomenon of 
current social realities in europe.
For example, 70% of the population immigrated to Ireland comes from other eu 
countries. this level is 21% in the uK, this country still maintaining a high level of 
immigrants from south asia (about a third). at the same time, for example, 2.7 million 
people left only from romania, or nearly 13% of the population (eurostat, 2014).
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this paper examines international migration in romania in terms of geopolitics. 
the discussion about a geopolitics of migration is absolutely grounded, especially 
if we assume that migration is a fundamental dimension of demographic, economic 
and political dynamics. In addition, the extent of the phenomenon, just at european 
level, in the past 25 years reinforces the need for a discussion about the geopolitics 
of migration.
lIterature reVIeW
The role of migration in geopolitical analysis is addressed in several studies, significant 
and recent being those made by Grosfoguel (1997), tesfahuney (1998), nagel (2002), 
Hyndman (2012). although these studies are not focused on the situation in europe, 
for example, Gosfoguel analyzes the relation between migration and geopolitics in the 
caribbean, tesfahuney explores the relationship between mobility, racism and geo-
politics, and nagel focuses on the problem of assimilation policies, the idea of the in-
terdependence between migration and geopolitics clearly emerges. Initially, migration, 
approached in terms of geopolitical logic, was seen as a phenomenon that can affect 
the stability and security of a state. In fact, Western europe immigration is perceived by 
some authors as an “invasion” (de Haas, 2008; Hyndman, mountz, 2008; tesfahuney, 
1998). approached in terms of race, gender and class, immigration in europe is often 
considered a threat to the economic, political and social development of the continent 
(mamadouh, 2012). of course, these approaches are not absolute; there are countless 
views that treat migration positively, such as those made by Taylor (1999) or León-
ledesma, miguel, and matloob piracha (2004). they emphasize the role of remittan-
ces as a positive effect on the economy of countries of origin. Whatever the approach, it 
is clear that migration can be considered a barometer of geopolitics (Hyndman, 2012). 
putting migration in relation to geopolitics is easiest through the population. one of 
the important dimensions of geopolitics is the population. a territory without popula-
tion means nothing. migration means population, not only in terms of quantity (either 
surplus or too little), but also in terms of quality (human capital). From auguste comte 
who said that “demography is destiny”, we thus identify the important role of migra-
tion in any geopolitical equation. the role of population and implicitly of migration 
in configuring the geopolitical map can also be decrypted from other studies focused 
mainly on the idea of quantification of geopolitical dimensions. Migration determines 
the policy and population changes, generated also by migration, affect the power of 
a state. In this way, the term “Druckquotient” introduced by geopolitician alexander 
supan (1924) is well known. In geopolitical, it expreses the demographic pressure 
exerted on a country by its neighbors. migration affects in terms of demographics both 
the country of destination and the country of origin. therefore, demographic pressure 
is influenced by migration. In fact, migration represents a loss (in population) for some 
and a gain (in population) for others (Weinar, 2014).
the idea of geopolitics of migration may sound strange for many people in the 
eu. one of the most recent works that address the geopolitics of migration is that of 
roderick parkes (2015). migration is considered a form of ideological and cultural 
cross-border interaction. It highlights the fact that migration has become an object of 
geopolitical competition. migration is seen as a triumph of economic interdependence 
on territorial order.
In this research, we treated geopolitics of migration through three dimensions: de-
mographic, political and economic. We felt that these three dimensions give value 
to the concept of geopolitics. We analyzed the demographic, economic and political 
effects produced by migration from romania.
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tHe GenesIs  oF  romanIan mIGratIon. 
DemoGrapHIc anD General socIo-polItIcal aspects
until 1989, romania was not an important reference on the map of european or in-
ternational migration. The only significant population movements, by the time men-
tioned, were those posed by migration especially from transylvania to the new World. 
It should be noted that this happened in the second half of the 1800s. at that time, 
transylvania was part of the austro-Hungarian empire. therefore, migration from 
transylvania to north america was part of a larger phenomenon that occurred in the 
entire austro-Hungarian empire and which amounted to almost 4.5 million people. 
Between 1875 and 1914 (egyed, 1970), around 250,000 people left transylvania, 
given that the population of the entire province was 4.8 million.
However, some interesting migratory phenomena occurred during the communist 
period. We are referring to asylum seekers and the departure of ethnic Germans and 
Hebrews. With the establishment of the communist regime in romania, the western 
border (with former yugoslavia, led by a socialist regime still allowing the free move-
ment of persons) became the only point through which those who wanted to escape 
from the communist camp could leave the country. there are no accurate statistics on 
the extent of this phenomenon. It is supposed that over 16,000 Romanians tried to flee 
across the border only between 1980 and 1989, 12,000 of whom were caught (steiner, 
Magheţi, 2009). Therefore, this is not a far-reaching phenomenon but rather one with 
a political and emotional impact.
another phenomenon is the departure of ethnic Germans from romania. a more 
special form of migration, if we consider that many of them left as a result of govern-
mental agreements between Federal Germany and romania. the communist regime 
in Bucharest charged a fee for each ethnic German who was to leave the country. the 
fee was paid by the German Government. secret negotiations between romania and 
Germany have resulted in about 230,000 saxons and swabians leaving the country 
from 1962 to 1989 (Banu, 2011). the same format was used for the departure of He-
brews from Romania. According to official Israeli data, between 1950 and 1990, in 
Israel established 242,827 Hebrews coming from romania, all of them being sold by 
communist governments of that time (Ioanid, 2005).
Graph 1 Migration flows, Romania 1990–2012
Source: Eurostat, Immigration by five year age group, sex and citizenship
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In 1989, romania put an end to a period of 40 years of communism. like the other 
countries of the former eastern bloc, democracy also brought the much-needed free-
dom of movement. Gradually, migration from romania becomes a widespread social 
phenomenon being subject. at the same time, to conditioning inherent to political 
dynamics.
Immediately after 1990, there is a migration boom in romania. the dynamics of 
migration, starting with 1990, is shown in chart 1. according to eurostat (2014), 
for the period 1990-2010, the flow of migrants from Romania only to EU countries 
ranged from 30,092 in 1997 (the lowest level) to 555,797 in 2007 (the highest level).
Freedom of movement first set in motion the German or Hungarian ethnic popula-
tion. With existing support networks through relatives or friends, they chose to leave 
the country immediately after 1989. 60 thousand Germans left romania only in 1990, 
followed by another 15 thousand in 1991. these numbers have also been supplemen-
ted by yet many other romanians who already had relatives in foreign countries (who 
ran/left abroad during the communist period). Thus, in the first stage, we dealt with 
family reunification migration and ethnic migration. This has substantially changed 
the ethnic map of romania’s population, as can be seen in table 1.
Table 1 romania’s population by ethnicity
1992 2002 2011
total 22,810,035 21,698,181 20,121,641
romanians 20,408,542 19,409,400 16,792,868
Hungarians 1,624,959 1,434,377 1,227,623
roma 401,087 535,250 621,573
Germans 119,462 60,088 36,042
ukrainians 65,764 61,353 50,920
russians 38,606 36,397 23,487
turks 29,832 32,596 27,698
tatars 24,596 24,137 20,282
serbs 29,408 22,518 18,076
slovaks 19,594 17,199 13,654
Bulgarians 9,851 8,092 7,336
croatians 4,085 6,786 5,408
Greeks 3,940 6,513 3,668
Hebrews 8,955 5,870 3,271
czechs 5,797 3,938 2,477
poles 4,232 3,671 2,543
Italians 1,356 3,331 3,203
armenians 1,957 1,780 1,361
other groups 7,246 18,950 18,524
unreported 766 5,935 1,236,810
Source: romanian census 1992, 2002 and 2011
the ratio changes only by 1993–1994, when immigrants become majority ethnic 
romanians. However, this happens amid the general decrease in the volume of immi-
grants (see chart 1) and amid the appearance of travel restrictions and the elimination 
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of political asylum for romanian citizens. It should be noted that in the early 90s, 
many romanians who left requested political asylum in the West. In 1992 alone there 
were 116,000 applications (ethnobarometer, 2004).
another important moment in the geopolitics of romanian migration is the travel 
visa-free in the schengen area starting January 1, 2002. this is also the moment that 
marks the beginning of massive migration from romania. the upward trend is main-
tained until the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. In addition, with the roma-
nian’s accession to the eu, the development of new (easier) policies for the movement 
and labour of romanian citizens is strongly emphasized in 2007 (see chart 1). Basi-
cally, with romania’s integration into the european union, labour migration becomes 
the most significant. From a country that for a long time has not stood out either as a 
major source nor destination for migration, after 2000, in the overall pattern of intra-
european migration, romania has become one of the main suppliers of migrants.
the full liberalization of the labour market for romanian citizens starting January 
2014 is the most recent moment with effects on romanian migration, but perhaps 
also the one with the deepest geopolitical significance. The fear of an invasion of 
romanian immigrants generated extensive reactions in the media in many countries. 
The most significant are the British press media campaigns such as that of the Guard-
ian entitled “Don’t come to england” or the recent documentary (2015) released by 
chanel 4 entitled “the romanians are coming”. However, the total liberalization 
of the labour market has not generated significant flows of Romanian migrants. The 
explanation is that the romanian migration pattern is changing. If in the 90s there was 
ethnic migration, and in 2000 there was labour migration, now we can rather speak 
of a cultural aspiration migration. the reasons for leaving are not ethnic or economic 
but rather social and cultural. those that leave are not necessarily economically moti-
vated, but socially and psychologically. It is the general dissatisfaction towards social 
reality first and only secondarily to the economic aspects.
polItIcal DImensIons oF  romanIan mIGratIon
probably, politically, one can observe how important the psychological and emotional 
dimension is for the behavior of romanian migrants. Given that currently about 13% 
of the romanian population is abroad, it is almost impossible that this will not gene-
rate effects on the political environment in romania. electoral moments are most 
evident in this regard. although the presence of romanian migrants at the vote, rela-
tive to their total, is not very high (between 5% and 10%), the effect which they cause, 
however, is significant (Table 2). For example, the diaspora vote is heavily oriented 
towards right-wing parties (central election Bureau of romania, 2009, 2014), even 
when the migrant is in countries with leftist governments. the problem starts from 
realities perceived rather than real. this is due to the fact that left politics in romania 
is assimilated with the former communist party. therefore, in the migrant’s view on 
the political reality there are two conflicting plans: left, which means communism and 
right which means Western welfare. Given that elections are won at little difference 
(0.68% in 2009 and 9.01% in 2014, see table 3, col. 4), the percentages of votes com-
ing from the diaspora and heavily oriented to the right (idem, 2009; 2014) acquire 
importance. Basically, both in 2009 and in 2014, the diaspora decided the winner.
The political effect of the Romanian migrant is also amplified by the role of the 
social network and the influence exerted by the migrant on the country. Migrants 
who left before 1990 or immediately after have not developed strong relationships 
with those who remained in the country. Besides, being an ethnic or family reunion 
migration, their social network in romania was modest. after 2000, however, we are 
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dealing with migration for work. this meant that only a member or few members of 
the extended family initially went abroad to enhance the income of the family but 
there was an important network of friends and relatives left in the country. thus, the 
link between migrants and those left at home is very present, moreover becoming in-
creasingly tight. the growing technological development contributes greatly to these 
aspects. Forms of virtual interaction such as Facebook or skype make the connection 
between romanian migrants and those at home very easy. ten years ago, the possibi-
lity of communicating by phone was extremely difficult (in financial terms). Currently 
there are telephone companies that offer alternatives focused on the needs of roma-
nian migrants: free or very cheap calls to/from Italy/spain etc. these aspects highlight 
the dependency relations between those who left and those at home and facilitate 
the circulation of influences. In Romanian culture, the person who moves to the city 
(either to study or just to work) is regarded positively. the opinion of the person who 
left is considered more grounded because he/she is better informed, more educated, 
knows more, and is taken into account. The same logic is applied to the influences 
exerted by the diaspora in the country. their opinion is taken into account by those 
at home because they “know the world, democracy, have access to information” etc. 
It is hard for the person who stayed at home, usually an elder (parent, grandparent) to 
resist the influence exerted by the young emigrant.
In this context, the diaspora’s political influence is major, not only in terms of turn-
out to vote but especially through the influence they exert on those left at home.
economIc ImplIcatIons oF  romanIan mIGratIon
economic analysis, as part of geopolitical analysis, is closely related to the economic 
structure, its interdependencies, resources, and population. economic networks of 
migrants introduce a very complex dimension in geopolitical analysis. economies 
are interdependent and political borders may sometimes conflict with economic ones. 
economic implications of migration analysis take into account the dynamics of work 
force, the economic wellbeing of migrants, their relations with the country of origin, 
etc. one of the main dimensions of current romanian migration is labour migration. 
therefore, it has a direct economic dimension. Work force mobility generates both 
positive and negative effects on romania or destination countries. the immediate 
positive effect at home takes the form of remittances. their value is not at all negligi-
ble, sometimes reaching 4 – 4.5 of GDP (Table 3). The flow of remittances to Roma-
nia comes in a proportion of about 81% from the EU, which it is significant only in 
4 cases (Italy, Spain, Hungary and Germany). The first two countries of destination of 
romanian mobile workers in the eu give almost 59% of all remittances incoming on 
official channels in Romania (World Bank, 2014).
Despite the change in Romanian migrant flows after 2007 (see Chart 1), Ro-
mania is the 4th remittance receiving country in eastern europe and central asia, 
with an average value of $3 billion annually (after ukraine, russia and tajikistan). 
Table 2 Difference between loser and winner votes, the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections
1 2 3 4
elections Votes expressed by the diaspora percentages
Difference between the 
winner/loser (%)
2009 146,876 0.97% 0.68%
2014 377,651 3.3% 9.01%
Source: central election Bureau of romania 2009 and 2014
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table 3 highlights the value of remittances sent to romania by romanian immigrants 
in the period 2003–2013, and the percentage of GDp represented by them.
regarding the destination of remittances, there are no relevant statistical data for 
romania. there are studies (orozco, 2003) showing that approximately 80% of remit-
tances are used for basic household consumption, and between 5-10% are used for in-
vestment in human capital (education, health, nutrition). the difference may include: 
purchase of land, housing, etc., often seen as migrant assets, a small portion is spent 
on social and cultural events, for the payment of loans, savings, and a very small part 
in creating productive activities. It is difficult to assess the role of remittances in long-
term economic growth. Given, however, the important share they have in romania’s 
GDp (see table 3), we can say that the country’s economy is sensitive to european 
economic dynamics.
although remittances do not solve social crises, they act as a safety net for a large 
number of families. undoubtedly, they represent the positive dimension of migra-
tion for romania. But this phenomenon is accompanied by one with a negative di-
mension, namely the migration of skills or the phenomenon of brain drain. For ro-
mania, there is no data on the extent of this phenomenon. there are no very precise 
statistics on the number of romanian specialists, on socio-professional categories, 
who chose to go abroad but only general data on which one can infer the magnitude 
of the phenomenon. For example, only after 2007, over 15,000 physicians left. the 
state has invested about 3.5 billion euros (romanian college of physicians, 2015) 
in their training.
But the major negative dimension of migration, economically speaking, is the re-
duction of the tax base. the existence of a large segment of the economically active 
population who emigrates affects the tax base, revenues to the state budget and, es-
pecially, the sustainability of social security systems. Migration affects the financing 
of social security systems by reducing the mass of taxpayers. a recent forecasting 
(panzaru, 2015) shows that the sustainability of pensions for old age pensioners will 
disappear in 2015 (in 2020, only 87% of pensions will be supported) and in terms of 
total number of pensioners, the system is already deficient, since in 2010 only 80% 
of the pension could be supported directly from revenues received as contributions 
from taxpayers. the ratio of income received and expenditure on pensions will reach 
0.41 in 2060, i.e., only 41% of the pension will be paid. under these conditions, the 
number of taxpayers should be supplemented with nearly 1.5 million in 2015, about 
2.5 million in 2025–2030 (when the peak volume of pensioners will be recorded) and 
more than 3 million in 2055–2056 (when the population employed and the number 
of taxpayers will record the most dramatic decrease). only some of them may come 
from the active population (in terms of increasing employed population), but the vast 
majority will have to be ensured through migration.
although, on the short-term and from an economic point of view, migration can 
have positive effects, for example by reducing the potential candidates for unemploy-
ment aid and the increased flow of money from abroad in the form of remittances, on 
the long-term, economic and social risks are major.
Table 3 remittances ($)
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bill. € 0.11 0.11 3.81 5.36 6.24 6.41 3.54 3.41 2.70 2.86 2.72
% GDp 0.21 0.17 4.79 5.48 5.04 4.59 3.00 2.74 2.05 2.16 1.93
Source: World Bank and own calculation
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conclusIons
europe currently absorbs 2 million migrants every year, more as a proportion of the 
population than any other part of the world, including north america. even if we are 
dealing with a mixed migration – refugees and labour migration – the latter prevails. 
labour mobility has both positive and negative effects on the countries of origin or 
destination. It is difficult to balance these aspects and assess the extent to which labour 
migration has produced benefits or not. For example, European Commission assess-
ments consider that immigration “contributed significantly to employment growth in 
the eu in recent years” (platonova, urso, 2010, p. 257) thus, within the preced-
ing onset of the economic crisis (2000–2007), according to european commission 
estimates, migrants from third countries contributed to an increase in the employed 
labour force with almost 3.7 million people, representing about a quarter of its total 
growth (idem, p. 260). Between 1994 and 2004, spain has created over 6 million jobs, 
of which one third was occupied by migrants. norway has created about 250,000 jobs 
between 2000 and 2008, almost half of which being occupied by migrants.
This influx of people changed the configuration of Member States population more 
than birth rate and mortality. But the effects are not only economic. migration links 
countries through their economies and cultures and facilitates the mobility of ideas 
and cultural values. migration affects the individual and national cultural identity of 
both migrants and their hosts (triandafyllidou, 2001, p. 89). migration changes the 
size, ethnicity and age structure of populations; it alters the cultural, religious and 
linguistic composition of societies; and enriches or impoverishes the social and eco-
nomic strata of society (castles, 2000, p. 12).
In this picture of european migration, romania is one of the major suppliers of 
migrants. therefore, romania provides an excellent research opportunity in inter-
national migration. analyzing romanian migration can identify the socio-economic 
and political effects of migration, both in the country of origin and in the country of 
destination.
From an economic point of view, the main advantage of the migration of romani-
ans is reflected in increased value of remittances. Given the significant share of remit-
tances in GDp, we can undoubtedly say that these are resources used for development 
and growth. on the other side, however, we are dealing with the negative effects of 
migration on the social security system. the existence of a large segment of the eco-
nomically active population who emigrate affects the tax base, revenues to the state 
budget and, especially, the sustainability of social security systems.
politically, the role of migration is undeniable. culture and the experience of mi-
gration has contributed to the country’s political scene reconfiguration. The new Ro-
manian diaspora consists of those who went to work after 2000. the main feature of 
this new diaspora is that it is more tied to the country, in almost simultaneity coordi-
nates. this diaspora has learned democracy in the West and now becomes more active 
and willing to speak on politics in romania. In addition, the experience of the West 
does not belong only to the actual migrant, but (indirectly) belongs to his/her entire 
social network. technological development and technology enables sharing migration 
experiences with those left at home and therefore facilitates the circulation of ideas 
and influences.
On the other hand, Romanians abroad have a specific profile, are more critical of 
the situation in romania, and sanction any aspect not only by view but also by at-
titude.
Beyond the quantitative aspects of romanian migration, the phenomenon also 
has a pronounced qualitative side. the presence of migrants in the european space 
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generates specific public agendas. Thus, the discussion on the presence of immigrants, 
including romanians, puts in opposition the projects to restrict access to the labour 
market of immigrants and the european commission paradigm that prohibits member 
states to discriminate against its own citizens, “and those of other member countries”. 
although discussions have not yet generated effects on the immigrant status in any of 
the eu countries, this debate is a good example of how the issue of migration (legal 
and illegal) can turn into a meta-problem with ample economic, social and societal 
reverberations.
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During his 2011 address to the society for personality and social psychology (spsp) 
annual meeting in san antonio, Jonathan Haidt stressed that the whole discipline of 
social psychology has become a “tribal moral community”, with its own taboos and 
danger zones. He claimed that psychologists today are much more homogeneous in 
terms of political ideology than in the 1960s, the great majority of researchers align-
ing with the liberal left and almost no one sympathising with the conservative right 
(Haidt, 2011). 
 Interestingly, empirical studies reported left wing skew among psychologists as 
early as in the 1960s. among academic psychologists of that time, 78% held left-wing 
ideologies, whereas 22% defined themselves as Republican (McClintock, Spaulding, 
turner, 1965). current research on the topic (Jussim et al., in press) suggests that the 
left-right ratio in current psychology is even more unbalanced, reaching the propor-
tion of 10:1. 
IDEOLOGICAL DISTINCTION. THE POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS 
IN THE EAST AND WEST
MICHAŁ BILEWICZ, PAULINA GÓRSKA
University of Warsaw
aleKsanDra cIcHocKa
University of Kent, Canterbury
ZSOLT PÉTER SZABÓ
University of Pecs
address correspondence to: bilewicz@psych.uw.edu.pl
this research was supported by the polish ministry of science and Higher education Iuventus plus 
Grant IP2014 002273 to the first author.
aBstract
the problem of “liberal bias” among perso-
nality and social psychologists has been widely 
discussed in recent years (Haidt, 2011; Duarte 
et al., in press; Inbar, lammers, 2012). most 
of these discussions extrapolated findings ob-
served in american and Western european so-
cial psychology to the whole discipline. this 
article presents a first insight into regional dif-
ferences in the political opinions of Western, 
and eastern social psychologists. Based on 
the characteristics of intellectuals in eastern 
european countries as reproducers of existing 
structures of dependence, we hypothesised that 
eastern european psychologists would not ex-
press a “liberal bias” but instead, at least in the 
domain of economic opinions, that they would 
support rather conservative political solutions. 
an empirical study of social psychologists 
from Hungary, poland, the usa and the uK 
supported this hypothesis. Furthermore, it was 
demonstrated that, despite forming the majo- 
rity in the field of social psychology, Polish sup-
porters of a free market economy were reluctant 
to express their views in public. Finally, based 
on the european Values survey, we compared 
the economic attitudes of european social psy-
chologists with the attitudes prevalent in their 
countries (i.e. Hungary, poland and the uK). 
this comparison suggested that Hungarian 
and polish social psychologists hold more pro-
capitalist stances on economic issues than the 
poorest segments of the societies they live in, 
whereas British social psychologists supported 
state interventionism to a greater extent than the 







the only existing empirical study of the population of personality and social psy-
chologists (Inbar, lammers, 2012) was based on two surveys of 774 members of the 
spsp, a professional association comprising mainly american social psychologists. 
The results of the study confirmed that only 6% of SPSP members declared con-
servative political opinions. the study has been criticised for several methodological 
shortcomings (e.g. skitka, 2012), such as a lack of adequate representativeness for the 
studied population. obviously, a study performed on a sample that includes more than 
80% of americans is not representative of the global population of personality and 
social psychologists.
the authors of recent alarming articles about “liberal bias” in modern psychology 
(Jussim et al., in press; Duarte et al., in press) suggest that a hostile workplace atmos-
phere and direct discrimination may be key reasons for the disproportionally high 
number of liberals among academic social psychology.
another potential explanation for the left-wing skew among social and personality 
psychologists points to the specificity of research practices in academia, and the ob-
servation that it reflects liberal goals and values (Prentice, 2012). Sociologist Robert 
K. Merton (1942), who analysed the specificity of academic work, defined four institu-
tional imperatives that comprise the ethos of contemporary science: universalism, com-
munism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism. this list of values clearly suggests 
the link between scientific codes of conduct and the values typical of the political left 
(cf. tetlock, mitchell, 2015). potentially, this could contribute to the self-selection pro-
cess that might ultimately create a liberal skew in personality and social psychology.
In this article we would like to suggest that the discussion on the “liberal bias” is 
based on an American-centric perception of the field of social psychology, negating 
the character of the field in the other parts of the world. Additionally, we would like 
to propose an alternative explanation for the dominant political ideologies in persona-
lity and social psychology, derived from the concepts of distinction (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Zarycki, 2014) and social identity processes (tajfel, turner, 1986) among people of 
high socio-economic status.
IDeoloGIcal DIstInctIons amonG eastern european 
Intellectuals
sociologists studying the cultural habits of eastern european intellectuals, the intelli-
gentsia, stress the fact that highly educated members of post-communist societies tend 
to form a distinctive cultural elite that reproduces the existing structures of depen- 
dence (Warczok, Zarycki, 2014; Zarycki, 2014). contrary to the Western intellectuals 
who support socially critical alternatives to the dominant discourse about politics and 
economy, the eastern european intelligentsia tend to play the role of interpreters of the 
dominant discourse, promoting capitalist ideologies even when using the same concepts 
as their american or Western european colleagues (Warczok, Zarycki, 2014). 
this strategy allows eastern european intellectuals to create a distinction between 
themselves and lower socio-economic groups in their society, being at the same time at 
the forefront of the Westernising discourse in their countries. the rapid transition from 
communism into a free market economy left large sections of these societies disenfran-
chised, and encouraged the emergence of regional populist and nationalist movements 
(schields, in press). In opposition to this process, eastern european intelligentsia stressed 
their commitment to capitalist reforms and democratic political order. this affected also 
academic practices in social sciences: Western social researchers often seemed dissident 
in terms of politics and critically analysed existing political practices; whereas academ-
ics from eastern europe became part of the cultural elite in their countries, often appear-
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ing as governmental experts, engaged in the corporate world and acting as interpreters 
of the rapid transition (Bilewicz, olechowski, 2014; Warczok, Zarycki, 2014).
Based on this observation we assume that, contrary to the observations of Haidt 
(2011), eastern european social psychologists are more conservative in terms of the 
economy, thus supporting free market capitalism rather than welfare state solutions. 
In this respect, eastern psychologists differ from their Western counterparts – who 
would prefer a rather unidimensional left-wing ideology, combining a welfare-state 
economy with progressive social worldviews. such a divergence would correspond to 
the different relationships observed between social and economic dimensions of con-
servatism in Western and eastern societies (e.g. Duriez, Van Hiel, Kossowska, 2005). 
Whereas in the West the two are usually positively correlated (those who endorse 
traditional values and norms supporting a free market economy), this is not the case 
in eastern europe. In their policy programmes eastern european right-wing parties 
combine social conservatism either with state interventionism or pro-capitalist views. 
conversely, left-wing parties associate cultural liberalism with support either for a 
welfare state or a free market economy. 
In order to test our prediction, we decided to perform a cross-cultural study of 
social psychologists in four countries: two countries in post-communist central and 
eastern europe (poland and Hungary), and two countries in the english-speaking 
West (the united states of america and united Kingdom). Furthermore, we inves-
tigated if reluctance to express one’s political views in public is related to political 
ideology across the compared countries.
surVey oF socIal psycHoloGIsts
the survey was conducted at the beginning of october 2014 in four countries. We tar-
geted participants in two Western capitalist countries (the usa and the uK) and two 
post-communist eastern european countries (poland and Hungary). the respondents 
were contacted via mailing lists of the society for personality and social psycho-
logy (us), the British psychological society [social psychology section] (uK), and 
the polish society of social psychology (poland). In the case of Hungary, snowball 
sampling was employed. 
Respondents
one hundred and forty-two individuals participated in the study. Data from ten re-
spondents, who indicated areas of interest different to social or personality psycho-
logy, were excluded from analysis. the remaining sample included 132 participants: 
52 from the usa (57% female), 22 from the uK (76% female), 32 from Hungary 
(55% female) and 26 from poland (33% female). In all countries we included both 
senior faculty, as well as graduate students. 
Measures1
political orientation was measured by two items, which tapped different dimensions 
of ideology. the social issues item read: “What are your political views with regard 
to social issues (such as religion, gender roles, abortion or homosexuality)?”. partici-
1 apart from the described constructs, we measured other variables, including general political ori-
entation, perceived dominant political orientation in the field, and perceived discrimination due to 
political views. For the purpose of the current paper, only the data concerning participants’ political 
orientation in terms of social and economic issues and the reluctance to express one’s ideology in 
public were analysed. 
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pants indicated their responses on a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 = progressive/li- 
beral to 10 = traditional/conservative. the economic issues item read: “What are your 
political views with regard to economic issues (such as taxes or welfare state)?”. the 
response scale ranged from 1 = I support state interventionism to 10 = I support free 
market economy. 
reluctance to publicly display one’s political opinions was assessed by a single 
item: “are you reluctant to express your political views to your colleagues for fear 
of negative consequences?”. participants answered on a 10-point scale, ranging from 
1 = not at all to 10 = very much. 
results
East-West differences in political ideology
a two-way mixed-design analysis of variance tested the differences in social and 
economic opinions between psychologists from Western (usa and uK) and eastern 
european (Hungary and poland) countries. cultural area (east/West) served as the 
between-subjects factor; political views (social issues/economic issues) were treated 
as the within-subject factor. the results are presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 political orientation of social and personality psychologists in West (usa, uK) 
and eastern european (Hungary, poland) countries
as revealed by the results of two-way mixed-design anoVa, both the effect of 
cultural area, F(1, 130) = 83.95, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.39, and the effect of political views, 
F(1, 130) = 104.99, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.45, were significant. Social psychologists from 
eastern countries adhered more to conservative ideology (M = 4.72; SD = 1.71) than 
their counterparts from Western countries (M = 2.51; SD = 1.02). Furthermore, par-
ticipants reported more conservative attitudes with regard to economic (M = 4.68; 
SD = 2.39) as compared to social issues (M = 2.28; SD = 2.08). the main effects 
were qualified by a two-way interaction, F(1, 130) = 5.78, p = 0.018, η2 = 0.04. the 
difference between eastern and Western countries was more pronounced for the eco-
nomic, F(1, 130) = 65.82, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.34, than the social dimension of political 
attitudes, F(1, 130) = 23.02, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15,. In other words, social psycholo-
gists from Hungary and poland exceeded psychologists from usa and uK predomi-
nantly in terms of economic conservatism (MEast = 6.24, SDEast = 2.18; MWest = 3.46; 
SDWest = 1.76). the difference regarding social issues had the same direction 
(MEast = 3.19, SDEast = 2.68; MWest = 1.57; SDWest = 1.01) but lower magnitude. the gap 
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between economic and social views proved to be higher in eastern, F(1, 130) = 71.36, 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.35 than Western countries, F(1, 130) = 34.99, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21. 
social psychologists from Western countries declared more ideologically coherent 
views than their counterparts from central and eastern europe. 
Expression of political views
In order to assess if ideology predicted unwillingness to display one’s political views 
in public, we performed a series of linear regressions, separate for each country. 
Whereas social and economic conservatism were entered as predictors, reluctance to 
express one’s political views publicly served as a dependent variable. 
In most cases, political ideology did not explain variability of the reluctance to ex-
press political views. the only exception was poland, where economic conservatism 
(support for a free-market economy) positively predicted unwillingness to display 
one’s views among other social and personality psychologists, b = 0.63, SE = 0.21, 
p = 0.008. 
Comparison with nation-wide surveys
In order to compare economic views held by social psychologists with the opinions 
prevalent in their countries among people differing in socio-economic status, we used 
data from the european Values survey 2008 (eVs, 2010). the fourth wave of eVs was 
conducted in 47 countries, including Hungary, poland and the uK (eVs, GesIs, 2010). 
since the eVs does not include participants from the usa, we had to limit our compari-
sons to social psychologists coming from three european countries (two eastern europe-
an and one Western European). The following figures are based on weighted EVS data. 
neither question included in the eVs questionnaire exactly matched the item we 
used to assess psychologists’ economic views. thus, we selected the semantic dif-
ferential question (1 = individuals should take more responsibility for providing for 
themselves; 10 = the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for) as a proxy2. For the purpose of current comparisons, responses were 
recoded so that high scores reflected more conservative views. 
Figures 2–4 combine the results of both studies. Whereas the left vertical axis re-
flects the response scale used in our study of personality and social psychologists, the 
right vertical axis refers to the eVs answer format. the eVs responses are presented 
for five groups distinguished on the basis of annual household income. Horizontal 
lines reflect the means for social psychologists in specific countries. 
the eVs data revealed a positive correlation between economic conservatism and 
income in all analysed countries (rHungary = 0.11, p < 0.001, N = 1255; rPoland = 0.14, 
p < 0.001, N = 1081; rUnited Kingdom = 0.14, p < 0.001, N = 1079) – such that the lowest 
income groups expressed most left-wing economic opinions. combining the results of 
our study with eVs data shows that the relationship between the economic views of 
social psychologists and society in general differs across countries. In the uK, social 
and personality psychologists exhibited higher support for state interventionism than 
other social groups. This finding conforms to the notion of social criticism prevalent 
among Western intellectuals. 
In contrast, Hungarian psychologists proved to be more in favour of a free market 
economy than the general public, regardless of the economic status of the latter. this 
result is in line with our hypothesis assuming a pro-capitalist ideology of the well-edu-
cated groups in post-communist countries. the economic attitudes of polish social 
2 Due to the differences between measures used in the eVs and the current study, the following 
results should be interpreted with caution.
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psychologists were more conservative compared to the views of low-status groups, 
but more progressive than the ideologies held by the highest-status segments of soci-
ety. nevertheless, both polish and Hungarian psychologists supported a free market 
economy to a greater extent than the disadvantaged sections of their societies. 
DIscussIon
This survey of social psychologists in the East and West revealed significant diffe-
rences between eastern-european and Western social and personality psychologists. 
respondents from Hungary and poland were more conservative than their counter-
parts from the usa and the uK, especially with regard to economic issues. 
Figure 2 economic views of social psychologists and society in general (Hungary) 
The horizontal line reflects the mean for social psychologists. Bars represent sections 
of Hungarian society differing in annual household income.
Figure 3 economic views of social psychologists and society in general (poland)
The horizontal line reflects the mean for social psychologists. Bars represent sections 
of polish society differing in annual household income.
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a small and unbalanced sample size constitutes the main limitation of the study. 
a larger and more systematically collected sample would allow the formulation of 
more justified generalisations – similar to the findings of Inbar & Lammers (2012). 
nevertheless, the study provides initial evidence about the political differences be-
tween eastern and Western social psychologists.
our study supports Inbar and lammers’ (2012) argument that the number of social 
psychologists who are conservative in the social domain is relatively smaller than the 
number of economically conservative psychologists (supporters of an unconstrained free 
market economy). What is more, we have shown that this discrepancy is even more 
pronounced in eastern europe – here social psychologists would express mo-derately 
conservative economic opinions, whereas their social opinions would tend to be liberal.
the visible difference in the attitudes of east-european and West social psycholo-
gists could be attributed to differences in the political role of intellectuals in their 
countries. In that respect, psychologists form a part of the eastern european intel-
ligentsia – a cultural elite of the region that holds values and worldviews that sup-
port existing power structures (Warczok, Zarycki, 2014) and attach themselves to 
the ideology of “Westness”, represented as freemarket economy and rapid systemic 
transition (Zarycki, 2014). comparison of social psychologists with the income-de-
fined segments of their society shows that in the post-communist Eastern European 
countries (particularily in Hungary) the economic opinions of social psychologists 
resemble the opinions held by the upper-middle and upper classes of these societies. 
such economic opinions create a clear distinction between social psychologists and 
low-income groups in these societies, as the poorest poles and Hungarians clearly 
support left-wing economic solutions (that is, state interventionism in the economy). 
conversely, social psychologists in the West seem to maintain left wing liberal 
worldviews in both domains, economic and political. This reflects the findings ob-
served in other studies of this professional group (Inbar, lammers, 2012). on the 
other hand, our comparison of British social psychologists’ economic opinions with 
the opinions of different segments of British society shows that the economic views of 
Figure 4 economic views of social psychologists and society in general (uK)
 The horizontal line reflects the mean for social psychologists. Bars represent sections 
of British society differing in annual household income.
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social psychologists resemble those visible in the middle classes of British society. 
Quite interestingly, although polish psychologists supported a free market economy 
more than their Western counterparts, they preferred to conceal their right-wing econo-
mic opinions to avoid the negative reactions of others. It is possible that psychologists in 
eastern europe are aware of the prevalence of left wing and liberal ideology in american 
psychology (Haidt, 2011; Inbar, lammers, 2012). this awareness might lead to some 
form of self-censorship when communicating with other psychologists. at the same time, 
their own private economic attitudes tend more towards the right-wing, thus support-
ing the unconstrained free market economy and opposing welfare state solutions. Haidt 
(2011) and Duarte et al. (in press) called for a more politically diverse field of social psy-
chology. our research shows some initial evidence that the political diversity is already 
there: it can be found in other countries than united states of united Kingdom. What is 
missing, is the class diversity. political ideologies of psychologists in all studied countries 
resemble the ones of upper and middle classes of their respective societies, rather than the 
ideologies of low-status groups. It would require further research to examine how such 
class homogeneity of psychology affects their research interests and practices.
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